Watson Webb to Rear-Admiral Charles H. Davis, October 9, 1868

Mr. Webb to Rear-Admiral Davis.

Sir: On returning from the United States consulate to the ferry, yesterday afternoon, when passing a Portuguese corner grocery, known as “Portuguese Joe’s,” the proprietor stopped my carriage and placed in my hands your official letter dated yesterday, October 8, in answer to my official letter of the 6th, delivered on board the Guerriere on the same day, by my secretary in person. Your letter is as follows:

“Sir: I owe you, perhaps, an apology for not having acknowledged sooner the reception of your letter of the 6th instant, in which you give me the unsolicited benefit of your opinion on the subject of my official duties.

“Since your opinion is formed without a knowledge of all the circumstances of the case, I may not, possibly, attach as much value to it as you seem to expect.”

There is no mistaking the purport of this language; although it does appear incredible to me that it should have been penned by you.

The first paragraph of your response to my letter of the 6th is, as subsequent reflection must have satisfied you, equally inaccurate and unjust. To demonstrate this declaration, I am compelled to go back to the origin of a difference of opinion which the tenor of your note aims to convert into a personally offensive correspondence.

Immediately on receiving and reading Mr. Washburn’s letter, which I did at the consulate on the 5th, I handed it to Fleet Surgeon Duvall to read and deliver to you; and while he was reading it, I addressed to you the following hasty note and handed it to the doctor, which you subsequently returned to me:

“Consulate, 11½.

“My Dear Admiral: I inclose for your perusal a letter from Washburn. I think we should talk over this matter and see if anything can be done to relieve the two members of the United States legation, so outrageously seized by Lopez. It is one of the cases in which to do nothing is to do wrong and it appears to me that the mere fact of sending up a force to look after our people would at least avert much reproach that will otherwise fall upon us.

* * * * * * *

“Your friend,

“J. WATSON WEBB.”

On my arrival on board you promptly indicated your unwillingness to act in the affair, and put to me the question, “What would you have me do?” I certainly did not consider that you thereby intended to ask my advice in the premises, because you took prompt measures to intimate that my advice was not desirable. But I understood then, as I do now, that, I having invited a friendly consultation on the subject, you were really desirous of knowing what it was I would have you do. To that question I replied at length in my letter of the 6th, and in that reply as I did not only stated my wishes as the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States accredited to Brazil, but, as it was my imperative duty to do, I gave you my reasons for desiring prompt and energetic action on your part in vindication of the honor of our country, as well as to afford protection to our much-abused citizens.

To what you allude as “official duties” I am quite unable to determine. Most assuredly I have not attempted to interfere with the administration of the affairs of your squadron, and I do not pretend even to have any knowledge of its internal condition. I have contented myself with the discharge of my duty in pointing out to you what in my judgment the honor and dignity of our country demand, and wherein our people require that protection which it is made the duty of our navy to afford; and to secure which is the sole object of your presence here, at the cost of many millions annually to the public treasury. In doing this I have not gone beyond the strict line of my duty, as better information in regard to what a minister’s duty is, in an emergency like the present, cannot fail to convince you. But I might have gone still further than I did, and not only have pointed out your duty and advised you what to do, but finding you tardy in recognizing your duty in the premises, and ignoring the testimony of United States officials and adopting the charges and rumors of the Brazilian press and of Americans in Brazilian employ, I might with great propriety have formally remonstrated against your supineness and your rejection of official testimony, while you indorsed the slanders put forth against Mr. Washburn by those whose interest it is to traduce him.

When I addressed you my letter of the 6th, I regretted the necessity of so doing, and dreaded an official collision between friends. Your letter of yesterday has completely eradicated all those regrets. Its deliberate ignoring of a minister’s having any opinion whatever in regard to matters relative to which he should be far better posted than under any circumstances you can be, and your arrogantly assuming to yourself, and consequently to the junior lieutenant in the navy, an absolute superiority over the envoys extraordinary of our country, be they who they may, brings at once to an amicable issue a question which it is the interest of our country should be settled by legislation, and not be left longer to the whims and caprices of officers of the navy, to the very serious injury and possible dishonor and discredit of our country. According to your theory, it is positive offense against your dignity, meriting rebuke such as is conveyed to me in your note of yesterday, for the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary from the United States to Brazil to entertain any opinion whatever upon a great outrage such as has been perpetrated by Paraguay against the honor and dignity of the United States; and if he should happen to entertain such an opinion and, in the discharge of what he considers a duty, should venture to express it, no matter how courteously, and point out what in his judgment should be done, he is guilty of a crime for which any ensign in the navy who happens to be in command of a gunboat may rebuke and insult him!

