[Enclosure No. 3.], April 18, 1863.

[Enclosure No. 3.]

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 7th, and also letter of the 17th instant, enclosing memorandum of a meeting held at her Britannic Majesty’s legation the day before.

Although confined to my bed by sickness, and subject to intense spasms of pain, such as I never experienced before, I hasten to make a few remarks for your consideration.

I regret to see that at this late day Rear-Admiral Kuper and the naval officers of France and the Netherlands now in command at Yokohama have come to the conclusion that the means at their command are insufficient for the protection and defence of that settlement, as from your communication of the 7th instant, in which you say “that Admiral Kuper will concert with the diplomatic agents and naval commanders,” &c., an impression was certainly conveyed of an entirely different character.

I sincerely regret that no notice or invitation to assist at that meeting was given to me, as the diplomatic representative of the United States, as I would then have had an opportunity of explaining my views more fully. Such an opportunity not having been afforded me, I have to say, if it be now intended that it is impossible to afford protection in the event of an unprovoked attack on the settlement, that I have no observation to offer, as in such a contingency the attack must be met and resisted with the means at hand; but I do not believe it at all likely that such attack will be made.

But if, as I suppose, you refer to hostilities which may ensue at the expiration of the time noted by you, in consequence of the refusal of the Japanese government to accede to the demands you have been instructed to make, and of measures being resorted to to enforce these demands, then I feel it my duty to say that it is probable that this people, like all Oriental nations, have an exaggerated idea of their own strength; any temporary advantage which they might gain would probably arouse the whole country, and deprive us of advantages which we have now secured, and which we could never regain except by the expenditure of life and treasure of infinitely more value than those advantages.

It appears to me, therefore, the dictate of wisdom, that no coercive measures be resorted to by any power, unless ample means be at hand for the defence and protection of life and property at the settlement.

The memorandum communicated to all the foreign consuls for the information of foreign residents must necessarily be known to the Japanese, and may be regarded by them as a declaration of weakness, as well as an invitation to attack.

It appears to me, further, that such of the treaty powers as have a valuable commerce with this country, and citizens and subjects residing here, who have made large investments, should desire to avoid establishing a precedent which may lead at some future time to great loss of life and property.

What is now done by Great Britain while there is a powerful fleet in these seas may hereafter be attempted by some one of the treaty powers with a force wholly inadequate for the protection of residents.

I shall be pleased to learn that these views, thus hastily submitted, are substantially in accordance with your own already arrived at.

I have been induced to submit them for your consideration in consequence of our peculiar relations with this government, which will always be inclined to regard the treaty powers as one, and not be able to discriminate between them in the event of hostilities, and because the United States and Great Britain, having the largest commerce here, and the largest interests at stake, are most concerned in the preservation of peaceful relations.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,