Watson Webb to Joao Silveira de Souza, Councillor to his Imperial Majesty the Emperor, July 13, 1868

Mr. Webb to Senhor de Souza.

The undersigned, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary from the United States, has the honor to acknowledge the receipt, on the 9th instant, of a note, bearing that date, from his excellency Joao Silveira de Souza, councillor to his Majesty the Emperor, minister and secretary of state for foreign affairs, in reply to his note of the 1st July instant.

The note of his excellency, after reciting the contents of the undersigned’s note of the 1st, says:

“The Marquis de Caxias could not recognize Lieutenant Kirkland, a subaltern in the United States navy, in command of the Wasp, as a competent person to make a direct request for permission for that vessel to pass the war lines of their very legal and effective blockade, which he only did towards the end of May, and not four months ago.”

In the first place, the marquis did recognize Lieutenant Commander Kirkland as a proper person to make the request he did, as appears from his prompt response to his application.

Secondly. Lieutenant Commander Kirkland was not sent to Curupaity to make a “direct request for permission to pass the allied lines.” His destination was Asuncion; and presuming that Brazil would not again wound the sensibilities of the people of the United States, or outrage their sovereignty and honor, it was not deemed necessary for him to do more than courteously notify the Brazilian commander-in-chief of his presence, destination, and purpose, accompanied by the assurance that nothing would be done or permitted militating against the rights of either of the belligerents or of the national character of his ship and flag.

Thirdly. His excellency has misapprehended the remarks of the undersigned in regard to the delay of four months, already produced by the action of the Marquis de Caxias. If the Wasp had not been obstructed in her passage to Asuncion on the 25th April last, Mr. Washburn and family would probably have reached Montevideo early in May; whereas it is not possible for him to do so now until September; and it may be still later, if the modus operandi of getting him and family from their “embarrassing and possibly dangerous situation” is to be determined at Washington.

His excellency the minister of foreign affairs next denies that in refusing to let the Wasp pass, the Marquis de Caxias offended the sovereignty and honor of the United States, as is alleged by the Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, and insists that by so doing he only maintained an unquestionable right of sovereignty on the part of the allies. And it is insisted also that, in stopping the Wasp, the marquis in no way violated the arrangement made between the undersigned and Brazil in August, 1866, because the Shamokin, with Minister Washburn on board, was only allowed to pass the allied lines under protest.

On the subject of this protest the honorable Secretary of State wrote to the undersigned as follows:

“The President, however, marks the incident that the opposition to the passage of Mr. Washburn was withdrawn under a protest. So tar from considering the question of the right of Mr. Washburn to proceed to his destination as a debatable one, the United States cannot consent to argue that question.”

His excellency the minister of foreign affairs will perceive, therefore, that the undersigned has no authority to discuss the right of the United States to communicate with its minister in Paraguay. The obstruction offered in 1866 was declared by Mr. Seward “disrespectful in itself, and entirely inconsistent with the laws of nations.”

And yet his excellency, the minister of foreign affairs, informs the undersigned that “the imperial government does not consider that the proceedings of the Marquis de Caxias, in this transaction, are at all open to censure; but that, on the contrary, they merit its approbation.”

It is a well known fact that Asuncion, the capital of Paraguay, can only be reached by the river of that name; and also, that long before the empire of Brazil, and Uruguay, and the Argentine Confederation, bound themselves, by treaty, to carry on war, not against the people of Paraguay, but against its government until overthrown, the United States had established diplomatic relations with that republic. In fact, but for the presence of the United States minister, Mr. Washburn, in Asuncion in 1864, and his threat of closing his mission if the minister of Brazil was not permitted to leave the country by water instead of by land, as the Marquis de Caxias proposed that Mr. Washburn should do, that gentleman would, most probably, have shared the captivity of Governor Campos. How it is possible, then, for any intelligent Brazilian to claim that by virtue of Brazil’s blockade of the Paraguay, the United States shall not communicate with her minister by the only channel he can be reached, is more than the undersigned can conceive. But, as Mr. Seward says, from a sense of self-respect, the United States cannot consent to argue that question. Thus precluded from any discussion on this question of right, the undersiged notes the declaration that in this proceeding by the Marquis de Caxias there is no disrespect intended, and no unfriendly feeling towards the United States.

And this is said to be made manifest by the declaration that he did offer and place at the command of Mr. Wash burn and Lieutenant Kirkland, with the heartiest good will, the proper means for the safe and most convenient conveyance of the American minister from Paraguay. That is to say, Brazil, or the commander of her land and naval forces on the Paraguay, is to determine what is the “proper means” of getting our minister out of Paraguay, and not the United States. And what were those “proper means” thus proposed?