Permit me to illustrate my meaning. For more than three years past we have had on this coast a South Atlantic squadron, consisting of from six to eight steamers in number, and sustained certainly at a cost of not less than $5,000,000; and yet, during that period the only national services required of it have been the firing of a salute to the Brazilian flag in Bahia as an amende honorable, promised by me, the United States envoy extraordinary, in consequence of our having violated Brazilian neutrality in cutting out and capturing in Brazilian waters the pirate Florida. That salute should have been fired by the flag-ship, because, when a great nation resolves to make an amende honorable, self-respect demands that such amende shall be made in a magnanimous and manly manner. But your predecessor, having denounced any such concession to the wounded honor of Brazil, and actuated by anything but a commendable feeling towards the civil service of our country, and incapable of appreciating the chivalry of the act, sent one of the smallest gunboats in our navy to perform this duty, while he in the flagship remained in this harbor; and when the duty had been discharged in a manner so disreputable to us and so offensive to Brazil, he immediatly sailed for Bahia to demonstrate, as it were, the contemptuous manner in which the matter had been disposed of. One high in authority here very justly remarked: “It was an act of grace performed most ungraciously;” and it became my duty to explain that no slight was intended by our government, and that it was our misfortune to have had in command a naval officer who could not understand, much less appreciate, the delicate duty with the performance of which he was intrusted, and who did not perceive that it was his own country and not Brazil that was slighted by his proceeding.

The salute referred to was fired by the Nipsic, commanded at that time by one of the junior lieutenant commanders in service.

The next national service rendered by the squadron was by the gunboat Shamokin, which was permitted to take Mr. Washburn, our minister to Paraguay, through the enemy’s lines, because I gave notice to this government that if they refused such permission I should demand my passport.

And the third occasion upon which our squadron has rendered a national service was when you sent the Wasp to Asuncion for Mr. Washburn, and after a detention of seven weeks at the allied headquarters, permission to pass was peremptorily refused by the Marquis de Caxias. You, at my request, reported the facts to me, and I, contrary to your judgment, insisted upon our right to send her to Asuncion, and demanded that all hinderance to her passing up should cease. Twice, in formal notes from the Foreign Office, was the demand rejected, and the conduct of the Marquis de Caxias approved. I then again, in opposition to the advice of cautious friends, assumed the responsibility of inforrning this government that on a certain day either my passports or an order for the Wasp’s going up to Asuncion must be sent me.

Thereupon all opposition to the Wasp’s passing the blockading lines of the allies was withdrawn. I communicated the facts to you, and requested that the same vessel, commanded by the same intelligent gentleman, might be sent up to Paraguay. You promptly complied with my request, and, thank God, she not only arrived safely at her destination, but most providentially just in time to save the lives of our minister and family.

Now you know that the Nipsic could have rendered all the national services performed for our squadron by the Shamokin and Wasp; and at the same time have made an annual visit to the coast of Africa. Let us suppose, then, that the Mpsic, commanded by a lieutenant commander, had been the only United States vessel of war on the station, and that upon receiving Mr. Washburn’s report of the gross outrage perpetrated in Paraguay against the honor of our country and the rights and liberties of our people, I had addressed him the identical letter I addressed to you; are you prepared to say that such lieutenant in command would have been justified in sending me in response such an exceedingly offensive note as that to which I am replying? You will not pretend that any immunity in the premises attaches to you which would not equally apply to him. The rights and immunties, whatever they may be, attach to the position, to the officer in command, and have no relation to his rank.

I now pass to the second paragraph of your note, in which you say:

“Since your opinion is formed without a knowledge of the circumstances of the case, I may not, possibly, attach so much value to it as you seem to expect.”

