[Translation.], November 14, 1865
[Translation.]
MEXICAN REPUBLIC—CORPS OF THE ARMY OF THE NORTH—GENERAL-IN-CHIEF.
After the capture of Catorce, by a part of my forces and the complete rout of the traitor Tinajero and his brigade at Paso de las Cabras, as I have already informed you in official despatches, I determined to collect all the material of war on the frontier to carry on the campaign in that quarter. For that purpose I posted the Vega brigade at Linares and vicinity; the 1st cavalry at Cerralvo and adjoining points; the 2d at Villaldama; the 1st and 2d infantry at Punteagudo and Agua Leguas; and I went in person to the northern towns, to gather the troops that had organized during my expedition into the interior, and to collect artillery and provisions for the main body of the army. On my return, I fixed my headquarters between Matamoras and Monterey, as the principal points held by the enemy, and better to determine upon which of the two I should begin operations.
I invited General Cortina and Colonel Canales to join me with their troops, in the campaign I was preparing. The former offered his services in the cause of national independence, in any part of the republic where they might be needed; the latter promised only to aid me against Matamoras. The last circumstance, and the great importance of the place, induced me to begin operations there; and I accordingly issued orders to concentrate, which was promptly done by the brigades, with the exception of the 1st cavalry of New Leon, which I left to watch Monterey, and that of Colonel Canales, which delayed for some unaccountable reasons.
On the 22d of October, the main body of the northern army, with the exceptions above mentioned, moved in sight of Matamoras, and encamped at the Alvino Pena ranch, only a cannon-shot distance from the place.
October 23, 1865.—A reconnoissance was made around the town, with some unimportant skirmishes. In the afternoon the camp was prepared for moving wherever it should be ordered. Colonel Sostenes Rocha, major general in the regular army, was sent from headquarters, with his aids and an escort, to give notice of the attack on the place. During the night other reconnoissances were made, some trenches were dug, and a few batteries were planted.
October 24.—The first parallel was made at six hundred yards from the town. Esplanades for the batteries were begun, and the troops took position in the following order: The right wing, consisting of 200 men of the San Luis brigade, under General Vega, was stationed at the Quintero house. The left, under General Cortina, his brigade strengthened with a squadron of the Rio Grande, and 100 infantry of the 1st brigade. The centre, under Colonel Naranjo, with his brigade and one of infantry. All this line under command of General Espinosa, quartermaster of the army corps.
Another column, under General Hinojosa, composed of the Coahuila brigade, fifty infantry and fifty cavalry of Tamaulipas volunteers, cut off the road from Bagdad. The reserve, formed of the 2d infantry brigade, and a column of cavalry, with the Supremos Poderes Valle de Mexico, and sharpshooters of the Naranjo brigade, were stationed in order. The artillery, the baggage, the supplies, hospitals, and trains were arranged last.
Orders were given for the attack General Hinojosa and Cortina were to begin the attack with their columns at 3 o’clock in the morning, while the centre was to make a feint in front for diversion.
October 25.—A hard north wind and rain began at 2 a. m. and continued till 5. The columns in position near the enemy’s forts fell back, after the hour for attack had passed, because no signal had been given on account of bad weather. However, they opened fire at half past four, and the columns, on hearing the signal, began the attack with great vigor General Hinojosa took the fort they attacked, and entered the city, going as far as Independence square, driving the enemy before them; but the latter being re-enforced by troops from the other forts, and aided by the steamer La Antonia, shelling us in the rear, drove us back slowly, till we had reached our first position in good order. General Hinojosa and Colonel Adolfo Garza were both wounded.
At this moment the left attacked with the same spirit; General Cortina silenced one fort and captured another; but the enemy’s reserve, now free, hastened to the attack, and drove him back. He retreated in good order to his first position.
Although preparations were made for a simultaneous attack, the rain interrupted it, and the result was partial. Nevertheless, the troops fought bravely, and caused great slaughter in the enemy’s ranks, but the result was not decisive.
The enemy having succeeded in repulsing us, ordered out the cavalry three successive times upon our centre, and was driven back to the centre of the town in great disorder, though continuing to cannonade us with little effect. On the evening of this day the Canales brigade arrived, and was placed in the reserve. The firing between our line and the enemy’s continued the whole day.
