Edward C. Lord to G. F. Seward, February 28, 1880

Mr. Lord to Mr. Seward.

Sir: In reply to the request made in your dispatch, No. 51, dated the 10th ultimo, that I should report to you such facts as I might be able to obtain bearing upon the war power of China, including the condition of the army and navy, and of the forts, arsenals, and training establishments of this district, I beg to submit the following notes:

1. In speaking of the army and navy of China, it is needful at the outset to observe that these institutions are very unlike those to which these names are given in the West) The armies and the navies of England, France, Germany, and the United States, though differing as to size, make-up, and equipment, are yet all organizations. Each is a body, made up indeed of many parts, but of parts in which there is a mutual relation and a mutual dependence. And this body, however complicated, however vast, is governed by one law, animated by one spirit, and moved by one mind. An arm of the nation to which it belongs, the life of that nation lives in it, and the will of that nation controls it. The case is different here. Here there are men called soldiers, but there is no army; there are vessels called men-of-war, but there is no navy. Materials there may be adequate for both, but they are only materials, they are not yet constructed. In other words, the war power of China is essentially wanting in organization. Bearing this in mind, there will perhaps be no objection to the use of these terms, army and navy, in our notes on this subject.

2. There is in this province, as I suppose there is in each of the others, what in theory resembles a standing army. That is to say, there is a certain number of men enlisted and employed as soldiers. They are commanded by officers of various ranks, under the control of the te-tuh, or provincial general. The te-tuh of this province has naval, as well as army, jurisdiction. And for this reason he resides at Ningpo, the provincial port, rather than at Hangchow, the provincial capital. This officer is not, in our sense of the terms, either a naval or a military commander. He seems to be a sort of provincial secretary of war and of the navy. His jurisdiction and his powers are certainly large, but his knowledge of the matters over which he is placed must be very limited. He is supposed to know the number and location of his soldiers; the kind of arm—jingall, matchlock, or musket—which they bear; the names and commands of his subordinates; the amount of pay which soldiers and officers receive; and such like matters. He is supposed to know also when, where, and how many soldiers are needed, either to man forts, hold positions, or to put down disturbances. And, to a similar extent, his knowledge and authority extend to the vessels of war belonging to or serving within his district. But in matters of practical warfare, such as army organization and discipline, navigation, naval architecture, gunnery, army and naval tactics, as they are understood in the West, he has probably very little theoretical and no practical knowledge. What, then, one might ask, is he good for? Well, in war, as it is carried on among western nations, he would be good for nothing. But he has his place here.

The war power of this province, such as it is, needs a head. And the head that he makes has at least this to recommend it, that it is suited to the body. And, it may be added, both are in keeping with the ideas and institutions of the country.

3. The number of soldiers enrolled in this province is not always the same. A few years ago it is said to have been some 39,000. The present number is said to be about 20,000. And it seems to be regulated in this way: The te-tuh, the officer of whom I have spoken, is presumed to know the number, kind, and equipment of the soldiers needed to defend and keep in order his district. He reports on these matters to the lieutenant-governor or to the governor, or to both, and through them, or with their concurrence, to the head government at Peking. And the order received in reply settles, in theory, the matter. I say “in theory,” for in this, as in many other things here, theory and practice are not always the same.

If the general government assents to the enrollment of 20,000 soldiers in this province, it must of course allow the expense for the pay and equipment of this number, to be deducted from the provincial revenue. This being understood, it is easy to see that those in charge of the matter might, if so inclined, actually employ a number considerably less than that reported as needed, and appropriate the amount thus saved to objects nearer home; common report says that this is done, and done to a very considerable extent. And common report in this matter is very likely correct. There is no way to ascertain the actual number of soldiers in this province. But I should be inclined to place it below rather than above 10,000. This number, or the number whatever it may be, is distributed in larger or smaller detachments throughout the province. The nominal number assigned to Ningpo and its surroundings is betwixt two and three thousand. This includes also those who serve on board the gunboats.

4. The land forces of this province are infantry. The country, owing to the want of roads, and to the numerous canals and watercourses, is adapted to the use of neither cavalry nor artillery. They are armed mainly with jingalls, matchlocks, and muskets. These jingalls and matchlocks are very rude and unwieldy weapons of war, and they could be of very little use in conflict with arms now used in the West. The muskets are foreign made, but only a small number are in use; and those in use are most likely of inferior kind.