This is a most extraordinary, gratuitous, and, I must add, a most reckless assertion. And upon what is it based? If upon testimony of a higher character than that of our duly accredited minister, received by you since our interview, then, most assuredly it was your duty to have apprised me of such testimony being in your possession. But such a supposition is simply impossible; because, there can be no reliable testimony—nay, there cannot, in the nature of things, be any testimony whatever in the case which can for one moment weigh against Mr. Washburn’s history of what has occurred in Paraguay, as reported to me and as has been set forth by him in his official letter to the British minister accredited to the Argentine Republic. Besides, you distinctly informed me on Monday, that although you had received Cammander Kirkland’s official report of his having performed the duties assigned him, he had made no report upon the events which had transpired in Paraguay. Of course not. Commander Kirkland is too wise to pretend to make a report upon events of which he necessarily could know nothing except what he learned from Mr. Washburn.

It follows, then, that your unwarranted assumption that my “opinion was formed without a knowledge of all the circumstances of the case,” has no other foundation whatever than the abuse heaped upon Mr. Washburn in the allied press, because he has told, imprudently perhaps, disagreeable truths about the Marquis de Caxias, and upon the slanderous stories concocted by the allies, and retailed and circulated by Americans in the pay of Brazil, who consider it a condition of their employment that they shall be more Brazilian than Brazilians themselves. And upon such data you venture to set aside the elaborate and carefully prepared testimony of the American minister, who has just escaped from Paraguay with his life; and as an apology for so doing affect to discover in his own report of events the evidence of a man writing under such excitement (the result of bodily fear) as discredits his testimony. This is, indeed, an extraordinary state of things; and whatever may be “your official duties,” and however disagreeable it may be to receive “unsolicited” opinions in regard to them, I venture the assertion, that thus to repudiate the direct testimony of a duly accredited United States minister upon the unfounded slanders of his enemies cannot and does not constitute any part of such “duties.” And I assert, moreover, that your repudiation of Mr. Washburn’s testimony, officially indorsed by me, has no more warrant than your uncalled for assumption and unqualified declaration that my” opinion is formed without a knowledge of all the circumstances of the case.”

I will only add, in conclusion, that the question of the relative duties and respective rights of United States ministers and naval officers in command, which for some purpose that I cannot fathom you have thought proper to raise, should, and I trust will, be speedily settled by Congress. Whether in your favor or mine, does not matter. We are simply the instruments whose differences in a far-off land, in regard to what action is demanded by our naval forces on this station in vindication of the nation’s honor, the rights of its officials, and the lives of our citizens, must and will call forth congressional legislation too long delayed. To secure such a result I shall cause this correspondence to be called for at the next session of Congress; and to convince you that, in the performance of my whole duty in this emergency, I do not intend to permit an official difference of opinion to degenerate into a personal controversy, I inclose herewith a copy of my dispatch to the Department of State written yesterday, when you were penning your extraordinary note to me, and which went forward by the steamer to Southampton this morning. Its spirit will be found somewhat different from that which guided your pen, and invited a personal controversy. To that spirit I shall adhere; and now feel it my duty to reiterate my requisition upon you, promptly and properly, to employ the large naval force under your command in the vindication of our national honor, the protection of the diplomatic rights of our country, and to attempt at least to save the lives of our outraged officials.

You may not know—and probably, if you did, would ignore it if reported to you by any one in the civil service of our country, but it is nevertheless my duty to inform you—that among the diplomatic representatives of foreign governments at this court, so far as I can learn, there is no difference of opinion in regard to what is expected from our minister and naval force on this station. They do not know that you and I are at variance on the question of duty; and, judging me by the past, they assume most naturally that we will not be unmindful of what is due to our country, and in her vindication, to the civilized world. As evidence of this sentiment, I copy from a note of his excellency George Buckley Matthew, the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Great Britain at this court, his opinion upon this emergency, and which undoubtedly is the opinion of all his colleagues. You will perceive by its date that it was written on Tuesday, although it only reached me last evening:

“October 6.

“My Dear General: ’Tis not pleasant to add to bad news, but a line to the eleventh hour tells me that your unfortunate countryman, Bliss, had been cruelly tortured, and that his companion was said to have been shot.

