Anson Burlingame to William H. Seward, June 23, 1863
Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward
Sir: You are aware from my previous despatches that when General Ward was killed, General Burgevine, the next in command of the force, was, through the efforts of Vice-Admiral Sir James Hope, Sir Frederick Bruce, the British minister, as I now learn, and myself, put in his place. The pecuniary affairs of the force under Ward were not in first-rate condition, from the fact that he left them entirely to the hands of the local Chinese officials.
When General Burgevine took the command he undertook to reform its affairs. This conduct on his part at once raised the indignation of the corrupt Chinese officials who had been making money out of the Chinese government in the name of the Ward force, and they formed a conspiracy to put him out. He was nominally under the military direction of Governor Li, who ordered him, without preparation, to attack Nanking; this he could not do, as the authorities would not aid with supplies. At last, the men of the force, without pay, became mutinous, and threatened their Chinese leaders with death. Burgevine kept them together. Takee, whose business it was to supply money, failed to do it; but, under the fear of the force, promised General Burgevine that if he would come to Shanghai he should have the money to pay the force. The money was there delivered to the general, and he paid the troops with it; but after it was delivered, Takee, who is thought to be anything but honest, intending to have a rupture with Burgevine, insulted him in the most gross manner, to such a degree that Burgevine, though a mild man, lost control of himself and struck him. This was all Takee wished. Burgevine was instantly denounced as a robber of public money, a reward of 50,000 taels was offered for his head, and every conceivable charge made against him; and though the force wished to defend him against these men, he would not permit it, but appealed at once to Peking. Before I learned these facts, I received from Prince Kung a despatch, marked A, in which all manner of charges are made against General Burgevine. In a short time I received General Burgevine’s statement, with evidence to sustain it, covering forty or fifty pages. I at once had it translated and sent to the Prince, with a letter marked B, in which I did not claim any right to have General Burgevine restored to the command, or to interfere in their affairs, but expressed the hope that, when he should examine the facts, he would not permit one who had so long, and, I believed, honestly served the Chinese government, to be lost to it; that I was sorry he did not wait, before publishing his despatch, to hear Burgevine’s story, &c. As to the claim he made to try General Burgevine by Chinese law, I utterly denied his right to do so, and informed him that no citizen of the United States could be tried but by the consuls of his country, and according to the laws of the United States. General Burgevine came to Peking. After a great many conferences with the members of the government, and a great many explanations, the government was convinced that the general had been wronged, and undertook to restore him to the command.
My colleagues became as much interested in his case as I was, and unitedly sustained him.
Sir Frederick Bruce wrote, after a full examination of the evidence, the letter marked C, which disproves the charges which had been brought against him. In my interview I learned that all power in the south along the Yangteze had been given to Changkwokfau, and that Governor Li, an able Chinese, was a creature of his, and the sum to do was to restore Burgevine without offending these local authorities. It was then understood that what had been said on both sides should go for nothing, and that I should write a request that Burgevine should be restored, and if restored, that he would try to make things go smoothly; that they would reply in a letter, which would “save the faces,” as they called it, of the local authorities, and that they would send an officer with General Burgevine to explain privately to Governor Li why the general should be restored. I wrote the letter marked D, and they responded in the letter marked E. General Burgevine proceeded to Shanghai, accompanied by an officer, but upon his arrival it was found impossible to secure his restoration; and the government, to conceal their weakness with their local authorities, tried to cover their failure by pretending that they had new charges, which they made in the despatch marked F. When they found that I would not permit such charges to go unchallenged, and that I required proof of them, they then changed again, and in private admitted that they knew Burgevine was innocent, but that they were afraid to do him justice because of the local authorities. I then said if the local authorities were stronger than they were, then I must see them. I only desired to know where the government of China was. They then said if General Burgevine would go to Shanghai and relieve his character from the charges in relation to accounts, they would fulfil their promise. I consented to this. They changed again, and said a witness had arrived who would meet Burgevine face to face, and that he need not go to Shanghai. I assented to this; but before the day of meeting they refused to permit General Burgevine to meet the witness.
