Winf'd S. Hancock to George G. Meade, September 21, 1865

GENERAL:

I have the honor to forward my report of the operations of the Second Army Corps from June 13 until July 26, 1864, which is the time designated by Major-General Meade as the fifth epoch of the campaign.

The troops reached Wilcox’s Landing, on the James River, at 5.30 p. m. on the 13th. Myself and the officers of my staff were busily engaged during that night and the following day and night in conducting the embarkation of the troops and material of my corps, which were all safely landed on the south bank of the James, at Wind-Mill Point, near upper landing, at an early hour on the morning of the 15th. My headquarters remained on the north bank of the river until the troops had crossed, communication being kept up by the signal telegraph.

I had been directed by General Meade on the evening of the 14th to hold my troops in readiness to move, and informed that it was probable I would be instructed to march toward Petersburg, and that rations for my command would be sent me from City Point. Later in the evening the following instructions reached me from General Meade :

General Butler has been ordered to send to you at Wind-Mill Point 60,000 rations ; so soon as they are received and issued you will move your command by the most direct route to Petersburg, taking up a position where the City Point railroad crosses Harrison’s Creek, where we now have a work.

On receipt of the above instructions I at once sent my chief commissary to the south bank of the James to receive and issue the expected rations.

About 4a. m. on the 15th I wrote to General Williams, assistant adjutant-general of the Army of the Potomac, that all of my troops, save one regiment of infantry and four batteries, were disembarked on the south side of the James, but that the rations which I had been informed I would receive from City Point had not arrived, and that I feared that a good deal of time would be required to issue them when they came. About 6.30 a. m. I again reported to General Williams that no rations had arrived.

I delayed the order for my troops to march until 9 a. m., waiting to receive the rations from City Point, but as they did not arrive I gave the order by signal telegraph for the head of the column to move. I also sent Lieutenant-Colonel Morgan, my chief of staff, to General Birney (who was to take the advance) with the same order, but the boat in which he crossed to the south bank grounded and he was delayed half an hour, to find on landing that the order which I had sent by signal telegraph had miscarried. In consequence the column did not get in motion until 10.30 a.m. I notified the commanding general that the expected rations had not arrived, and that I had given orders for my troops to move at once; this order was approved, and I was instructed to push forward to the position designated for my command behind Harrison’s Creek. Lieutenant-Colonel Morgan, my chief of staff, was directed to remain with General Birney to conduct the march of the column. He was furnished with a map from headquarters of the army, on which our position behind Harrison’s Creek was marked—by the map about four miles from Petersburg, and between that place and City

Point. It is proper to say in this connection that it afterward appeared my orders were based on incorrect information, and the position I was ordered to take did not exist as it was described on my instructions; Harrison’s Creek proved to be inside the enemy’s lines and not within miles of where it was laid down on the map with which I was furnished to guideme. The map was found to be utterly worthless, the only roads laid down on it being widely out of the way. Colonel Morgan succeeded in obtaining some negro guides, and on his communicating to me the information he had obtained from them, I decided that the speediest way to get to the position I was directed to occupy would be to turn the head of the column from the Prince George Court-House road toward Old Court-House, and then by a cross-road get behind Harrison’s Creek as laid down on the map. None of the inhabitants could or would give any information concerning the location of this creek. Accordingly Birney’s and Gibbon’s divisions were turned to the right, leaving the Prince George Court-House road, within six miles of Petersburg, before 3p.m. Barlow’s division with the train marched by the Old Court-House on a shorter road, which the head of his column had barely passed. At 5.30 p.m., as the column neared Old CourtHouse, Birney being about one mile distant, a dispatch from General Grant, addressed to General Gibbon or any division commander of the Second Corps, reached me. This dispatch directed all haste to be made in getting up to the assistance of General Smith, who it stated had attacked Petersburg and carried the outer works in front of that city. A few moments later a note from General Smith was delivered to me by one of his staff, which informed me that he (General Smith) was authorized by Lieutenant-General Grant to call upon me for assistance and requesting me to come up as rapidly as possible. Fortunately these dispatches were received just when the head of Birney’s division was passing a country road leading directly toward Petersburg, and the column (Birney’s and Gibbon’s troops) was turned in that direction. No time had been lost on the march during the day although it was excessively hot. The road was covered with clouds of dust, and but little water was found on the route, causing severe suffering among the men.

