John G. Parke to Joseph Hooker, November 18, 1862

Lieutenant COMSTOCK, or, in his absence, CHIEF OF GENERAL BURNSIDE’S STAFF:

Major Spaulding has been delayed in obtaining harness, teamsters, &c., for 270 new horses. He expects to start to-night. D. P. WOODBURY,

Brigadier-General of Volunteers.

On the 19th, General Hooker’s grand division was at Hartwood, and a portion of the cavalry occupied positions above him, opposite the fords, where they could cross, upon the receipt of the necessary orders. It was my intention, and I so informed General Halleck, to cross some of the cavalry, and possibly a small force of light infantry and artillery, over the fords of the Rappahannock and Rapidan, with a view to moving rapidly upon Fredericksburg, and holding the south bank of the river while bridges were being laid ; but the above telegrams, announcing still further delay in the arrival of means to cross the main army, decided me in the already half-formed determination not to risk sending a portion of the command on the opposite side of the river until I had the means for crossing the main body. Subsequent events proved the wisdom of this course, by showing that none of these fords are reliable for the passage of large bodies of troops without the use of temporary bridges, and the pontoons did not arrive until the 25th. It is possible that the cavalry, with some light infantry, could have crossed both rivers and moved down to Fredericksburg on the south side; but before the pontoons arrived, enabling the entire army to cross, this force would have been called upon to resist an attack from the greater portion of General Lee’s army.

General Sumner, on arriving at Falmouth on the 17th, suggested crossing a portion of his force over the fords at that place, with a view to taking Fredericksburg; but, from information in my possession as to the condition of the ford, I decided that it was impracticable to cross large bodies of troops at that place. It was afterward ascertained that they could not have crossed. ‘

On my arrival at Falmouth, on the 19th, I dispatched to General Halleck’s chief of staff the report in appendix, marked C, which explains the movement of troops up to that date, and also states the fact of the non-arrival of the pontoon train. These pontoon trains and supplies, which were expected to meet us on our arrival at Falmouth, could have been readily moved overland in time for our purposes in perfect safety, as they would have all the time been between our army and the Potomac River; and, had they started from Washington at the promised time, they would have certainly reached Stafford Court-House as soon as the advance of General Franklin’s grand division, and from that point they could have been forwarded by his teams to Falmouth, if the teams from Washington had needed rest.

On the 22d, not hearing from these trains, I sent to General Halleck the report in appendix marked D. It appeared afterward that no supplies had been started overland, as suggested in my plan of operations, and the pontoon train did not leave Washington until the afternoon of the 19th, two days after the arrival of the advance of the army at Falmouth, and five days after the arrival of the pontoons in Washington from the Upper Potomac.

From the report of Colonel Spaulding, who had charge of the pontoons, and from other sources of information, I learned that the order of November 6, from Captain Duane, of the staff of General McClellan, to move from Berlin to Washington with his train, was not received by Colonel Spaulding until the 12th instant; that he then at once gave the necessary directions for carrying out this order; after which he proceeded to Washington, arriving there at 10.30 p. m. on the 13th, and reported to General Woodbury, at his residence in the city, the same night, and was requested to call at the general’s office the next morning, the 14th.

Colonel Spaulding called upon General Woodbury at the hour appointed on the morning of the 14th, and was requested by the general to wait until he called upon General Halleck. In about one hour General Woodbury returned, and directed Colonel Spaulding to put his pontoon material in depot at the brigade shops, on the Anacostia River, near Washington, as fast as it arrived from Berlin, and go into camp there with his men. The colonel considered this as countermanding his order to make up the overland pontoon train, and, knowing that General McClellan had been relieved after the order had been issued, inferred that the plan for the campaign had been changed with the change of commanders, and that the land train was not required.

He visited General Woodbury’s office again on the morning of the 15th, and did not find him in, but was informed that he had gone to see General Halleck ; but, while waiting for his return, was told that a dispatch had been received from Lieutenant Comstock, my chief engineer, wishing to know if he (Colonel Spaulding), with his pontoon train, had been heard from. After some time, General Woodbury came in, and, in the course of conversation, repeated the order to put the pontoon trains in depot as fast as they arrived. It should be remembered that this was on the 15th, one pontoon train, which would have been sufficient for our purposes, having arrived in Washington on the evening of the 14th. The second train arrived the day after this interview. Later on this day (the 15th), or the day after, General Woodbury directed Colonel Spaulding to make up two trains in rafts to go by water, and to organize the necessary transportation for forty pontoons by land.

Due diligence was no doubt used by Colonel Spaulding in prosecuting his work, but he was not impressed with the importance of speed, neither was he empowered with any special authority that would hasten the issuing of the necessary transportation.