I found that the witness was Seih, late superintendent of trade at Shanghai, and that he pretended to have new charges. I objected to his proceeding with them in the absence of General Burgevine, and stated that if he did I would not remain. He did not proceed. I then found that through their desire to please me, and their fear of Changkwokfau and Governor Li, they had gotten themselves into a most embarrassing position. I then said to them, as we had discussed the question for weeks, and as I had disproved the charges again and again, that I must insist upon a final interview; that I had no right to require that they should employ Burgevine— indeed that he now utterly refused to be employed by them; but that, as an American citizen’s reputation was dearer to him than life, it was my right and my duty to see to it, that the charges which had been disproved to the satisfaction not only of myself, but of all my colleagues, should be withdrawn.
It was agreed, at a final interview, that if I would disclaim the right to have him employed, and state the charges which had been made against him, they should be withdrawn. I addressed to him the letter marked G, to which I received in reply the letter marked H; which, so far from withdrawing the charges, reiterated a portion of them, and made the singular statement that if he were innocent they would not hurt him, &c. I then felt that it was necessary to end the subject by sending a kind of ultimatum, which I did in letter marked I, in which I stated that I did not wish to discuss the subject any further, but that if they did not withdraw the charges stated in a former despatch within two days, I should take it for granted that the Chinese government refused to do justice, and should take such action as the case required. In the afternoon of the second day I received the letter marked J, in which the charges are all withdrawn. To this I replied, expressing my satisfaction, in letter, marked K. Thus ended this most protracted affair. I do not send you all the papers, for they would make a volume, but content myself with this brief history of the case, and with sending only such despatches as illustrate it.
The result is, my relations are better than ever with the Chinese, and the whole subject of employing foreigners has been considered by the legations at Peking, and the conclusion arrived at, that we do not think it wise to encourage our people in putting themselves in positions where they may be subject to the grossest injustice from the Chinese, and become the cause of dangerous complications among ourselves.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.
Mr. Burlingame to Prince Kung
Sir: I have the honor to state, in reference to the communication of your imperial highness of the 7th of the 12th moon, that I have just received by mail the facts in relation to Burgevine, as stated by many witnesses at Shanghai; and that your highness may have them, I send herewith a full translation of them, and beg to say that I find a variance from the statement made to you by Governor Li; and so great is that variance, that I regret that your highness did not, before sending to arrest Burgevine, wait to hear from him. Surely the man who had built up Ward’s force by his organizing ability, who had fought in all the battles with that force with success, and who had been many times greviously wounded in the Chinese service, was entitled to less summary treatment. As a friend of the Chinese government, desiring to see the rebellion put down and Ward’s force kept together, I recommended Burgevine. As the English had Osburn on the sea, I thought it was fair to keep an American at the head of the “Ever Conquering Legion” on the land, not to antagonize the English, for we are friends, and have a common interest in your prosperity. Indeed, Sir James Hope was the first to recommend Burgevine; and Mr. Bruce has informed me that he approved of that recommendation. I deeply regret that anything should have occurred to destroy our hopes. Though I disclaim any right to interfere in your affairs, still you will not take it unkindly from a friend if I express the hope that even yet the difficulty with Burgevine may be arranged, and a brave and, I believe, honest officer retained in the Chinese service. By all the testimony, his affair with Takee was his only fault; and but for that fault, the Chinese force would have been dissolved. A short time since, Burgevine seized 12,000 taels’ worth of contraband arms from one of my own countrymen for the Chinese government; and when the case was appealed to me, I at once decided that the arms rightly belonged to the Chinese government by confiscation.
Touching the question of punishment, I have looked carefully over the treaty, and find that he cannot be punished except by his own consul, and according to the laws of the United States. If he has committed any offence, he will certainly be punished by the consul. Your highness must see that the doctrine claimed by Governor Li would drive every foreigner from your service, both in the custom-house and army, and would make it impossible for us to assist each other, as we are now doing.
I have, &c.,
Prince Kung, Chief Secretary for Foreign Affairs.