First, the Marquis de Caxias proposed that the minister, his feeble wife and child, his servants, with their luggage, &c., should traverse some fifty or one hundred miles of wilderness, more or less, and then embark on board a Brazilian vessel bearing a flag of truce, and descend the Paraguay to Curupaiti; President Lopez, of course, to give sanction to this espionage of his territory by an enemy avowedly engaged in a personal warfare against him and for his overthrow, and not against the people of Paraguay.

To this his excellency Charles A. Washburn, the minister of the United States accredited to the government of Paraguay, which it is the avowed purpose of the allies to overthrow, replied as follows, after very properly and peremptorily refusing to leave his post of duty, except in the manner indicated by his government:

“The proposition of the Marquis de Caxias that, if we are so disposed, we may go by land, is similar to that which was made to me by the Paraguayan government in the case of the Brazilian minister, Senhor Viana de Lima, after the taking of the Marquis de Olinda and the suspension of his diplomatic relations. When I interfered on his behalf, I was told he could go by land. But I rejected the proposition as absurd, and my conduct in that matter was highly approved by the Brazilian government and press, while that of Paraguay was universally condemned by both. Does the Marquis de Caxias expect me to accept terms for myself and family that I would not accept for a Brazilian minister?”

Secondly. The first proposition of the Marquis de Caxias having been very properly and indignantly rejected, he deliberately substituted the following:

“I will give orders that one of the Brazilian vessels of war above Humaita shall go up the river with a flag of truce to receive his excellency, his servants, and effects, at the point of the river previously indicated by his excellency; and this steamer, on its return, shall disembark his excellency at the nearest possible point to Humaita, or pass that fortification with, the consent of the government of Paraguay, so that his excellency may be able to move immediately from here to the United States gunboat Wasp.”

It would be improper on the part of the undersigned to speak of this proposition in the terms it deserves, after it has been gravely indorsed by the Brazilian government; and therefore he leaves it to the just indignation of that public opinion which must ultimately pass upon this correspondence, and which will treat this unheard-of proposition with the severe condemnation it so richly merits. Your excellency pronounces it friendly and magnanimous, while the undersigned deems it unfriendly and offensive, and, he might add, on the part of the marquis, trifling with the dignity of his position.

That the commander of the Wasp so considered it is manifest from his reply, which, written in doubt whether it was a serious proposition or one intended to cast ridicule upon the whole affair, is worthy of all praise. He says:

“Your excellency undoubtedly gives me credit for a knowledge, which I do not possess, of that usage of warfare which permits one of the belligerents, by a resort of a flag of truce, to pass by the fortifications and into the heart of the enemy’s country without molestation. I know that the Paraguayan government would be guided by a false sense of courtesy did it permit such an act by a Brazilian vessel of war.

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“A conversation, sought by one of the members of your excellency’s staff, leads me to believe that your excellency thinks that the family of the President Lopez might seek protection under the American flag, and that to prevent such an occurrence you will not allow the United States steamer Wasp to pass through your fleet. The fact of virtually detaining as prisoners the United States minister and family in Paraguay in order to prevent the suspected escape of the feminine and infantine portion of President Lopez’s family, is so unreasonable that it savors strongly of extending the dangers and difficulties of war to women and children.”

Whether this proposition was ever intended by the Marquis de Caxias to be seriously received, or whether it was designed to treat Lieutenant Commander Kirkland’s application with ridicule and contempt, it is equally unfriendly and offensive. Unfriendly, because it denies on the most frivolous and indefensible grounds an act of courtesy to a friendly and neutral power, which could not be withheld without offence, even if the law international conferred the right of such denial on Brazil, which it assuredly does, not. And grossly offensive, because it assumes that the commander, officers, and crew of the United States steamer Wasp would act dishonorably and give information in regard to the Brazilian fleet to the Paraguayans, while no such suspicion of dishonorable conduct could possibly attach to the officers and crew of a Brazilian vessel of war, which it is gravely proposed to send hundreds of miles into the enemy’s country.

Now it is patent to the world that the number and character of the Brazilian fleet, above and below Humaita, are as well known to President Lopez as to the Marquis de Caxias, the press, and the public. And if we are to believe official reports, it is equally certain that the state of things on the Paraguay, above the allied forces, is absolutely unknown to the Marquis de Caxias or any other person. If, then, every person on board the Wasp were of the disreputable character implied, the most they could possibly communicate to the injury of the allies would be to report the number of vessels, they saw; information which President Lopez has already. How utterly idle, then, and how exceedingly offensive the pretence that the passage of the United States steamer. Wasp, under the United States flag, and commanded and officered by gentlemen who recognize all the obligations which a high sense of honor imposes upon them as neutrals—how exceedingly offensive to a friendly nation to allege that such passage would be injurious to the interests of Brazil, “because of the operations and movements of war shortly to be carried into effect near the place indicated as the destination of the North American steamer.” That is to say, “the steamer of a friendly neutral power, rapidly, running through our lines, and communicating with no one but the commander-in-chief and his staff, will become possessed, supernaturally, no doubt, of all our purposes: and those on board not being men of honor, will disclose to our enemy, the President, and not the people of Paraguay, the knowledge thus supernaturally acquired.”