I desire to say here that the messages from Lieutenant-General Grant and from General Smith, which I received between 5 and 6 p. m. on the 15th, were the first and only intimations I had that Petersburg was to be attacked that day. Up to that hour I had not been notified from any source that I was expected to assist General Smith in assaulting that city. Some artillery firing had been heard for many hours in the direction of Petersburg, and careful inquiry was made during the day of the inhabitants as to its cause, but the only information I could get on the subject was that General Kautz’s cavalry, with some artillery, had passed toward Petersburg; I attributed the firing to some reconnaissance or raid by that officer.

I have been particular in describing the incidents of the march of my command on the 15th, because I conceive that undue importance has been attached to the fact that my troops did not arrive in front of Petersburg at an earlier hour on that evening, which has been given asa reason that the city was not taken that evening, and because I believe that the circumstances attending the movements of my troops on that day have never yet been fully explained. Linformedthe major-general commanding the Army of the Potomac on the morning of the 15th that I was supplied with rations for one day, and had I then been notified that Petersburg was to be assaulted on the 15th the delay occasioned by waiting for rations at Wind-Mill Point would have been immaterial ; but notwithstanding that delay I could have joined General Smith by marching directly toward him at Petersburg by 4p. m. I was even, as I have before mentioned, at a point six miles from that city on the Prince George Court-House road at 3 p. m.

My troops received no rations until the 16th, when they occupied the works in front of Petersburg, the rations having been sent to City Point. I spent the best hours of the day on the 15th in marching by an incorrect map in search of a designated position, which, as described, was not in existence or could not be found.

When Birney and Gibbon turned off toward Petersburg, orders were sent to General Barlow to march toward the same point by the nearest route from Old Court-House, but by some misapprehension his division took the City Point road and was not brought up to Petersburg until daylight the next morning. As soon as Lieutenant-General Grant’s note, directing me to hasten to the assistance of General Smith, reached me, I sent my chief of staff to inform General Smith of the whereabouts of my column, and to assure him that I was marching to his support with all dispatch. At 6.30 p.m. the head of Birney’s division had arrived at the Bryant house, on Bailey’s Creek, about one mile in rear of the position of Hinks’ division, of the Eighteenth Corps. Leaving Birney and Gibbon instructions to move forward as soon as they could ascertain at what point their assistance was required, I rode forward to the field, where I met General Smith, who described to me the operations of the day, and pointed out as well as he could in the dusk of the evening the position of the enemy’s lines he had carried. I now informed him that two divisions of my troops were close at hand and ready for any further movements which in his judgment and knowledge of the field should be made. General Smith requested me to relieve his troops in the front line of works which he had carried, so that the enemy should encounter fresh troops should they attempt their recapture. He was then of the opinion that the enemy had been reenforced during the evening. In accordance with this request, I at once directed Birney and Gibbon to move up and occupy the captured earth-works from the Friend house, on the right, to the Dunn house, on the left of the Prince George road. By the time this movement was completed it was 11 p. m., too late and dark for any immediate advance. At midnight I instructed Generals Birney and Gibbon that if any commanding points were held by the enemy between their positions and the Appomattox they should be attacked and taken at or before daylight. I was extremely anxious that all the ground between my line and the river should be in our possession before the enemy could get his heavy re-enforcements up. These instructions were not promptly complied with, and it was not until about 6 a. m. on the 16th that Generals Birney and Gibbon advanced to reconnoiter the ground in their front, by which time the enemy had moved a considerable body of fresh troops on the field, had occupied the large redoubt and rifle-pits in front of the Avery house, and had greatly strengthened their positions at all important points. During this first advance on the morning of the 16th, Egan’s brigade, of Birney’s division, made a spirited attack upon the enemy, who held a small redoubt on Birney’s left, which was carried by Egan in his usual intrepid manner. Barlow’s division arrived on the field about daylight, and took position on Birney’s left, extending toward the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad.

