Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward, April 16, 1862

Mr. Adams to Mr.
Seward.

Sir: I have this morning received despatches
from the department numbered from 214 to 217, inclusive. I yesterday
succeeded in obtaining the expected conference with Lord Russell. I
began by reading to him the copy of your despatch No. 8, containing
instructions to Mr. Burlingame, in China, agreeably to your direction, and I made an offer to leave a
copy with him, which he accepted.

I then opened the main topic with which I was charged. I expressed to his
lordship my reluctance to touch upon any subject which looked like
complaint at this time, when everything was so quiet between the two
countries, but it seemed to be the duty of public men not to confine
themselves merely to the study of the present. If there were reasons to
suspect the existence of causes of irritation which might lead to
serious differences between nations, even at a remote period, it was the
part of prudence to make an early effort to remove them. In this sense,
I desired to speak of the tendency of the efforts continually making
here, reports of which were sent by every steamer to America, to supply
to the insurgents the means of persevering in their resistance to the
government. It could not admit of a doubt that their hopes of final
success, though much weakened, were still buoyed up by the encouragement
obtained in the supplies from here. On the other hand, the people of the
United States drew inferences of a hostile disposition to them in a
corresponding degree from the same sources. I was bound in frankness to
add that the various occurrences which confirm this notion were too apt
to revive the recollection of the original measure to which they were
traced as natural consequences. I had reason to believe the government
to be so strongly convinced of the fact that the original recognition of
the rebels as a belligerent was their only remaining moral support, that
I felt it my duty once more to bring the subject to the attention of her
Majesty’s government. Although I had heretofore received repeated
requests so to do, I had been indisposed to press it, from a belief that
any such movement would be unavailing. In a late visit to Paris,
however, where I had conferred with Mr. Dayton, I had learned from him
that in a personal conversation with the Emperor, in the course of which
the latter had represented the urgency of the necessity for cotton, he
had, in reply, dwelt upon the difficulties experienced from the effects
of the Emperor’s recognition of the belligerent right of the rebels in
prolonging the war, and had pressed for the withdrawal of it. The
Emperor had not shown himself averse to entertaining the question, but
had referred to his co-operation with Great Britain and to the necessity
it imposed of consultation with it in this case. The knowledge of this
fact had determined me on my side to propose the same thing here. I
should not go into any repetition of the argument on the subject, but
should content myself with expressing the conviction that nothing would
more conduce to establish perfect confidence in the disposition of Great
Britain, and to accelerate the reopening of the customary intercourse
and trade between the two countries, than such a step.

His lordship alluded, first, to my report of Mr. Dayton’s conversation
with the Emperor. He presumed it was confidential, and therefore he
could take no cognizance of it. All that he was bound to know was what
had been mentioned by Mr. Thouvenel to Lord Cowley of Mr. Dayton’s
conference with him. He had only learned by this that there was some
general conversation. He did not learn that Mr. Dayton had offered any
distinct proposition. No reference of the matter had been made to this
government by the French. I said this was precisely the point I desired
to arrive at. The impression I received was that such a reference had
been promised.

I did not tell Lord Russell the most significant portion of Mr. Dayton’s
report of his conversation with the Emperor, because I felt bound not to
commit him. From the tenor of yours to me (No. 211) of the 31st March, I
am led to believe you are fully possessed of it. My object was simply to
see where the responsibility for the policy rests. A discovery which a
comparison of the tone
maintained by the respective parties renders it not difficult to
reach.

His lordship enlarged once more upon the magnitude of the region engaged
in the revolt, and upon the urgency of the call to provide for the new
emergency. He attempted an analogy between the course taken by Great
Britain in this case and that of the United States towards South America
after the revolt of the dependencies of Spain. Subsequent events had
only confirmed the correctness of the decision. For the very efforts to
which the United States had been compelled to resort proved the
magnitude of the task undertaken, and they were still engaged in
pursuing their object without absolute certainty of success. The wish of
Great Britain was to remain neutral and impartial. They had no cause of
quarrel with the southern States. We might fight it out with them. The
southern people seemed, from the accounts in the morning papers, to be
finding equal fault on their side for their not taking part with them.
We on our part seemed to be urging for what was equivalent to joining
our side to put them down, yet that was a course which we had professed
not to desire.

