[Enclosure No. 8.], April 30, 1863.

[Enclosure No. 8.]

Sir: As you are already aware, your despatch of the 20th instant was sent to Yedo while I was on the way to see you, at the request of the Japanese government, in reference to the extension of the time fixed for their reply to the demands made by your government.

The time thus occupied, the interviews with the Japanese government consequent thereon, and a visit to Yokohama to make the necessary inquiries to enable me to notice that part of your letter relating to the sale of arms by citizens of the United States, have prevented an earlier reply.

I have already thanked you for your kindness in reading to me the note you were about to address to the Japanese government, conveying the decision which the government of Great Britain had taken; and as on that occasion you had informed me that you were acting under explicit instructions, it was far from my thought, while writing my letter of the 18th, to attribute to you the disposition to act with undue haste. On the contrary, I can bear willing witness to the kindness and considerate forbearance which, as far as I have observed, has marked your intercourse with this government. Nor was it my purpose to express an unfavorable opinion with reference to the action of the British cabinet.

I had in view only the safety of American citizens. My solicitude was increased by the fact that among those citizens there was a larger number of women and children than of all other nationalities combined. In the absence of a national vessel of the United States, and of any offer of protection to those women and childrend from any source whatever, I could not but deplore a notice which appeared to contemplate the possible abandonment of the place, and was a deliberate declaration—a few days before the expiration of the period, when you had assured me measures might be taken which might eventuate in hostilities —of the insufficiency of the force at Yokohama for the defence of the place.

I felt it my duty to refer briefly to the serious consequences which might follow such abandonment, or from a partial success of the Japanese; and not being aware of the precise character of your instructions, I hoped they might be such as to enable you to postpone a resort to such measures until better prepared for defence. I have carefully reviewed my letter, and see nothing in its language or its spirit which I regret or would desire to modify, particularly as I had not failed in my conversation with you, before referred to, to express my opinion with great freedom, and to assure you of my desire for the prompt and satisfactory adjustment of the demands. I take this occasion to assure you that I had no idea that my delay in acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 7th could be attributed to a want of sympathy. You had already given me more information than that letter contained, for which I had thanked you; when your letter followed I regarded it as formal, and for the purpose of record, and as I had held several conversations with the Japanese government, I indulged the hope that I would be able to communicate to you information which might at least give promise of an amicable settlement when acknowledging its receipt. I need not remind you that on the day succeeding the murder of Mr. Richardson, Mr. de Wit, his Netherlands Majesty’s consul general, and myself obtained with much difficulty, because without the customary formalities, an interview with the ministers for foreign affairs, and made every effort to awaken them to the necessity of prompt and vigorous action and ample reparation. Nor have I since failed to bring this subject repeatedly to their notice, and to urge the danger of delay, and the advisability of proffering satisfaction in advance of a demand. And I have it in my power to say, and after this I trust my position cannot be misunderstood, that I have more than once advised a compliance with the demands of your government, on one occasion reading to them immediately on its receipt a letter in which the hope of the President was expressed that ample reparation would be made.

I also assure you that I have not been unmindful of the wise and humane proposition made by Mr. Seward to the British representative at Washington, in 1861, to which you refer, which was also made to the other treaty powers. On the tenth day of April, two days after the receipt of your letter, I referred to it in a letter addressed to my own government. I thought it proper, however, in writing you, to avoid expressing any regret that the government of Great Britain had not thought it desirable on the present occasion to act in concert with the other powers, thinking it more respectful to leave such expression to my government if it thought proper to make it.

If I rightly understand Mr. Seward’s proposition, he desired to establish the principle that the treaty powers, recognizing their identity of interest and their exposure to a common danger, should abstain from separate action and make common cause in maintaining common rights, and securing the common safety of their citizens and subjects. It was a wise suggestion, because it insured unity of action and moderation and equity of demand; it was humane likewise, because necessarily attended with peaceful results.