Between the hours of 11 and 12 on the night of the 15th, after Birney and Gibbon had relieved the troops of General Smith on his front line,

Ihad a dispatch from General Grant directing me to move up to Smith’s division, stating that General Butler understood that I had halted at Bailey’s Creek instead of at Harrison’s Creek, where I had been directed to go. It is proper to say here that my troops had only halted at Bailey’s Creek long enough for me to see General Smith and to inform myself as to the point on the battle-field at which they would be most serviceable; when I had obtained such information the troops were 1mmediately marched to the front. The same dispatch from LieutenantGeneral Grant stated that the enemy were then throwing re-enforcements into Petersburg, and instructed me that should Petersburg not fall on the night of the 15th it would be advisable for General Smith and myself to take up a defensive position and maintain it until all of our forces came up. These directions of the lieutenant-general were carried out; the earth-works captured by General Smith were turned against the enemy, artillery was brought up and placed in them, and all preparations were made to prevent their recapture.

During the forenoon of the 16th I was instructed by Lieutenant-General Grant, in the absence of General Meade and himself, to take command of all the troops in front of Petersburg, and to push forward a reconnoitering force in my front for the purpose of discovering the most favorable point at which to make an attack. I was ordered to be prepared to commence the attack at 6 p.m. In the mean time General Burnside had been directed to mass his corps upon my left, in readiness to assist in an assault upon the enemy when it should be determined, or to aid me in the event of my being assailed. The reconnaissance ordered by General Grant was made by General Birney on the left of the Prince George road, and in front of the hill on which the Hare house stood, which was then held by the enemy. It was decided by Major-General Meade, who had now arrived upon the field, that the attack should be made at that point. Very sharp skirmishing, accompanied by artillery fire, continued along my front until 6 p. m., when, in accordance with instructions from the major-general commanding, I directed Generals Birney, Barlow, and Gibbon to advance and assault the enemy in front and to the left of the Hare house. My troops were supported by two brigades of the Ninth Corps and by two of the Eighteenth Corps. The advance was spirited and forcible, and resulted, after a fierce conflict, in which our troops suffered heavily, in driving the enemy back some distance along our whole line. The severe fighting ceased at dark, although the enemy made several vigorous attempts during the night to retake the ground which he had lost ; in this, however, he was foiled, as our troops had intrenched themselves at dark and repelled all efforts to dislodge them. Among the many casualties during this engagement was the gallant commander of the Irish Brigade, ‘Col. Patrick Kelly, Eighty-eighth New York Volunteers, who was killed at the head of his command while intrepidly leading it to the charge. Col. James A. Beaver, One hundred and forty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers, was severely wounded while performing his duty with his accustomed conspicuous bravery.

On the morning of the 17th General Barlow advanced against the enemy in conjunction with General Burnside, and succeeded in pushing forward his line considerably after some sharp fighting. Birney and Gibbon on the right also moved forward, driving the enemy from the hill on which the Hare house stood and occupied it. (Fort Stedman was afterward erected on that hill.) The enemy made frequent efforts to retake the Hare house during the day, but were handsomely repelled on each occasion. In the evening, about 6 p. m., General Barlow again participated in an attack with General Burnside’s corps, in which Barlow’s division lost heavily in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

The night of the 17th of June I was compelled to turn over my command on account of disability from my wound, which during the entire campaign had given me great annoyance, and at times had prevented me from taking that active part in the movement of my troops which I desired to do. I relinquished the command to Major-General Birney, the next senicr general officer present in my corps, who conducted its operations until the 27th of June, when, having partially recovered, I again assumed the command. From that date until the 26th of July my troops were engaged in the arduous and dangerous duties incident to the siege operations in front of Petersburg; severe and almost constant labor (much of it during the night) was required from the men in erecting the formidable earth-works which were thrown up in front of that town. While performing these exhausting labors, the troops were at all times exposed to a heavy artillery fire and to the enemy’s sharpshooters, from which a long list of casualties resulted daily.

