George Stoneman to Jos. Dickinson, December 20, 1862

CoLONEL: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of thé corps under my command during the recent engagement in and around Fredericksburg, Va.:

On the 9th instant, I received instructions from the headquarters center grand division to hold the corps in readiness to move on the night of the 10th instant, and place it in position at daybreak on the morning of the 11th. In accordance with those instructions, the corps was directed to hold itself in readiness to move at an hour’s notice any time after sundown of the 10th instant; wagons packed and parked, and men and animals supplied with three days’ rations.

On the morning of the 11th, pursuant to instructions received the day previous, the corps was put in motion, and occupied the position determined upon. As directed (Sumner’s grand division, which I was to follow, not crossing during the day, owing to the delay in the construction of the pontoon bridges), my corps bivouacked during the night on the ground occupied in the morning.

The next morning the corps was moved down to the vicinity of the foot of the bridges, and held in readiness to move across the river, to the support of Sumner, at a moment’s warning. Sumner’s grand division did not get over till near 2 p. m., when Whipple’s division was ordered to cross toSumner’s support. The town, however, was so much packed and jammed with the troops of Sumner that Whipple was unable to find room for his men, and he was directed to bivouac his division at the foot of the three bridges. Shortly before sundown I received instructions to move with the other two divisions of the Third Corps, Birney’s (First) and Sickles’ (Second), down the river about 34 miles, by the road, and place them at the foot of the two bridges over which the left grand division had that day crossed, and to communicate with General Franklin, in command of the left, which was completed by 10 p. m., the night being foggy and dark, and the road muddy and rough. This road was taken in order not to expose our movements to the enemy, which we should have done by moving down the river road,’a shorter and better route.

At daylight the next morning both divisions were ready to cross at the lower ford at a moment’s notice in support of Franklin, as directed. During the night of the 12th, I received directions from General Franklin to send four regiments to guard the bridge, and render such assistance as might be necessary in constructing roads, preventing straggling, &c. These four regiments were detailed from Carr’s brigade.

About 9a. m.on the 13th, I was directed by General Franklin to send half a regiment to support De Russy’s batteries, on this side of the river, where they had been placed to support the left.of General Reynolds’ corps, on the other side of the stream. In place of dividing an effective regiment into two parts, 1 directed one small regiment to be sent on this duty. Shortly afterward, 10.30 a. m., I was directed by Colonel Platt, assistant adjutant-general, to send the only long-range battery with me to report to General Smith.

About 11.30 a. m. I received orders, through an aide-de-camp of Gen- eral Franklin to send a division to the support of General Reynolds,

and to report in person to General Franklin, on the other side of the

river; the other division to hold itself in readiness to cross at a mohaces notice. The First Division was sent across and the Second left ebind.

The location and condition of my corps at this time, 12 m., was as follows :

Myself and staff at the headquarters of General Franklin; 3 miles above was Whipple’s Third Division, detached to the support of Sumner; in front and moving into position to support Reynolds’ corps was the First (Birney’s) Division ; on the other (this) side of the river was the Second (Sickles’) Division, from which had been detached a battery of rifled guns, and sent to General Smith four regiments to guard bridges, and one regiment to support batteries; so that my corps was divided and subdivided into seven parts or parcels, and scattered and distributed over a space of country 6 miles long by 2 or 3 wide.

Not perceiving that I could be of much use at headquarters, I informed the commanding general where I could be found, and went to the front with the First Division. Arriviug on the ground, I found the condition of affairs as follows:

Parallel to and about 600 yards from the river runs the Bowling Green road. This road has on either side a ditch, and outside the ditch an embankment, forming a double caponiere or covered way. Nearly parallel to, and about 800 yards beyond, the Bowling Green road was the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad. This latter ran nearly the whole way along our front in a shallow cut, forming an excellent outer or first line of defense for the enemy. Between the railroad and the river lie cultivated fields. The ground between the Bowling Green road and the river is intersected by a ravine; that between the Bowling Green road and the railroad is an open plain, which extends down the river to the hills on the farther side of Massaponax Creek. Smith’s (Sixth) corps, 25,000 strong, occupied the Bowling Green road with two divisions (the Third Division, of same corps in reserve), and constituted the right wing; Reynolds’ corps (the First) formed the left wing. The arrangement of this corps was—Gibbon’s division on the right, Meade’s in the center, and Doubleday’s, with his left refused, and extending down to the river.

Gibbon’s and Meade’s divisions had driven the enemy beyond the railroad, and were hotly engaged with him in the wood on the high ground beyond. By request of General Reynolds, Birney formed his division to support Meade, Ward’s brigade on the right and Berry’s brigade on the left, Robinson’s brigade, from some cause, having been delayed on the road. Gibbon’s division was without any support whatever. Meeting General Gibbon, by his request I directed General Birney to send two regiments to occupy a portion of his ground and support his battery, which was in soft ground, without ammunition, and considerably crippled.

