Unknown to George B. McClellan, U. S. A, December 23, 1861

General GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, U. S. A.:

DEAR GENERAL: I have not yet been able to see Commodore Du Pont, but have thought somewhat of the Charleston problem, which is rather difficult to solve, and will demand much thought; but the premises on which much of the data must be based are that the South Carolinians have long come to the conclusion that Charleston is to be attacked by land. Some time ago they removed several of the barbette guns from Sumter and guns from the island batteries to place on the guns to some works they have thrown up on the Stono—I believe three in number, including the one at the mouth. Several vessels have been sunk in this river. They are making, therefore, a desperate effort to prevent a landing on James Island. What they have done on the north side of Charleston I have not learned. Without looking at the thing satisfactorily, yet I am inclined to the opinion that the easiest way to take or destroy the city is by the route of Sullivan’s and Morris Isiands, erecting batteries there, carrying Moultrie, seizing on Point Pleasant (making a demonstration by Bull’s Bay, if necessary), and reducing Sumter, then bringing forward the Navy and shelling the city, assisted by mortar batteries on land, if necessary; but the objection will now arise to this that the channel has been stopped up by a stone fleet. If so stopped, of course this mode would not be so convenient though it will be very possible to shell Charleston from Sumter and Point Pleasant and other points that will readily be seized upon when Sumter has fallen. I have heard it said, however, by officers of the Navy that, if found necessary for the gunboats to enter Charleston Harbor, it can yet be done. As soon as I can get Captain DuPont’s views I will write again.

I believe that the South Carolinians are under the conviction that we are about to strike their center by Port Royal Ferry. We want to keep up the delusion, and if I only had some cavalry would feel justified `n moving the bulk of our force to the southern end of the railroads and shutting off South Carolinia from Savannah, and preparing the way to effectually take the city by the southern route. I have written also for another battery of light artillery.

Very respectfully and truly,