The losses in action in the Second Corps during the period included in this report were over 6,000 men killed, wounded, and missing, as will be shown by the following tabular statement:

Killed. Wounded. Missing. g Command. Z 3 g PS) PO ee ey a be Es o a ® Fe ® vi) iS) A ‘S) a 5 a 4 Artillery Brigade 1 By eecee I) ooeeies 3

First Division. –. 17 249 53 1,006 29 922 2, 276 Second Division. – Soe)) ytd 161 44 805 32 907 1, 961 SEIT Oy Di vasiON eee see eerie ee PiaeOe ence 26 250 73 1,256 15 377 1,

ER Ota ee setae ict ttet eee Yaie ee ew siete Sie feilelelciei= 56 663 170 3, 077 76 2,209 6,

The casualties of the Kighth Ohio and First Delaware Volunteers are not included in the above table, as no reports of their losses have been furnished corps headquarters.

The conspicuous valor and good conduct of the officers and men under my command during the marches, battles, and siege operations embraced in this epoch of the campaign, gave me complete satisfaction and merit the highest commendation. As I have already stated in my reports of this campaign, it is impossible, owing to the fact that I have received so few reports from my subordinate commanders, for me to mention in detail the names of all the officers and men of my command who were specially distinguished for marked bravery and meritorious conduct. :

The following general officers, commanders of brigades and divisions, are entitled to my thanks for their distinguished and valuable services: The late Maj. Gen. D. B. Birney, then commanding Third Division, Second Corps; Brigadier-General (now Brevet Major-General) Barlow, commanding First Division; Major-General Gibbon, commanding Second Division; Brigadier-General Mott, commanding Third Brigade, Third Division; Brigadier-General (now Brevet Major-General) Miles, commanding First Brigade, First Division; Colonel (now Brevet MajorGeneral) Egan, commanding [First] Brigade, Third Division ; Colonel (now General) Pierce, commanding Third [First] Brigade, Second Division. Col. J. ©. Tidball, Fourth New York Heavy Artillery, chief of artillery, conducted himself with marked intrepidity ; the artillery under his command performed most effective service throughout the campaign. The batteries attached to the Second Corps were ably and gallantly commanded.

The following officers of ny staff deserve special mention for bravery and faithful performance of duties: Lieut. Col. (now Brig. Gen.) C. H. Morgan, chief of staff; Maj. (now Bvt. Brig. Gen.) W. G. Mitchell, aide-de-camp; Surg. (now Bvt. Lieut. Col.) A. N. Dougherty, medical director, Second Corps; Lieut. Col. (now Bvt. Col.) F. A. Walker, assistant adjutant-general, Second Corps; Lieut. Col. (now Col.) R. N. Batchelder, chief quartermaster, Second Corps; Lieut. Col. (now Bvt. Brig. Gen.) J. S. Smith, chief commissary of subsistence, Second Corps; Maj. S. O. Bull, provost-marshal, Second Corps; Maj. A. W. Angel, acting topographical engineer, Second Corps; Capt. (now Bvt. Lieut. Col.) I. B. Parker, aide-de-camp; Capt. (now Bvt. Maj.) W. De W. Miller, aide-de-camp; Capt. (now Bvt. Lieut. Col.) W. P. Wilson, acting assistant adjutant-general; the late Capt. E. P. Brownson, commissary of musters, Second Corps; Capt. (now Bvt. Maj.) C.S. McEntee, assistant quartermaster, and Captain Taylor, chief signal officer, Second Corps.

I have the honor to transmit herewith all of the reports received by me from subordinates who served under my command from May 3 until July 26, 1864.

very respectfully, your obedient servant,