“If U. S. (Uncle Sam) stands that he can’t hold up his head again. * * *

“Yours, always.”

I am in the receipt, too, of another letter from Mr. Washburn, dated the 29th September, (doubtful authority, the Brazilians, native and adopted, will tell you,) by which it appears that, in ignorance of your estimate of his character and the character of his testimony, he has addressed you a letter on the subject of his affairs. He says, among other things:

“Come what may, I fear that I am embargoed here for several weeks. The reaction that has come upon Mrs. Washburn renders it out of the question that she should venture to sea at present. While the danger lasted, and we did not know but I should be arrested, tortured to death or shot, and she sent on foot to the Cordilleras, she held up bravely. But the danger is past, and she has completely broken down. Visions of imprisonment, fetters and stripes for your humble servant, disturb and haunt her, and her doctor tells me to-day she must keep entirely quiet, and not go out for weeks. This excitement and prolonged strain on the nerves has brought on * * * * *; so that there is no remedy but to wait here till she is sufficiently restored to start for home. What she most needs is quiet, together with sleep, undisturbed by horrid visions of Lopez and torture.”

A horrible picture this; but horrible as it is, be assured, no matter what others will tell you to the contrary, and no matter how great your unfounded prejudices against Mr. Washburn, it is strictly true. Mr. Washburn is incapable of falsehood. His report of events in Paraguay is as worthy of credit as if signed by you or by me and we may judge from Mrs. Washburn’s present state what she and her husband have passed through.

May I not indulge the hope that this picture of the present consequences of past events may induce you to accept the truth as officially presented to you instead of your being biased in your judgment, and permitting your official action to be controlled by the representations of interested individuals? General Quitman, a northern man and classmate of mine, brought me a challenge from Brooks after his brutal assault upon Sumner, and my account of that infamous affair; and in justification of his bringing the challenge he informed me that no northern man could live quietly in the south unless he proclaimed himself more ultra upon the question of slavery than the slaveholders themselves. May not this be the condition of our countrymen in the employ of Brazil? Be this as it may, the only purpose for which the United States squadron is stationed on this coast, at enormous cost to our treasury, is to give protection to American commerce and American citizens, and to defend and vindicate the national honor, no matter by whom assailed. This cannot be accomplished by its lying idly in the harbor of Rio. The squadron you command is not here either for your pleasure or your convenience; and patriotism requires that it should be in the waters of the La Plata. And therefore it becomes my imperative duty, earnestly but respectfully, to urge upon you an immediate departure for the south.

Saturday, October 10.

While writing, I have had placed in my hands the following from the British minister, written yesterday. I have not seen Governor Matthew for a week, but I know he speaks the sentiments of the entire diplomatic corps as well as the wishes of every disinterested and patriotic American in this region:

“October 9.

“My Dear General: Is your fleet going down to the river and up? I hope so. I declare to you I think we should have a general raid upon that wretch, who, with such a foe as Caxias, will go on for months.

“Yours, always,

“G. BUCKLEY MATTHEW.”

Does it not occur to you, admiral, that it is alike strange and unaccountable that you alone, of all intelligent men in Brazil, and without the sympathy of a solitary disinterested countryman, should look unconcernedly upon the outrage perpetrated against our national honor, and should persistently refuse to employ our squadron for the purposes for which alone it was intrusted to your care? Does it not become you to scan close the influences which guide and mislead you, and, irrespective of self, to try and discover what the honor of our country requires at your hands?

Should this correspondence be continued, I request that you will send your official notes to me in the same manner that you have heretofore forwarded your private correspondence, that is, by a boat from the Guerriere direct to the legation. Or if that should be inconvenient, please send your letters to our consulate, which is in close proximity to the fleet landing. It is not seemly that an official correspondence between the United States minister and the naval officer in command of a station, no matter how exalted or humble his rank, should be left at a corner grocery, to be forwarded when the proprietor of such grocery finds it convenient to, send lard and groceries to the minister’s kitchen. One proceedng of that nature is quite sufficient to indicate your contempt for the subject discussed, even if not intended to be personally offensive to your minister.

This note, like my previous one, will be delivered to you in person on board the Guerriere, by my secretary.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,