To this I replied that very certainly we did not desire it. What we did
desire was, that foreign nations would leave the matter entirely in our
hands. What we complained of was, that the course adopted was not
neutrality. That it had not been so regarded by the insurgents
themselves was made apparent in the very documents published at the
opening of Parliament; for it was certain that the early overtures made
by the two powers to obtain a sanction of the declaration of Paris had
been construed at Richmond, and, as I thought, with reason, as a ground
to expect a further acknowledgment. It seemed to me they had some right
to complain of a disappointment of their hopes then raised. I begged,
furthermore, to advance an opinion that there was not an example in all
the history of the United States or of Great Britain, nay I might say of
any civilized nation of the world, of so precipitate a recognition of
belligerent rights to insurgents as this one of which we were treating.
If there was such an instance, I should be glad to see it. Upon the
basis thus made there could be no question that much of the perseverance
in resistance had rested, and did still rest. A withdrawal of this
recognition was the only thing that would put an end to the delusion. On
the other hand, the continuance of it but served to countenance and to
stimulate the efforts pertinaciously made by people in Great Britain to
sustain them. This led me naturally to enlarge upon the effect produced
upon the people of the United States as well as the government by the
frequent accounts of the manner in which vessels of all kinds were
fitted out from the ports of Great Britain to assist the insurgents.
Most of the consuls weekly sent home a repetition of the same story. I
had even been told by one of them lately that he believed as many as
fifteen vessels were now preparing to make the voyage. Such things could
not go on without giving rise to unpleasant implications, which, however
unfounded, would be likely to be so far credited as to render them as
dangerous as if they were facts. I remarked that his lordship must be
aware that the answer that nothing could be done was very
unsatisfactory; because it might be fairly presumed that every nation
that possessed the will naturally carried within itself the power to
prevent abuses of its authority.

His lordship replied, in substance, by expressing his belief that the
parties engaged in these undertakings were not so much interested in the
cause of the insurgents as in the profits to be expected by running the
blockade. Such attempts always would be made in similar cases. For the
rest these adventurers were compelled to take their own risk. They had
the dangers of capture to encounter, and the certainty of being deprived
of their rights of reclamation. The government had no disposition to
give them protection.

I observed that this reasoning seemed hardly satisfactory or consoling to
persons exposed by the effects of such acts to a long and painful and
costly extension of their labors of repression. I then put it to his
lordship distinctly, if Great Britain would be contented, should the
people of Canada break out into open rebellion, to find the United
States promptly declare a neutrality, recognize the rebels as a
belligerent power, and then from myriads of posts along the extensive
line of boundary and the many harbors on the seaboard tolerate the
equipment and despatch of numerous vessels freighted with all the
materials necessary to protract the struggle? I very much doubted
whether his lordship would be perfectly quiescent under the answer that
no violation of neutrality had been committed, and that no power existed
to put a stop to the proceedings. His lordship met this by saying that
he should certainly object to any such direct
expeditions; but there was no evidence in any of the cases I had brought
up of destination or of wrong intention. In that of the Oreto, upon
which I had addressed a note to him, he had directed an investigation to
be made, and the authorities at Liverpool had reported that there was no
ground for doubting the legality of her voyage.

I replied that this was exactly what gave such unpleasant impressions to
us in America. The Oreto, by the very paper furnished from the
customhouse, was shown to be laden with a hundred and seventy tons of
arms, and to have persons called troops on board,
destined for Palermo and Jamaica. The very
statement of the case was enough to show what was really intended. The
fact of her true destination was notorious all over Liverpool. No
commercial people were blind to it. And the course taken by her
Majesty’s officers in declaring ignorance only led to an inference most
unfavorable to all idea of their neutrality in the struggle. It was just
such action as this that was making the difficulties of our government
in the way of giving the facilities to the supply of cotton, which they
hoped to furnish in a short time if the whole control of means to put an
end to the contest was left to them.

His lordship concluded by a polite expression of regret at these
circumstances, at the same time that he could not see how the government
could change its position.

I concluded the conversation by saying that I had only done my duty.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,