The pontoons which started for Belle Plain on raft arrived there on the 18th, but no wagons for their transportation from that place were sent with them, nor was any intimation given to Colonel Spaulding that any would be needed; neither to his knowledge had any information of that kind been given to General Woodbury. Had this information been given to Colonel Spaulding, the necessary wagons could have been placed on the rafts and floated to Belle Plain, from which point the pontoons could have been hauled to Falmouth by teams from the army before the enemy had accumulated sufficient force to resist the crossing. This was not, however, the method by which it was expected the pontoons would arrive, in time to cross the river before the enemy could concentrate to prevent it.

After arranging for these trains to go by water, Colonel Spaulding proceeded at once to make up the overland train, but was not enabled to start with it until the afternoon of the 19th. On this day it commenced raining, in consequence of which the roads became very bad. Great exertions were made by Colonel Spaulding to push his train forward, but before his arrival at the Occoquan he decided to raft his boats when he reached that river, and have them towed to Belle Plain, for which purpose he sent an officer back for a steamer to meet him at the month of the river. The animals were sent overland. He arrived at Behe Plain with his pontoons on the 24th, and by the night-of the 25th he was encamped near general headquarters.

By this time the enemy had concentrated a large force on the opposite side of the river, so that it became necessary to make arrangements to cross in the face of a vigilant and formidable foe. These arrangements were not completed until about December 10. In the mean time the troops were stationed with a view to accumulating supplies and getting in readiness for the movement.

I omitted to say that on the 19th instant I received, through Colonel Richmond, my assistant adjutant-general, a communication from General Hooker, suggesting the crossing of a force at the fords above Falmouth. This letter appears in his (General Hooker’s) report, and my reply thereto in the appendix, marked E.

I determined to make preparations to cross the river at Skinker’s Neck, about 14 miles below Fredericksburg, and, if the movements of the enemy favored the crossing at that point, to avail myself of such preparations; otherwise, to adopt such a course as his movements rendered necessary. The ground at this point was favorable for crossing, but our preparations attracted the attention of the enemy, after which he made formidable arrangements to meet us at that place.

The necessary orders, both written and verbal, had been given for the troops to be in readiness to move, with the requisite amount of ammunition and supplies. Before issuing final orders, I concluded that the enemy would be more surprised by a crossing at or near Fredericksburg, where we were making no preparations, than by crossing at Skinker’s Neck, and I determined to make the attempt at the former place. It was decided to throw four or five pontoon bridges across the river— two at a point near the Lacy house, opposite the upper part of the town, one near the steamboat landing, at the lower part of the town, one about a mile below, and, if there were pontoons sufficient, two at the latter point.

Final orders were now given to the commanders of the three grand divisions to concentrate their troops near the places for the proposed bridges; to the chief engineer, to make arrangements to throw the bridges; to the chief quartermaster, to have the trains of the army in such position as not to impede the movement of the troops, and at the game time to be in readiness, in case of success, to follow their separate commands with supplies of subsistence stores, forage, and ammunition ; to the chief of artillery, to so post his batteries as to cover the working parties while they were constructing the bridges and the army while crossing.

The eKeeniiations of the three grand divisions will be found in the appendix, marked F,* and in speaking of the movements of the troops T shall, as nearly as possible, confine myself to the movements of the grand divisions, and must refer to the reports of the commanders for more detailed statements.

The right grand division (General Sumner’s) was directed to concentrate near the upper and middle bridges; the left grand division (General Franklin’s) near the bridges, below the town; the center grand division (General Hooker) near to and in rear of General Sumner. These arrangements were made with a view to throwing the bridges on the morning of December 11. The enemy held possession of the city of Fredericksburg and the crest or ridge running from a point on the river, just above Falmouth, to the Massaponax, some 4 miles below. This ridge was in rear of the city, forming an angle with the Rappahannock. Between the ridge and the river there is a plain, narrow at the point, where Fredericksburg stands, but widening out as it approaches the Massaponax. On the north side of the river the high bluffs gave us good opportunities for placing the batteries, which were to command the town and the plain upon which our troops were to move.

For a full understanding of the position of the batteries and the general movement of the artillery, I beg to refer to the report of my chief of artillery, Brig. Gen. H. J. Hunt.

Had it been determined to cross at Skinker’s Neck, I should have endeavored, in case of success, to have moved in the direction of Guiney’s Station, with a view of interrupting the enemy’s communications, and forcing him to fight outside his intrenchments. When this intention was abandoned, in consequence of the heavy concentration of the enemy at or near Skinker’s Neck, and it had been decided to cross at or near the town, I hoped to be able to seize some point on the enemy’s line near the Massaponax, and thereby separate his forces on the river below from those oecupying the crest, or ridge, in rear of the town.