But while the Marquis de Caxias thus guards against American officers, not revealing what everybody knows, and nobody better than President Lopez, and while he cannot listen to the idea of a friendly neutral passing his lines, he perceives the benefit to be derived from availing himself of the occasion presented, to send one of the Brazilian vessels of war above Humaita, with a flag of truce, into the very heart of the enemy’s country, to bring away the United States minister, and at the same time explore the terra incognita where he would willingly extend his operations. Nay, he would go even still further, and permit the iron-clad thus employed, now above Humaita, to repass that fortification with the consent of the government of Paraguay, and thus escape from what is deemed a perilous position until the fall of Humaita, if fall it should What President Lopez would have said to this proposition the good sense of the commander of the Wasp promptly determined; what the Brazilian government thinks of it is to he found in its formal approval, conveyed to the undersigned by the dispatch of your excellency; but what the governments, statesmen, and military men of Europe and America may say of it, remains to be seen.

President Lopez, “the government of Paraguay,” was the only party who could possibly suffer injury from the presence of a friendly neutral in his waters and amidst his defenses. And yet President Lopez, recognizing his duty to that friendly neutral, and to the comity that should be practiced between nations, and entertaining none of the doubts in regard to the honor of American naval officers, which so disturbed the mind of the Marquis de Caxias and made him desirous of sending a Brazilian vessel of war into his enemy’s country under a flag of truce, to be guaranteed by the flag of the United States minister, no doubt, promptly consented that the United States steamer Wasp should ascend the Paraguay to any place she might desire to visit.

The undersigned is of opinion that the facts of the case will abundantly demonstrate whether the act of the Marquis de Caxias, indorsed by Brazil, was not as unfriendly and offensive as it clearly was in violation of international law and the sovereignty and honor of the United States.

But, says your excellency, if the Wasp had been permitted to pass the blockading lines of the allies, other nations would have been entitled to claim a similar right for all their ships. Most assuredly so, if those other nations had diplomatic representatives at Asuncion whom it was desirable to get away. But Mr. Washburn is the only diplomatic representative resident in Asuncion, and consequently the position is untenable.

Your excellency next quotes Rear-Admiral Godon, then commanding the United States South Atlantic squadron, as fully justifying the action of the allies in 1868. So correct is this, says your excellency, “that Admiral Godon himself, in 1866, when the passage of Mr. Washburn to Paraguay was in treaty, was the first to admit it, merely begging in his request the passage of Mr. Washburn, and that he might be helped forward to his destination either by land or by water, without placing any obstacle in his way. This is just what the Marquis de Caxias desired to effect in the present instance, had he not been denied the option.”

It is no news to the undersigned that in 1866 Admiral Godon, having quarreled with the three United States ministers in the river Plata—General Asboth, Mr. Washburn, and Governor Kirk—and with the consuls of the United States at Buenos Ayres and Montevideo, instead of simply obeying orders, and furnishing the United States vessel, which Mr. Washburn was authorized to demand, to take him to Asuncion, did all in his power to prevent Mr. Washburn’s having such conveyance, and on one occasion actually went north from this port instead of south, apparently to avoid receiving the contemplated application. But it is news to him that the then commanding officer of the United States squadron on this station should have permitted his feelings of hostility to Mr. Washburn to render him so forgetful of his duty to his country as to indorse and justify and advise the Brazilian government in its assumption that it might safely, and with great propriety, refuse to permit one of our national vessels to pass its lines with our minister on board, provided the minister “was helped forward to his destination, either by land or by water, without placing any obstacles in his way.”

But the Brazilian government and its representatives in the river Plata well knew that Rear-Admiral Godon was not vested with any diplomatic powers whatever, and that he was as proverbially ignorant of the law of blockade as of international law. He was the last man in the navy to be safely intrusted with the discussion of such questions; and his expressing any opinion upon Mr. Washburn’s case, or making any admissions in regard to it, was simply meddling with what did not concern him. That he should have done so in the gratification of a vindictive feeling toward a gentleman in every respect his superior, does not surprise the undersigned; but it does surprise him greatly that your excellency should refer to the unpatriotic acts of that personage, who was the representative of himself and his vindictive feelings only, as justifying a proceeding which every department of our government, and its four diplomatic representatives in this region, as well as every intelligent foreigner here, united in condemning. The undersigned does not doubt that Rear-Admiral Godon did make the admissions described, and did, in the gratification of his vindictiveness, seek to produce a result so diametrically opposite to what justice and honor, and national sovereignty, as well as the convenience of our minister and family, demanded; but as he was not vested with any diplomatic powers in the premises, and as it appears that if he had been he would not have exercised them in the interest of his country, his opinions and admissions cannot, with propriety, be introduced into this correspondence.

