William. H. Seward to Charles Francis Adams, January 30, 1865

Mr. Seward to Mr Adams

Sir. I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 12th of January.

I have read with much interest the letter of “Historicus,” in the Times, to which you have directed my attention. The publication clears up a mystery which I had found insoluble, and which for that reason was giving me some un easiness.

I give you herewith a copy of two pretended despatches of John Slidell, at Paris, to Judah P. Benjamin, in Bichmond, which was written on the 28th of November and on the 13th of December, respectively. In the first the emissary writes to the conspirator that in consequence of the absence of Lord Cowley, M. Drouyn de Lbuys has had no opportunity to speak to him on the subject of a certain communication of Benjamin, described as No. 42. Slidell adds, however, that as Lord Cowley has now returned to Paris, and as both he and M. Drouyn de Lhuys are invited guests of the Emperor at Compéigne during this week, Slidell thinks that the subject will be broached then. At least, (so he says,) “such is the opinion of my friend at the Affaires Étrangers.” Slidell, communicating the subject, says to Benjamin: Mr. Hotze will have informed you that, after diligent inquiry, he cannot find that any instructions relating to our cruisers or their prizes have recently issued from the admiralty. When the minister of foreign affairs returns to Paris, I will, I doubt not, be able to ascertain whether anything has been said or done by him in the matter.

Renewing the subject in the paper of the 13th of December, Slidell informs Benjamin that, for some reason or other, Lord Cowley did not avail himself of his invitation to Compéigne, (before mentioned,) and only returned from London a few days since. But Slidell adds, that during Lord Cowley’s-absence, M. Drouyn de Lhuys had not neglected to call the attention of the British government, as he had before promised, to the subject of Benjamin’s despatch, described as No. 43, as will appear by the following extract from à letter which Slidell had received from his friend at the Foreign Office. The extract is in the following words:

“M. Drouyn de Lhuys has written to our ambassador in London about the proposal of your government relative to neutral goods on board enemies’ vessels, and wishes to know the opinion of the English cabinet on that subject. He also, in conversation with the ministers of the marine and commerce, expressed the opinion that the proposal would be very acceptable. He is waiting for an answer, which I will not fail to, ask him to communicate to me,”

Slidell closes up the subject with the remark, that he expects soon to learn the secret of this overture to the British government.

The mystery which I have mentioned arose out of our ignorance of the contents of Benjamin’s so-called despatch No. 43, which was the basis of an intrigue carried on by an emissary at Paris, through the agency of a spy in the French Foreign Office, with the expected, but withheld, co-operation of the British ambassador at the imperial court. I now learn the character of that proposition from the publication of “ Historicus,” in the Times. Benjamin proposes to France and England modifications of their practice in regard to captures by rebel cruisers, as follows:

First, in the case of a vessel under enemy’s flag, with, cargo wholly or in part belonging to neutrals, Mr. Benjamin says that, under ordinary circumstances, this case would present no embarrassment. The captured vessel would be taken into a port of the captors, or of a neutral country, the portion of the cargo belonging to the neutral would be delivered to the owners, and the vessel, with such portion of the cargo as belongs to the enemy, would be condemned as prize.

Benjamin then proceeds thus: “The action of neutral governments has placed serious obstacles in the way of doing justice to their own people. They have closed their ports to the admission of captured vessels, and have thus rendered it impossible to make delivery in their own ports of the property of their own subjects, found on board of vessels of our enemies, while it would be exposing those vessels to almost certain recapture to attempt to “bring them into our ports, for the captured vessels are almost invariably sailing vessels, and the enemy’s cruisers off our ports are steamers Mr. Benjamin, after thus presenting the case, concludes upon it as follows: If, for instance, Great Britain will not permit a captured enemy’s vessel to be carried into one of her ports for the purpose of their delivery to a British subject of his goods found on board, she would certainly have no just ground of complaint that the goods were not restored to their owner. If, therefore, on the renewed representations we are about to make, we find neutral nations persist In refusing to receive the property of their subjects in their own ports, when captured by us on enemy’s vessels, it will become necessary to instruct our cruisers to destroy such property whenever they are unable to bring the prize into our ports. Benjamin, by way of stimulating her Majesty’s government to prompt compliance with these insurgent demands, complacently assumes that the commanders of our national cruisers should be instructed to continue their former practice of allowing the enemy to ransom his vessel in cases where the neutral property on board is of large value, or bears any considerable proportion to that of the enemy. But if a ransom bond is refused, or if the proportion of neutral property is small compared with the value of the vessel and the hostile cargo, the whole should be destroyed whenever the prize cannot be brought into a port of our own or a neutral country.

