Anson Burlingame to William H. Seward, October 25, 1862

Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward

Sir: I have the honor to inform you that I have received your kind despatch in reply to No. 12, of mine, and that it is exceedingly gratifying to me.

Since I last wrote you, Prince Kung and suite have returned my visit. The conversations were full, frank, and friendly. I have also entered into a tolerably extensive correspondence with his Imperial Highness Prince Kung, as the communications I send will inform you. The first question for discussion, directly with the government, arose on the receipt, by the Prince, of my communication, marked A, requesting that instructions should be sent to the Chinese authorities at the treaty ports Hankow, Kiukiang, Newchwang, and Tientsin, to recognize the newly appointed consuls at those places. This they had, in a manner, refused to do, because these consuls were men engaged in trade. In support of their position, they cited a casual remark in a letter written by one of my predecessors, Mr. Reed, to the effect that the United States did not appoint as consul any men thus engaged—a remark totally without the authority of precedent or law. Prince Kung, in his reply, marked B, taking the extract from Mr. Reed for law, proceeds to make complaint that such men should be appointed. In my reply, marked C, I maintain our right to appoint them. I refer to the fact that the French and Russians have, in China, such consuls, and explain the meaning, as far as I can, of Mr. Reed’s language, and ask the Prince if it is not better, where we have large trade, to have these men rather than none at all. The result has been, that while, as yet, they do not admit in any despatch my position, they have in interviews done so, and have sent, or say they have, the proper instructions to their officers.

I think, myself, that the policy of appointing men engaged in trade not a good one; but it was necessary to have some one, and I did the best I could, and selected men of such excellent character as to preclude all idea of corruption. Still, the business houses, not having consuls, imagine that they are taken at a disadvantage, and complain. I, therefore, earnestly recommend that, at the ports of Hankow, Kiukiang, and Tientsin, the consuls should be salaried. The next subject for communication, rather than discussion, is disclosed in the communication of Prince Kung, marked D, in which he states that he has received a communication from the governor of Kiangsei, informing him that the rebels had raised 500,000 taels with which to purchase steamers in the United States, and begs, after thanking me for what I had already done in that direction, that I would write again to my government, warning it against the intentions of the rebels. Not receiving an immediate reply to that communication, as I was at Tientsin, where I had gone to meet my family, he addressed another communication to me, marked E, in which he reiterates his statement about steamers, and makes a grave charge against my countrymen for selling arms to rebels, and urges me to stop them. In my reply, marked F, I stated the origin of the rumor about the purchase of steamers, that I had heard it as early as December last, when I immediately communicated it to my government, from which I had received a reply that it had no knowledge of any such transactions. I intimated that this was a revival of that rumor, and stated that there could be no danger from the rebels on the sea, because of the overwhelming force opposed to them there. As to the selling of arms, of which he justly complained, I told him that I had, ever since I had been in the empire, done all I could to prevent such things, and that all the officials of the United States had done the same thing, and were still ready so to do; that he had brought no specific charges against my countrymen. I denounced the trade in contraband articles, and said that I was ready, and ever had been, to consult and co-operate with the officers of his government and those of the treaty powers, to the end that this traffic might be prevented; that my countrymen, equally with his own, were suffering from lawless men. I pointed out the dangerous practice, on the part of Chinese officials, of granting “permits” to land arms, by which this trade could be facilitated. I stated, specifically, in that communication, and orally, to be communicated to Prince Kung, that these “permits” had prevented the seizure of arms. Mr. Bruce, the British minister, when he heard that I had made this suggestion, immediately supported it in the most positive language, and said to the medium of communication, in substance, that “standing together here we will do our part, and the Chinese government must do its duty.”

The Chinese government is sorely tried by rebels, lawless foreigners, and corrupt local officials. But I hope for the best. There is one great man in the government, Wensiang, who is master of the situation, and who comprehends the grave condition of affairs, and earnestly and uncorruptibly strives to maintain the integrity of the government. The representations of the treaty powers, without exception, sympathize with the government. If it can maintain itself for a few years the danger will be passed and order restored peacefully, without subjecting the whole empire to one of those gigantic struggles through which nations sometimes pass when moving from a lower to a higher form of civilization.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,