The proposition was made shortly after intelligence had reached him of the murder of Mr. Heusken, a subject of his Netherlands Majesty, temporarily in the employ of the government of the United States. It was made neither because the United States felt unable of itself to enforce, if needful, just reparation, or was unwilling to incur the sole expense.

For the sake of a salutary precedent, a specific demand for redress was waived. A moderate provision for Mr. Heusken’s widowed mother, who was dependent on him for support, was accepted nearly a year after his death by my predecessor on his own responsibility, but not in satisfaction of his murder, the Japanese government at that time being distinctly informed that the arrest and punishment of the murderers was demanded.

With reference to the supply of arms “through the active agency of merchants of the United States established in this country,” which you state as “a regretable and notable fact,” I have to say that I have made strict inquiry, and am satisfied that with one exception no sales whatever have been made by citizens of the United States to any Japanese since the sixth instant. And I have reason to believe that in the case referred to the sale was made without reference to the present relations with Japan, and consisted of a small parcel brought over in the British steamer Leemin. I examined particularly into the sale of pistols you referred to, when I asked for specifications. The number of pistols sold was less than forty, and, with one exception, to foreign residents. These are only sales by citizens of the United States, with the exception of five hundred muskets sold to the daimio charged with the defence of Yokohama, which was on a contract made before you presented the demand of your government, and, if I mistake not, the arms were also actually delivered before that time.

A part of the exaggeration may have arisen from attempts, made by British merchants to effect sales through merchants of the United States, of which I have been informed on reliable authority. I have also been informed that one sale, whether shortly after or before your note was sent in I am not sure, was actually made by a British merchant, but I am also informed that he can plead in mitigation of his offence that the contract was not consummated, as the arms were so poor as likely to be most destructive to those who used them.

I was startled by that part of your letter wherein you say, “Current reports proclaim a still more active agency on the part of the United States in behalf of Japanese preparation for resistance, which, if they were subjected to proof, would ill accord with the spirit of the conjoint action and policy suggested by Mr. Seward,” &c.

I had the honor to receive your explanation of this remark, which was, that on one occasion, at night, a small boat was going up the creek adjoining Yokohama and was hailed. Some one responded it was Mr. Conner who was on board, which was untrue, as those who hailed were in his employ and knew to the contrary, and on the hail being repeated the answer was that it was Mr. Banks, the assistant United States marshal. It did not seem to occur to you that the second reply was probably as false as the first. The significance of this alleged transaction consisted in the fact of his official position, which I had the power to inform you at that time had terminated on the first of January last. Neither does it appear that the contents of the boat were known. I cannot see why it should have been assumed that arms were on board. Our consul informs me that extensive smuggling operations have recently been carried on of ale, wines, and other articles of bulk, to which his attention has been called, and I think it more likely that in the case referred to a fraud was being perpetrated on the custom-house.

I am informed that the sales of arms, at least those made by citizens of the United States, have been made openly, and I cannot imagine, therefore, why the cover of night should be sought for their delivery. It is proper also that I should say that Mr. Banks solemnly denies all knowledge of the transaction referred to, or of any sale or carriage of arms whatsoever, and it is not pretended that he was identified.

As I am informed that nearly if not quite all the arms which have been brought to Yokohama came in British vessels, you have more opportunity of ascertaining what quantity has arrived than I have, particularly as you are in the place, and I am twenty miles distant.

You well know how little reliance can be placed on the reports of which Yokohama is the prolific parent, and I hope you have already had reason to distrust some of those to which you have referred.

In noticing this part of your letter I have waived the reply which might have been made, that all the transactions referred to, limited as they are in number and quantity, have been openly made in a time of peace, which I still hope will happily continue.

Should you regard it of sufficient importance, I shall be happy to join with you in any investigation you may judge needful, and I am convinced that the citizens of the United States will be found as little liable to censure as those of any other nation. I shall feel it my duty in this important crisis to attend any meeting of my colleagues which may be found necessary. A notice given in the evening would bring me to Yokohama the succeeding day.

Thanking you for your kind wishes for the restoration of my health, which is happily effected, I am sir, your most obedient, humble servant,