Having thus, in this manner, disposed of the first assumed case, he proceeds to state a second one, namely: a vessel really neutral, with cargo wholly or in part belonging to the enemy. Benjamin then states the rebel practice upon the case thus assumed, as follows: “The cruisers of the confederacy will therefore allow vessels of neutrals to pass free, unless laden with goods contraband of war; the contraband goods, if not the property of the owner of the vessel, are to be taken out if practicable, and transshipped or destroyed, and she is to be allowed to continue her voyage. But if the owner of the vessel has put on board contraband goods belonging to himself, destined for the enemy’s country, he thereby forfeits the neutral character, and the ship is to be considered an enemy’s vessel, and to be dealt with as such. No conflict with neutral powers on this subject is apprehended, as they have with entire unanimity issued proclamations forbidding their vessels, during the present war, from engaging in contraband trade, under penalty of forfeiture of national protection.

Benjamin then draws under review a third case, namely: a vessel ostensibly neutral, but really hostile, fraudulently placed under a neutral flag, and furnished with fraudulent papers, to protect her from capture.

In regard to this case, Benjamin avows this to be, the practice of the rebels: “The captain (of the cruiser) should in any case make rigid examination of the papers and documents of every vessel sailing under a neutral flag, known to have belonged to the enemy at the commencement of the war. He should take into consideration the nature of the trade in which the vessel is engaged, the national character of the master, the papers found on board, the place at which the alleged sale to the neutral took effect, by delivery of the vessel, and every other circumstance tending to establish the true nature of the transfer, and to satisfy his mind whether the vessel be really neutral, or merely disguised as such. If the captured vessel has double sets of papers, or if papers have been destroyed or subducted by her master during the chase, or if she has continued in the same course of trade and under the same master since the alleged sale to the neutral, it may be safely concluded that the property is still hostile, and covered by fraudulent use of neutral flag. In these and all other cases where there is great and decided preponderance of evidence to show that the vessel is really enemy’s property, the cruiser must act on his conviction and treat her as such, leaving to his government the responsibility of satisfying any neutral claim for her value. But when the commander has serious doubts as to the true character of the transfer, it will be proper rather to dismiss the vessel, if she cannot be brought into port, than to exercise a harsh and doubtful right.”

These are the new positions assumed by the rebels of the United States, recognized as a belligerent by the principal maritime powers of Europe, in derogation of the sovereignty of the United States. The positions dispense in every case with the necessity of ports and courts, and substitute the deck of the captor for the one, and the will of the captain for the other. The United States have no direct interest in the question, whether the other maritime powers shall acquiesce in the rebel claim thus made, because they are now at open war with the claimants. But they are indirectly interested, because it is presumed that the maritime powers will not expect the United States as a belligerent to concede to these persons any rights, privileges or advantages, which these powers may consent to waive in favor of the other so-called belligerent. You will, therefore, apply to Earl Russell for information.

Not having been made acquainted by the two maritime powers with the grave questions which have been submitted to them by the conspiracy at Richmond, it would not become us to intervene in the discussion of them. Otherwise, it might not be altogether improper for us to suggest, as a simple and effective mode of meeting these questions, that, Great Britain should concede no belligerent privilege to any cruiser that is exclusively manned, equipped, and despatched from British ports, in violation of British laws and of the law of nations. The insurgents do not even pretend to have any cruisers, except those which were so manned, equipped, and despatched. I think that we may not unreasonably hope for such a decision on the part of the British government as well as the French government. Certainly it would be a very peculiar result of the British policy in regard to this war, if, while lawful British commerce is respected by the United States, it should be embarrassed or destroyed by vessels issuing from her own ports in aid of the insurgents. But this is a matter which may wisely be left to the exclusive consideration of the British government.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,