Unknown, September 5, 1864

The Court met pursuant to adjournment. Present, Major-General Hancock, president, Brigadier-Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge-advocate.

Capt. F. U. Farquuar, U. S. Engineers, being duly sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th of July, and in what capacity ?

Answer. I was present, and was chief engineer on the staff of General Ord, commanding the Eighteenth Corps.

Question. Were you in a situation to observe the operations on that day?

Answer. I was, a portion of the time, after the smoke cleared away.

Question. Did you witness the explosion of the mine?

Answer. Yes, sir; I saw the explosion of the mine.

Question. Relate what you saw done unusual on such occasions—occasions of assault; state some of the omissions, if any, and the principal causes which conduced to the failure of the assault.

Answer, At or near 15 minutes before 5 a. m. the explosion of the mine took place. Immediately on the explosion the artillery opened, and I should judge three or five minutes afterward we heard the cheer of the assaulting party. Nothing could be seen from the time of the opening of the artillery for twenty-five minutes or half an hour, when the smoke commenced to clear away. At the time of the explosion the general officers in command were in the covered way in rear of the fourteen-gun battery near what are known as Thomas’ Chimneys, I believe. Between half and three-quarters of an hour after the explosion Lieutenant-Colonel Loring, of General Burnside’s staff, came from the front and reported that the troops that were in the crater were lying there and could not be pushed forward or gotten out of it. It was fully three-quarters of an hour after the explosion of the mine before the enemy opened any artillery, and then not at all severe. At the time of the explosion Turner’s division, of the Tenth Corps, which was under General Ord’s command, was lying at or near the mouth oi or entrance to the covered way on the right of the fourteen-gun battery. Ames’ division, of the Eighteenth Corps, was in rear of that strip of woods which is in rear of the fourteen-gun battery. Both the covered ways on the right and left of this fourteen-gun battery were filled with troops of the Ninth Corps, the negro division being in the left covered way. There seemed to be an unaccountable delay in the advance of the supports to the first assaulting column. I cannot tell the exact time. I did not see the second one go up, but I heard the cheer some time after, how long I cannot recollect. Somewhere between 6.30 and 7 o’clock I went to the front line to which the assaulting columns had started. The ground immediately in front of our salient, from which our forces started, was favorable for charging over, as the troops were partially protected pretty near all the way up, from the left flanking fire, by a very small ridge; the men could have passed over easily, and there were very few dead or wounded lying on that space between our line and the crater. The men seemed to be lying in the crater and on our side of the crater, but no movements seemed to be taking place. I saw General Turner at that time going to the crater. There seemed to be a lack of enthusiasm or spirit in both officers and men, The negro division filed over our parapet and went into the crater by the flank, exposing their whole line, as they passed over from our line to the enemy’s, to the fire from both sides of the crater. At between 9 and 10 o’clock the cross-fire of the enemy in front of the salient had become so severe that hardly a man could pass from our salient to the crater without being hit. At this front line that I went to there seemed to be no person of any authority to meet any emergency that might arise, and in that, in my opinion, lies one of the chief causes of the disaster. The chief causes of failure are, in the first place, that the mine was in the wrong place, because it was in a re-entrant, and, in the second, that there was no officer present to make any new dispositions or movements to meet any emergency that might arise. It seemed to me, so far as I could see, that the troops were not ready to move. They were in the covered way, and so situated that you could not follow the assaulting columns up with the necessary supports. Asit was, the assaulting column if it had gone forward would be a mile ahead before the supports could get up. I was present when General Turner sent back a note to General Ord saying that he could not get his troops forward on account of General Burnside’s troops being inthe way. General Ord then sat down and wrote a letter to General Meade—I believe it was to General Meade—telling him that he would advance Turnevr’s division as soon as General Burnside’s troops were out of the way. He showed it to General Burnside, who asked him not to send it, for he would have his troops out of the way immediately; but whether he ever sent it or not [do not know. General Ord then went to the front himself, at the time that General Turner said he could not get his troops forward, and found the same state of things existing—that the covered way was filled up with General Burnside’s troops going to the front, and that the wounded were being brought to the rear in the same covered way that the troops going forward to fight were going forward in. There was no reason why the troops should move through the covered way at all. From the position of the assaulting columns and the troops fighting, the enemy could not notice troops passing down the slope of the hill without going through the covered way. The colored troops seemed to be well led, and followed their officers with as much enthusiasm as any other troops that day. They seemed to go about 200 or 250 yards to the right of the crater going toward the enemy’s intrenchments. Then there came a halt, and by that time General Turner had got one of his brigades to the front, and he ordered an assault with this brigade. Instead of passing along the edge of the crater as the other troops had done, which gave them a temptation to lie down, he charged to the right of the crater. It was just then that the negroes came back and his men were carried back with them. I went to the front immediately after this affair, where I saw General Turner, and he seemed to be very much distressed about it.