The undersigned makes no apology for the length of this note. The existing diplomatic relations between the United States and Brazil, and the present and future intercourse between their people—whose interests, political and commercial, are inseparable—depend, to a very great extent, upon the amicable adjustment of the pending difficulty; a difficulty which should not and could not have arisen, and in the progress of which the sovereignty and international rights of neither party could have become involved, if Brazil had promptly extended to the United States that comity which is usual among all friendly nations.

Being prohibited from arguing the question of right in this very important matter, the undersigned, frankly and in the interests of good neighborhood, will now proceed to extract from his various instructions on this subject the well-settled convictions of his government in relation thereto, all or most of which may be found in part two of the published diplomatic correspondence of 1866:

“Mr. Seward to General Webb.

“Department of State, “Washington, April 21, 1866.

“We have learned, with much surprise, that Charles A. Washburn, esq., minister resident of the United States to the republic of Paraguay, has been hindered and detained at or near Corrientes, on the Parana River, by the allied armies engaged in the war against Paraguay, on his return, after a leave of absence, to Asuncion, the capital of Paraguay. I give you for your information a copy of instructions which have been sent to him in this emergency. We sincerely hope to learn that the Emperor of Brazil has neither ordered nor approved of this hinderance to the passage of the diplomatic representative of the United States, so disrespectful in itself and so entirely inconsistent with the law of nations.

“You will bring the subject to the notice of the government and the Emperor, and ask an explanation.

“Mr. Seward to General Webb.

“Department of State, “Washington, June 27, 1866.

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“I am obliged to write, therefore, in ignorance of the present condition of affairs in South America. Nevertheless, the sovereignty and honor of the United States will admit of no hesitation or delay in the matter. Mr. Washburn is therefore now instructed to return at once to the United States if the hinderance before alluded to shall not have ceased, through some proceedings of the governments concerned.

“In the case that you shall have put into execution the before-mentioned instruction which was given you by this department on the 21st day of April last, and shall not have received the satisfactory explanations which you were instructed to ask from the government of Brazil, you will now demand such explanations peremptorily. If they shall not be given you within six or eight days, you will ask for your passports to return to the United States.

“The Secretary of the United States, the Hon. William H. Seward, to General Asboth.

“Department of State, “Washington, September 24, 1866.

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“I have now before me a copy of a definitive correspondence which has taken place between this department and the Brazilian government, which leads me to hope that long before this reaches you the difficulty will entirely have ceased. But among the papers which the record presents is a letter written by President Mitre to Mr. Washburn on the 24th of July last, which distinctly asserts and maintains the right of the allies to make that detention endure according to the pleasure of the allies. The President of the United States cannot consent to hold relations of peace and friendship even with friendly nations, when they make their own interests the rule of exposition instead of the law of nations.

“The Secretary of State of the United States to General Webb.

“Department of State, “Washington, September 23, 1866.

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“The paper treats of the final disposition and settlement of the annoying question which arose by the detention of Mr. Washburn, &c., &c., &c.

“The President, however, marks the incident that the opposition to the passage of Mr. Washburn was withdrawn under a protest. So far from considering the question of theright of Mr. Washburn to proceed to his destination as a debatable one, the United States cannot consent to argue that question.

“In the second place, you are authorized to state that the sensibilities of the American people have been wounded by the transaction.

“I am not prepared to say that, in the absence of an explanation by the allies, the settlement of the question which has been made will be held to be satisfactory.

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“I am, sir, your obedient servant,

“WILLIAM H. SEWARD.”

Your excellency will perceive from the foregoing extracts from instructions from the Secretary of State of the United States why the undersigned has not entered into any discussion of the rights of his government in the question pending between it and the allies, prosecuting a war against the government and not the people of Paraguay. He has but one course left him to pursue, and that is, to urge upon “the government and Emperor of Brazil” a reconsideration of their decision as conveyed to him in your excellency’s note of the 9th instant. And again, in the Words of his note of the 1st instant, “he earnestly entreats that the government of Brazil will, without any unnecessary delay, issue instructions that all hinderance to the United States steamer Wasp’s passing through the lines of the allies on the Paraguay be withdrawn, and promptly advise the undersigned that such hinderance has altogether ceased.”

The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to renew to his excellency the assurances of his distinguished consideration.