A road was made for the artillery up to the intrenchments, the esplanades were completed, and ammunition was got ready. The north wind then brought on an unceasing rain.
October 26.—The rain did not cease, the trenches were completely inundated, and the troops had to bale them out. The plaza continued to cannonade our lines at intervals, and very feebly. Orders were given in the afternoon to open the artillery upon the plaza; the cannonade began at half past five, and stopped at dark. The enemy answered feebly. The north wind calmed, but the rain continued.
October 27.—More rain. A shop is fixed up for mounting artillery. The sharpshooting of the line is brisk, corresponding to that of the enemy. The Garza section comes up with one hundred men, and is stationed on the right wing, at the Quintero house, to relieve General Vega’s two hundred, who go to re-enforce the reserves. The enemy makes a cavalry attack on the centre and left of our line, but is promptly driven back.
October 28.—The enemy makes a sally upon our right with two hundred horse, and a battalion from the fort sustains them, while a brisk cannonade continues, in order to support the attack which has begun. After a short contest they are driven back to the plaza. We did not make use of our reserves. The fire of the riflemen continues.
October 29.—The riflemen continue. The enemy attempts to shut in their position by making trenches from fort to fort, constantly molested by our battery. Our left battery is not disturbed; it begins upon the plaza, cross-firing with the centre battery. Though cannon cartridges are made rapidly they begin to fail. The riflemen continue their firing all day.
October 30.—The centre prepares an advance and flank movement to join the left. Fresh esplanades are formed and new batteries constructed. The rain continues with force.
October 31.—Sallies from the town are driven back. Firing continues. The batteries on both sides are almost silent, ours for want of ammunition. The rain continues unabated.
November 1.—Continued rain. Riflemen keep up slow firing.
November 2.—Bad weather. Continuous fire. A few sallies from the town, without result.
November 3.—Bitter weather. Ammunition very scarce.
November 4.—Good weather. Firing of the riflemen continues.
November 5.—Canales’s brigade is ordered to move towards Bagdad at night to cut off supplies and communications of the enemy. The line is told to save its ammunition as it becomes quite scarce.
November 6.—The flank movement is discontinued and the works finished.
November 7.—The headquarters are moved with the line. The enemy attack our centre at night with infantry, but are driven back in disorder to the town. Orders are issued for the army to fall back one league and a half from town, to a place called La Marcelina. Information is received at headquarters that a steamer is coming up the river with an aid of French marines for the place. Colonel Canales is commanded to stop that boat by an attack from shore. The steamer is attacked the same day, some of its crew are wounded, but it manages to get up the river. Colonel Treviño informs us the French have left Monterey for Saltillo. He is ordered to get nearer to the town, watch the enemy, and see what direction he has taken. Colonel Canales reports that he cannot continue his march to Bagdad on account of the rains that have inundated the whole country. A battery that was ordered arrives.
November 8.—The camp is struck and forces begin to move. The enemy observing it, attack us, but is repulsed. Tents pitched in the Marcelina plain.
November 9.—Encamped in the same place. Abundant rains. The enemy makes a sally; a line of battle is formed to receive him; but not venturing, he returns to the town, after destroying and burning several ranches in the vicinity.
November 10.—In search of dryer ground the camp is moved to the plain of Realito.
November 11 and 12.—Nothing new.
November 13.—News is received confirming the movements of the French at Monterey; part of them remain in Saltillo, and the rest of the column, 800 men, march towards Monclova.
November 14.—Order is issued for the army to go into quarters, leaving the cavalry to watch the enemy. I go to Monterey to direct the operations in the attack on that place. I take the Naranjo brigade with me. I will give you due notice of my march to Monterey; and now conclude by calling the attention of the supreme magistrate of the republic to the preceding report. It shows that the extreme weather our soldiers had to suffer in their peculiar situation, and the want of ammunition, incidents over which we have no control, prevented our gallant soldiers from taking Matamoras. If its garrison had accepted the many challenges we offered them, and had come out into the open plain to give us battle, the result would have been very different.