5. Chinese soldiers are poorly paid. Each man is allowed a pound or two of rice per diem, and, in addition, a little money. The monthly pay of a soldier, including his rice, would probably not exceed $4. No clothing, I believe, is found him, except his uniform. This consists of a coarse blue cotton jacket, with some red trimming, and with some letters stitched on the front and back. The whole cost of this garment would probably be less than a dollar. And it is of very little use, except to indicate that the person wearing it is a soldier.

6. These soldiers are not only poorly equipped and poorly paid, but they are poorly disciplined. Indeed, they can hardly be said to have any discipline. A large number of them are engaged in other pursuits, and are seldom or never called upon to render any military service. And even those supposed to be in the service are only to a very limited extent charged with the duties of ordinary soldiers. Their mode of life is essentially idle, and their idleness results in demoralization. Thus, badly equipped, badly paid, and badly disciplined, they could not, one would suppose, be of any great benefit to their country. They may be, and probably they are, of some use in putting down or preventing local disturbances, though in doing it they are sure to commit extortions and cruelties of every kind. But the protection which they would afford their country, in case of hostile invasion, would probably be very small. The soldiery of this province a few years ago, when called to face the long-haired rebels, were not only weak, but they were utterly contemptible. It was said of them, and I believe with entire justice, that they were more formidable to their friends than to their enemies. They may have improved somewhat since then; yet, even now, were similar troubles to arise, is it likely that their behavior would be such as to redeem them from this old contempt? I think it very doubtful.

7. On the whole, then, the war power of this province, so far as concerns the number, character, and equipment of its soldiers, does not seem to be very formidable. Formidable no doubt it would be in attacking and cutting down unarmed peasants, and in burning and ravaging their districts. But placed face to face with well-armed and well-disciplined troops, it would not and could not stand.

8. The fortifications that are kept up in this province are not numerous, and most of them, I should judge, would be of very little use in case of hostile invasion. An exception to this remark should perhaps be made in favor of a fort of some pretensions recently built at the mouth of the Ningpo River. I have not Visited this fort myself, and I can give no better account of it than that found in the Reports on Trade at the Treaty Ports in China for the year 1875, page 181, and which, to save the trouble of reference, I will here copy: “The out station of Chinhai has been some time in the hands of the military engineers. A large fort is being built there on the extremity of the citadel hill, on the left bank of the river. This fort is being built after foreign designs—I believe supplied by Germans. It stands about 60 feet above the water, and commands the entrance to the river, the direct line of fire of the guns bearing (as far as I could judge) on the Seaon Yew Spit buoy. This fort, which is being built of native stone, is intended to be bomb-proof. The guns will be mounted on three platforms, four on the lower, three on the next, and one on the top. The lower ones at least will be mounted en embrasure, the openings being plated with iron to a thickness of about three inches, and provided with riveted iron doors of about the same thickness. The guns on the lower platforms are English made, of rather early date, but I believe they have been bored out and refined. The piece de resistance will be mounted on the upper platform. It is a large, breech-loading 10-ton Krupp cannon, mounted on a carriage worked by hydraulic power, and made to train over an arc of some 150°. It was brought here on the 5th June in the Chinese gun-vessel Fupo, and remained for some time on board pending the devising of some means of getting it landed at Chinhai. After some three or four months it was landed close under the fort and raised to the necessary elevation on a series of wooden platforms securely fixed into the rock. I have not yet heard of its being mounted. The estimated cost of the whole fort is put down at Haikwan taels 30,000. The work is being principally done by soldier labor.”

There was a fort in the process of construction in the harbor of Ting-hai at Chu-san, in the summer of 1876. I saw it at that time. It was built of stone. Its form was round or polygonal. Its walls were some seven or eight feet high, and some five or six feet thick. It had ports, I think, for some five or six guns, and quarters sufficient to accommodate some fifty soldiers. The work was yet unfinished. No guns were seen in or about the place. The work appeared to me unsubstantial, and good for nothing against heavy cannon shot. I do not know whether the work has been completed, but I suppose it has.

There are two forts that I have noticed on the banks of the Wenchow River; one is at the city of Wenchow, a little east of the city wall, the other is on the opposite bank of the river and several miles further down. I have not seen the inside of either, but I should judge them to be frail structures, and with no effective armament.

9. There is no arsenal or place where arms are manufactured or ships are built in this province. The war steamers on this station (there are three of them now) were built at the Foochow Arsenal. Two of these vessels are stationed at Ningpo, and one at Wenchow. This vessel is but recently built. She was waiting for her armament a week or two ago. These three vessels, both in size and equipment, are very respectable, and in war, if well handled, they would no doubt do good service. They are commanded and worked entirely by natives.

I have, &c.,