In speaking of this crest, or ridge, I shall speak of it as occupied by the enemy, and shall caJl the-point near the Massaponax the right of the crest, and that on the river, and in rear of and above the town, the left ; and in speaking of our own forces it will be remembered that General Sumner’s command was on our extreme right and General Franklin’s command was on the extreme left. I deem this remark necessary, because in some prominent quotations from my previous reports my meaning has been misinterpreted.

During the night of the 10th the bridge material was taken to the proper points on the river, and soon after 3 o’clock on the morning of the 11th the working parties commenced throwing the bridges, protected by infantry, placed under cover of the banks, and by artillery,

“Omitted, A revised statement of the organization, December 11-15, 1862 Pe ye & ‘ ‘ » appears on the bluffs above. One of the lower bridges, for General Franklin’s command, was completed by 10.30 a. m. without serious trouble, and afterward a second bridge was constructed at the same point. The upper bridge, near the Lacy house, and the middle bridge, near the steamboat landing, were about two-thirds built at 6 a. m., when the enemy opened upon the working parties with musketry with such severity as to cause them to leave the work. Our artillery was unable to silence this fire, the fog being so dense as to make accurate firing impossible. Frequent attempts were made to continue the work, but to no purpose.

About noon the fog cleared away, and we were able, with our artillery, to check the fire of the enemy. After consultation with Generals Hunt and Woodbury, I decided to resume the work on the bridges, and gave directions, in accordance with a suggestion of General Hunt, to send men over in pontoons to the other shore as rapidly as possible, to drive the enemy from his position on the opposite bank. This work was most gallantly performed by Colonel Hall’s brigade—the Seventh Michigan and Nineteenth and Twentieth Massachusetts—at the upper bridges, and by the Eighty-ninth New York at the middle bridge, and the enemy were soon driven from their position. The throwing of the bridges was resumed, and they were soon afterward finished.

No more difficult feat has been performed during the war than the throwing of these bridges in the face of the enemy by these brave men; and I take pleasure in referring to the reports of General Woodbury and Lieutenant Comstock for a more detailed account of this gallant work.

It was now near night-fall. One brigade of Franklin’s division crossed over to the south side; drove the enemy’s pickets from the houses near the bridge head, and Howard’s division, together with a brigade from the Ninth Corps, both of General Sumner’s command, crossed over on the upper and middle bridges, and, after some sharp skirmishing, occupied the town before daylight on the morning of the 12th.

During this day, the 12th, Sumner’s and Franklin’s commands crossed over and took position on the south bank, and General Hooker’s grand division was held in readiness to support either the right or left, or to press the enemy in case the other command succeeded in moving him.

The line, as now established, was as follows: The Second Corps held the center and right of the town; the Ninth Corps was on the left of the Second Corps, and connected with General Franklin’s right, at Deep Run, the whole of this force being nearly parallel to the river; the Sixth Corps was formed on the left of the Ninth Corps, nearly parallel with the old Richmond road, and the First Corps on the left of the Sixth, nearly at right angles with it, its left resting on the river.

The plain below the town is interrupted by hedges and ditches toa considerable extent, which gives good covering to an enemy, making it difficult to maneuver upon. ,

The old Richmond road, spoken of above, runs from the town in a line nearly parallel with the river, to a point near the Massaponax, where it turns to the south, and passes near the right of the crest, or ridge, which runs in rear of the town, and was then occupied by the enemy in force. In order to pass down this road it was necessary to occupy the extreme right of this crest, which was designated on the map then in use by the army as ” Hamilton’s.” : ab: ig

By the night of the 12th the troops were all in position, and I visited the different commands with a view to determining as to future movements. The delay in laying the bridges had rendered some change in the plan of attack necessary, and the orders already issued were to be superseded by new ones. It was after midnight when I returned from visiting the different commands, and-before daylight of the 13th I prepared the following orders :*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE Potomac, December 13, 1862—6 a. m.

Commanding Right Grand Division, Army of the Potomac:

The general commanding directs that you extend the left of your command to Deep Run, connecting with General Franklin, extending your right as far as your judgment may dictate. He also directs that you push a column of a division or more along the Plank and Telegraph roads, with a view to seizing the heights in the rear of the town. The latter movement should be well covered by skirmishers, and supported so as to keep its line of retreat open. Copy of instructions given to General Franklin will be sent to you very soon. You will please await them at your present headquarters, where he (the general commanding) will meet you. Great care should be taken to prevent a collision of our own forces during the fog. The watchword for the day will be “Scott.” The column for a movement up the Telegraph and Plank roads will be got in readiness to move, but will not move till the general commanding communicates with you.

I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,