Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward, March 20, 1862

Mr. Adams to Mr.
Seward.

Sir: Late last evening I received despatches
from the department numbered from 194 to 198, both inclusive. Several of
them are highly important, and I shall seize the earliest opportunity to
act upon the suggestions they
contain in my communications with her Majesty’s government. Indeed, you
will before this have received my despatch, No. 131, of the 13th
instant, which covered a copy of a note of mine to Lord Russell on the
case of the General Miramon, drawn up in the sense conveyed in your No.
184, of the 14th of February. As the efforts of disaffected parties here
grow more and more desperate in proportion to the increase of the
necessities on the other side of the water, I shall find occasion to
renew the subject with additional means of illustration.

I take it for granted that even in the midst of your engrossing
occupations you find sufficient time to glance at the report of the
debates in Parliament on subjects of interest to the United States, and
more especially on international questions of rights on the ocean and of
blockade in time of war. The most marked indication to be observed is
the general sense of uneasiness at the change operated in the position
of Great Britain as a maritime power by the enlargement gradually making
of the privileges of neutral nations. Whilst on the opposition side you
perceive a distinct disapproval of the agreement made in 1856 at Paris,
there is equally perceptible among the ministers a disposition to seize
the first opportunity to annul the obligations which it has been thought
to impose. The remarks of Sir George Cornwall Lewis upon the effect of
war upon the measure, regarded merely as a treaty and not as new rules
incorporated into the international law, are full of significance. Lord
Palmerston has been not inappropriately reminded of the difference
between the tone of his speech at Liverpool in 1856 and that in the late
debate, whilst even Lord Russell is quoted as having expressed the
opinion that some modification of the declaration of Paris would seem to
be almost indispensable.

Such are the immediate effects of that which, at first blush, appeared to
these enlightened gentlemen a great triumph in the case of the Trent.
Such are the consequences of refusing to accept the adhesion of the
United States to the declaration of Paris from an over-zealous desire to
escape the effect of a precipitate admission of belligerent rights. Both
these events have brought vividly to their observation the consideration
of the position of Great Britain in the contingency of a war on the
ocean. Like the dog in the fable, in snatching at the shadow, they find
they have lost the solid meat. A conflict with the United States would,
as things are now, at once transfer the whole carrying trade of Great
Britain into the hands of the neutral nations of the continent of
Europe. It is now becoming plain that, without the additional provision
first suggested by Mr. Maury, English interests on the sea are in great
jeopardy in time of war, and yet that, with the admission of it, the
control of the ocean is forever lost. Whichever way they look there is
difficulty. Self-interest being the cardinal point of the policy they
seek to pursue, it is plain that the adoption of the declaration of
Paris is a sacrifice of which they are beginning to repent. Not the
least remarkable among the admissions made in this debate is that which
specifies the danger of a war with the United States in the event of a
persistence in their former doctrine respecting the cargoes of neutral
ships, at the time of the contest with Russia, as having been the main
cause that prompted the concessions in that declaration. Thus it would
seem that the idea of the growing power of the United States as one
nation is everywhere present to their imaginations as the great obstacle
in the way of their continued domination of the sea. Can it be wondered
at if, under these circumstances, the notion of a permanent separation
of this power into two parts, one of which can be played off against the
other, were not altogether unwelcome to their hearts ?

To considerations of a similar kind are we indebted for the security that
has been afforded to us in our present contest against interference with
the blockade. That there has
been and still is a very strong inclination in the country to get rid of
it is unquestionable. That but for its unavoidable connexion with
possibilities of consequences in other and not very remote
complications, an attempt of the kind would have been made, I am
strongly inclined to believe. The argument that has overborne all these
tendencies is drawn from the fear that such a step would only lead in
the same direction with the preceding ones taken at Paris. It would
ultimately deprive Britannia of her power longer to rule the waves. The
“entente cordiale” with France is not yet
hearty enough to make such a result altogether acceptable even to the
fancy. Neither are the relations with Russia so friendly as to render a
voluntary release of the main instrument to keep her in check, a
proposition to be entertained with favor. For these reasons no
countenance will be given to any remonstrance against our blockade;
neither will the general reasoning of Mr. Cobden, in favor of limiting
neither will the general reasoning of Mr.Cobden, in favor of limiting
the right of blockade, find much response among people in authority.
Even the admissions rendered necessary to establish a position in
reclaiming the rebel emissaries on board the Trent will be limited, as
far as may be, to shut the door against further concessions.

It will then continue to depend upon the degree of concert established
among those nations of the world which have ever upheld neutral rights,
whether any real advance be made in the recognized doctrines of
international law or not, just as it has done in preceding times. Great
Britain will concede only from a conviction that such a course is the
safest for herself. The remedy for other countries is obvious. It is to
unite in the labor of raising the obligations of specific contracts to
the level of permanent international law, and to enforce the observation
of a consistent system of policy upon any single power whenever it may
venture to set up the promptings of its immediate interest as the only
rule of action it thinks proper to abide by.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,