George Stoneman to Seth Williams, April 16, 1863

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac:

GENERAL: Your letter of April 15, 1863, was received at 12 m. to-day, and I have delayed answering it until this hour, awaiting the acknowledgment of my two dispatches of yesterday, which has this moment come to hand. Icannot say what has been the state of affairs away from this vicinity, but here, at the hour of my last dispatch, the condition of things may be judged of when I tell you that almost every rivulet was swimming, and the roads next to impassable for horses or pack-mules, not to speak of artillery and wagons, the latter of which had in the morning all been started for the rear. The railroad bridge has been partly carried away by the freshet. The river is out of its banks, and was still on the rise a few hours ago. Three hours ago Gregg’s division, which was directed to move back from the river to higher ground, began crossing a bed nearly dry yesterday morning, and its rear is not over yet. This morning the same bed was swimming, and a squadron in attempting to cross it lost 1 officer and 2 men, swept off, and several horses drowned.

The whole corps is now on the north bank of the Rappahannock, and, as we all think, fortunately for us, as were we on the south side, we should have the Rapidan, now a swollen torrent, to cross, necessarily, in order to advance, and the Rappahannock, swollen as it is, in our rear; neither of which under the most favorable circumstances will be fordable for several days to come. Up to midnight, night before last, everything had worked as well as could have been wished, and my dispatch was based upon the expectation that we were to be favored with a continuation of fair weather. It certainly was not predicated upon the expectation of being overtaken by one of the most violent rainstorms I have ever been caught in, and that, too, in a country where streams rise as rapidly as do the rivers in our front.

No command ever had higher hopes, or was more confident of success, though ignorant of what it was expected to perform ; but the elements seem to have conspired to prevent the accomplishment of a brilliant cavalry operation.

Our movements were known at Culpeper Court-House on the morning of the 14th,and every disposable man was brought up toward – Kelly’s Ford by the operations of General Buford at that point.

The general commanding is mistaken in supposing that I was “using or maneuvering my [your] whole force against the command of Fitz. Lee, numbering not over 2,000 men ;” what I did being merely to make a feint and hide my intentions from the enemy.

Instead of acting from any “base or depot,” no depot has been established, and everything not absolutely necessary to promote the success of the undertaking had been sent back to Morrisville, with instructions to be sent to Falmouth, in advance of the infantry brigade at Kelly’s Ford, when it should be ordered to return. Tocross the swollen streams in our front at present, with any chance of meeting with a success, is an undertaking I consider, as a military operation, almost certain to meet with failure. The command will be held ready to advance the moment the streams are fordable. It may not be uninteresting to the commanding general to learn that the railroad is said to be in tolerably complete order from Alexandria to the Rappahannock railroad bridge, and that the people say they have been expecting the Northerners to advance by that route. Ihave sent to find out.

very respectfully, your obedient servant,