Wells Williams to Francis P. Knight, October 24, 1874

Mr. Williams to Mr. Knight.

Sir: I have received your dispatches of the 6th and 13th instant, with their inclosures of the correspondence, relating to the suspension of D. J. Haliday by the bar I or-master; and the reasons of your refusal, on the appeal of the former against this suspension, to agree thereto. The action of the harbor-master is based on the fact that Haliday had been sentenced in your consular court to a fortnight’s imprisonment for an assault and battery, and not for incompetence or wrong-doing as a pilot; and his authority for so doing is derived from Regulation VII of the pilot-service, under which rules the man agreed to serve as a pilot. The second paragraph of this regulation permits the harbor-master to suspend or dismiss a pilot for two causes, but this power is restrained by the right of the latter to appeal to his consul. This right necessarily involves the power of approval or reversal by the consul of the action of the harbor-master; and its repetition in the previous paragraph indicates the importance attached to it. The object in allowing an appeal was probably to protect the pilot from the capricious conduct of an irresponsible superior, and also to preserve the complete judicial control of the consul over his countrymen in regard to punishment of any kind. I do not regard, however, the suspension or dismissal of a pilot, under the circumstances stated, as of the nature of a judicial punishment; it is more like the dismissal or fining of a clerk in a counting-house because of his bad conduct.

In the present case, the man having appealed to you against the suspension of his license as a pilot, you have an undoubted right to reverse or approve the action of his superior; and I uphold your action as being within the letter and spirit of the regulation, Here the matter ends, so far as the regulation goes, for no appeal is provided from the consul’s decision. The harbor-master’s action is nullified in the premises, so far is I can see, and he can only report the case to his superiors.

But, with commendable regard for the benefit and safety of the shipping of the port, while deciding that Haliday shall receive back his license to act for the rest of the season, you appeal this decision yourself to this legation, and make the man’s resumption of his work next spring conditional on the decision of the United States minister. To his the harbor-master assents as an equitable solution of the difficulty, and the pile t-service receives no detriment.

I Look upon this appeal, however, in the light of a reference, or as an arbitration, ma le to reach a decision where a conflict of authority had arisen otherwise hard to reconcile, and not an appeal like those provided for in the act of Congress, from which it is totally different. The Chinese authorities might, however, appeal against your decision overruling their harbor-master, on the ground that it neutralized the efficiency of the pilot-service by compelling him to retain a man in whom he had no confidence, one who had disgraced himself and the body he belonged to by criminal conduct, for which he had received merited punishment from you. The wording of your decision has obviated that alternative.

I may remark that the efficiency, character, and standing of the whole body of pilots in the port are worth more than that of any one of its members; and to maintain those qualities the harbor-master is the best judge, and to him has been intrusted their control. His primitive action is confined to suspension or dismissal, but not to go into effect until a pilot under him has been tried and punished by his national authorities. He himself does not sit in judgment on the man’s conduct, but accepts the judgment already given in a consular court as conclusive of his moral character. The whole scope and spirit of this regulation is to enable the harbor-master to maintain the efficiency, character, and standing of the body of men he employs, and says not a word as to the skill or experience they possess as pilots. Regulation IV deals with their fitness as pilots, and Regulation VII with their moral character.

You bring forward the punishment inflicted on Haliday as a reason why he should not suffer more by being suspended, and argue that Captain Rennell has only to do with his conduct as a pilot. You state how much he had already suffered, and how much more he had done to atone for his wrong-doing, and regard the suspension of his license as if it were an additional punishment. I look upon it as a consequence of what he had done and suffered, a just warning for his cruelty and passion toward a defenseless woman. It is not his first nor his second offense either, nor the first time he has been punished in your court; and while you say that you would not interfere in behalf of a pilot convicted of theft, fraud, or manslaughter, or any serious charge connected with shipping or pilotage matters, as against Captain Rennell’s ruling, you are unwilling to let him decide in a case of assault. But I think you can properly allow him the scope of action allowed him in the seventh regulation, which includes all offenses for which punishment has been inflicted. Haliday himself puts forward this plea in his letter to you of the 1st instant, but I regard it as quite untenable.

While, therefore, I regard your reversal of the harbor-master’s action in suspending the pilot Haliday as coming within your consular powers, I cannot agree with you in the reasons brought forward in the letters now before me for this refusal. On a careful review of the facts herein stated, I decide that the harbor-master had sufficient grounds for suspending Haliday’s license, and may, if he pleases, refuse to return it to him in the coming spring.

I shall communicate a copy of this dispatch to the inspector-general.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,