Shortly afterward Meade’s division began to retire, soon followed by Gibbon’s, and both in no little confusion and disorder. Every effort was made to rally them, but all to no purpose. Regardless of threat and force, and deaf to all entreaties, they sullenly and persistently moved to the rear, and were reformed near the bank of the river by their officers, many of whom used every endeavor in their power to stay their weary and overpowered troops. A portion of Ward’s brigade, under its general, was sent by General Birney to the support of Meade, and they, in their turn, were driven back, but immediately reformed in rear of

Robinson’s brigade, which had arrived, and was just then deploying in line of battle in front of the batteries of Livingston and Randolph. The enemy was now advancing in strong force, but the two brigades of Berry and Robinson, together with three regiments of Ward’s brigade, on the extreme right, by a well-directed fire, first checked the advancing foe, and then drove him back into the wood beyond the railroad, taking a considerable number of prisoners. ar A}

While the enemy was being repulsed along the front of Birney’s division, I sent back to the commanding general to inform him that the whole field which had previously been occupied by Gibbon’s division was left without a gun or aman for its protection. My staff officer returned with the information that the Second (Sickles’) Division was on its way from the other side of the river. I again sent back to hurry up this division, for, at that time, the enemy could be seen in strong force in the edge of the timber, not 600 yards distant, and there was nothing to prevent him from dashing through to the river, a fact which gave me no little cause for well-grounded uneasiness. Scarcely had Sickles’ division arrived on the ground previously occupied by Gibbon’s, in front of the Bowling Green road and formed—Carr’s (First) brigade on the right, Hall’s (Second) on the left, and Revere’s (Third) in support—when the enemy appeared in some force on Sickles’ right. A well-directed artillery fire was opened upon him, and he halted the other side of the railroad. 1 learned from deserters from this force that it was under the command of the rebel General Hood.

Both Birney’s and Sickles’ divisions being now in position and covered by strong lines of skirmishers in front, who, at a great disadvantage, were actively engaged with those of the enemy, I reported the condition of affairs to the commanding general, and was directed to remain where we were, holding ourselves in readiness to repel an attack, or to advance at a moment’s notice. Just before sundown a battery of ten or more guns, on the extreme left, opened a most vigorous and destructive fire upon Birney’s division, but was soon silenced by the united efforts of Birney’s and Doubleday’s artillery.

After dark I directed the batteries to be withdrawn to the other side of the Bowling Green road, the line of pickets to be strengthened where necessary, rations and ammunition to be replenished, and, with the exception of some pretty sharp work between pickets during the night and a portion of the next day, particularly on Sickles’ right, nothing more of an active character occurred worthy of notice until our withdrawal to this side of the river, which was done in the most perfect order, and without the loss of men or matériel.

Previous to our withdrawal the killed had all been secured and properly buried, and the wounded sent across the river and properly cared for, under the supervision and direction of the very competent and energetic medical director of the corps, Surgeon Pancoast.

For details and particulars as to the movements and operations of brigades, regiments, and batteries, and the acts and duties performed by individuals and detachments, I beg leave to refer to the reports of subordinate commanders, herewith transmitted, some of which are very elaborate and circumstantial.

The state of affairs when Birney’s (First) division arrived on the ground, followed soon after by Sickles’ (Second) division, was anything but promising. Their opportune arrival, however, first checked and then drove back the advancing foe, who, yelling, were in hot pursuit of the two exhausted and retiring divisions of Meade and Gibbon ; saved all their guns, whick had been entirely abandoned by their supports ;

Doubleday’s division from being cut off and taken in reverse; the left of Smith’s corps, which had not been engaged, from being turned, and, possibly, if not probably, the whole left wing of the army from disaster. But in doing this valuable and important service, the First Division lost upward of 1,000 of as brave men as ever pulled a trigger.

Of the conduct of this fine division I cannot speak too highly ; composed, as it is, of regiments of almost every State, from the Penobscot to the Mississippi, the whole country may justly feel proud of its wellearned fame. Among the stragglers and skulkers the Kearny badge was never seen, and the new regiments appeared to vie with their veteran brothers in arms in coolness, courage, and efficiency.

It is a subject of great regret to the Second Division that it did not have an opportunity of adding to its well-earned and well-known reputation as a fighting division.

In regard to the operations of the Third Division, I know but little from personal observation, General Whipple having been detached and removed from my command on the evening of the 12th; but from all 1 have heard, and from the official reports of the general and his brigade commanders, herewith transmitted, I am assured, and happy to know, that it proved itself in every way worthy champions of the noble cause in which we are all engaged.

The Third Corps, as a corps, I am proud to say, did its duty, and its whole duty, to the country and its flag.

Where all act nobly and well it is difficult to distinguish. I must, however, be permitted to compliment Brigadier-General Birney upon the handsome manner in which he handled his division, and his brigade commanders, Generals Berry, Robinson, and Ward, in the way they fought their brigades. Also, Captain Randolph and his officers for the. style in which they used their guns; all, while under the fire of the enemy, proving the value and efficiency of thorough drill and discipline.

To the different members of my staff I am under many obligations. Their conduct was what might be expected of officers of their character and acquirements, and all that I could have desired.

We who survive have to mourn the loss of many brave and noblehearted brothers in arms, but in no way are we discouraged or dispirited by the failure of our efforts to conquer a brave and powerful foe, and all we ask or desire is to be led to renewed efforts in a just and holy cause.

very respectfully, your obedient servant,