Question. State if there were any means taken for crowning the crest

it gained—working parties with fascines, gabions, intrenching tools, c.

Answer. I can speak only with reference to myself. I had my sappers and miners equipped with tools ready to move with the Eighteenth Corps when it should move.

Question. With the ordinary performance of their duties by officers

and ae on such occasions, ought not the assault to have been success

Answer. It was successful, for the line was carried. It only wanted som present to tell them what to do afterward. I think that had hers been any Tarion of authority at the place, even at our own front line, at the salient, to have given directions at the proper time we had ninety-nine chances in one hundred of being successful in the object expected to be gained. From my own experience J know that it would take you at least three minutes to get to the front through the covered way, because it was so crowded, and three minutes to get back again to where the general was, and then count your time for observation besides; and at that time, when the opposing forces were so close to each other, ten minutes would make a great deal of difference. I think that, with the exception of a lack of enthusiasm, the troops behaved as well as troops ever behaved. What they wanted was handling. Just in front of the crater, in rear of the enemy’s line, there was a sort of a redoubt or earthwork upon the hill, from which not a shot was fired. There was not a soul between the crater and that position, and I believe that position was the objective point of the assault. And I think, had the troops been pushed forward properly, the columns following as one column should have followed another, there would have been no difficulty in the place being carried.

ocr eon: Then there were no physical obstacles in the way of our SUCcCceSS

Question. Is it your opinion that if we had not had the mine we would have been more successful?

Answer. No,sir. The mine of itself was a success. The consternation of the enemy in consequence of the explosion of the mine more than compensated for the flanking fire which they opened upon us. But it was three-quarters of an hour before they opened fire.

Question. Were adequate preparations made for the passage of our troops over our parapets and through the abatis?

Answer. There seemed to be room enough at our salient to pass over—certainly in regimental front.

Question. Could artillery have passed through?

Answer. No, sir. I saw no place where artillery could have passed through at any point within 200 or 250 feet of the salient. I do not know how practicable it was farther to the right or left. Leading up from the hollow to the front the covered ways were very narrow, not at all adequate to the necessities of the occasion for conveying troops to the front. And there was room enough in that hollow to have massed at the troops under cover of darkness. Had that been done, as it was not light when the mine should have exploded, they would have all been in the enemy’s lines before they could have been much hurt.

Question. Who gave you orders for preparing the fascines, gabions, and intrenching tools and working parties in the Eighteenth Corps?

Answer. I got them from General Ord. All I had were shovels, spades, picks, and sand-bags.

Question. Did you see General Burnside on that occasion?

Answer. Yes, sir; I saw him quite frequently.

Question. Any of his division or brigade commanders?

Answer. I only noticed one division commander.

Question. Name him.

Answer. General Potter. If the others were there I did not happen to see them.

There being no more witnesses in attendance the Court adjourned to meet at 10 o’clock on 6th of September.