Wells Williams to William H. Seward, August 11, 1874

Mr. Williams to Mr. Seward.

Sir: I have received your dispatch of the 26th of last June, (No. 374,) with its inclosures, relating to the case of Walter Jackson, a seaman belonging to the British ship Satsuma, who was charged with complicity in a case of piracy, and assault with intent to murder, on board that vessel, but who, having escaped to Shanghai, claimed your protection from arrest under a warrant from the British authorities of Hong-Kong, because of his being an American citizen.

This case presents some peculiarities which render it worthy a careful examination. The piracy is said to have been committed on or about the 29th of last January, and Mr. Austin’s letter is dated June 6, or more than four months after, during which interval it is not said where the ship went, or where Jackson escaped from her, but he had then been arrested in Shanghai as a British subject. He then applied to you for protection against this arrest, solely on the ground of his citizenship. You consented to protect him, and proposed to Mr. Austin to detain him until the government of Hong-Kong had had reasonable time to submit to you the evidence upon which the requisition was made; adding, as a reason, that you are “under no obligation to deliver Jackson, except in accordance with the provisions for the extradition of criminals, as settled by treaty between the respective governments.”

In my view the extradition treaty between the United States and Great Britain does not apply to this case at all; and if so, you bad consequently no power to interpose to prevent the rendition of Jackson from Shanghai by the municipal police on the warrant of the Hong-Kong government. It seems to me that the provisions of that treaty are intended to apply only to the territory of the United States, and they cannot be extended to the territory of the Emperor of China. Neither of the two governments in question has any need of an extradition treaty with China, for she has yielded all her rights over the persons of the subjects of both nations, and they cannot exchange or avoid their allegiance within her territory.

The phraseology of the treaty shows that crime must be committed within the jurisdiction of either, and that the criminals must have sought an asylum or be found within the territories of the other nation. This upholds my conclusion that Jackson, in the eye of the law, was still a British subject, and amenable to the laws of Great Britain. He was charged with piracy on British territory, and the British treaty with China gave the authorities of Hong-Kong power to claim him anywhere in her territory. But if a native-born British subject had committed piracy on board an American ship, and had fled to Hong-Kong to evade arrest from your consular warrant, the stipulations of the extradition treaty would properly guide your measures taken to execute a writ of habeas corpus, and bring him up for trial in your court in China, for the simple reason that that island is British territory. The essential element of that treaty being territorial jurisdiction, its stipulations could not apply in Jackson’s case, under the present circumstances, but would have done so if they had been reversed as above supposed.

The case of David Williams may be referred to. He was tried in your consular court in 1864 for piracy and murder, convicted, and sentenced to be hung, but appealed to the British consul to protect him because he was a Welshman by birth. The appeal was denied because the crime was committed under the American flag, though in Chinese waters; but neither party referred to the extradition treaty, which was felt to be totally inapplicable, because neither of them had territorial jurisdiction where the crime was committed.

Jackson could not escape his accountability for his crime by leaving his ship and fleeing to China, and there pleading his birthright of an American citizen, to exempt him from British jurisdiction, and your evident intention was to deliver him up as soon as the call was presented, but I conclude that you had no right to detain him.

If your interposition had any influence in preventing his trial and a merited punishment of his crime, I regret that it was extended to him, but rather infer that other things may have come to light to induce the authorities in Hong-Kong to abandon the prosecution.

I shall communicate a copy of this dispatch to the British minister here for transmission to Sir Arthur Kennedy.

I am, &c.,