Walker Blaine to Henry Trescot, May 8, 1882

Mr. Walker Blaine to Mr. Trescot

Sir: Referring to the subject of my dispatch numbered one, and dated Arequipa, March 28, 1882, which is hereunto attached, marked inclosure No. 1,I have the honor to further report that on Wednesday, March 29, 1882, I left Arequipa for La Paz, Bolivia, arriving at the latter place at noon of Friday, March 31. In the afternoon of that day I had the pleasure of receiving visits from Señor Zilveti, Bolivian minister of foreign affairs, and from Señor Del Valle, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary from Peru to Bolivia. These visits were purely of a personal nature, and our conversation was of the most general character.

On Saturday morning, April 1,I was, however, received officially by Señor Zilveti, and, in company with the gentleman who accompanied me to La Paz, presented to Señor Salinas, the vice-president of Bolivia, and to the ministers of the government, the President of the country, General Campero, being then with the army (consisting of some five thousand men) at Oruro. The conversation between Señor Zilveti and myself, which followed this presentation, is, with one or two noted exceptions, summarized with sufficient accuracy in the memorandum of Señor Zilveti, which was forwarded to you through Mr. Adams, of which a copy and translation are herewith inclosed (marked inclosures 2 and 3).

I had, also, during the evenings of March 31 and April 1, two long interviews with Señor Del Valle, the minister from Peru to Bolivia. Our conversation was unreserved and confidential; the principal incident worthy of comment was that Señor Del Valle showed me a memorandum, signed on the 11th of February last by Señor Zilveti and himself, the effect of which is to strengthen the alliance now subsisting between Peru and Bolivia, and by which the two parties agree to act in entire harmony and concert in all negotiations and efforts for peace with Chili. This agreement was shown to me in such confidence that I beg to earnestly request that knowledge on our part of its existence may be kept secret.

Señor Del Valle further stated to me that he feared that his government would not regard with favor the proposition to exchange a portion of its littoral for an interior province of Bolivia, an arrangement which had been suggested by Señor Carrillo, in our conversation at Arequipa. (See my dispatch, inclosure No 1.) The acquisition of such territory would, in his opinion, add nothing to the revenues of Peru; its care and government would be, in fact, only a source of expense, while the port upon the Pacific which Bolivia would obtain by the exchange is a source of large revenue to Peru. It was, however, thought Señor Del Valle, possible for an arrangement to be made by which the effective neutrality of some selected port of Peru—for example, Arica or Mollendo—could be guaranteed to Bolivia, and all the imports and exports of that country admitted and dispatched free of duty. In expressing these opinions Señor Del Valle spoke in a personal capacity, as he had no instructions from his government, nor was he informed as to its views. In the opinions expressed by Señor Carrillo, and reaffirmed by Señor Zilveti, the suggestion is made that Bolivia will cede her littoral to Chili only as in lieu of an indemnity, and that it shall be clearly expressed in the treaty of peace that acquisition of territory as the rightful result of conquest in war is not in any way recognized, but is, on the contrary, expressly disavowed. Señor Del Valle, who was informed of these views of the Government of Bolivia, stated to me that they would doubtless coincide with those of his own government, but he was unable to see how, in accordance with these ideas, Peru could justly surrender Tarapaca. Bolivia yields Atacama only because she finds hereself unable to pay a war indemnity, the amount of which is to be specified in the definitive treaty, and which she admits that, as a vanquished nation, she ought to pay. But how can Peru be called upon to cede territory when she is willing and amply able to pay the most liberal indemnity to Chili? I make mention of these views merely for the purpose of pointing out a stumbling-block, which would seem to obstruct united and harmonious effort on the part of Peru and Bolivia to make peace with Chili.

Leaving La Paz on the morning of Sunday, April 2, I arrived in Arequipa on the evening of Monday the 3d. That evening Señor Carillo, the Bolivian minister, called upon me, and again expressed his desire to proceed to Lima, requesting me to obtain from the Chilian authorities the necessary permission to do so. This, as you are aware, I did, upon returning to Lima, and on April 15 forwarded to him the passport which, at my request, Señor Novoa had obtained for him and for his secretary from Admiral Lynch, but so poor are the postal arrangements that, though Señor Carillo did not leave Arequipa until the 4th of May, my letter containing the passport and marked upon the envelope as from the special mission of the United States never reached him.

I returned to Mollendo on Tuesday, April 4, and sailing upon the U. S. S. Alaska had the pleasure of rejoining you in Lima on Friday, the 7th. As Señor Carrillo has arrived in Lima, and as you have conferred with him upon the desires and expectations of his government, it is not necessary for me to elaborate views and present facts with which you are entirely familiar. I desire, however, to say—

• First. That, so far as I can judge, my journey to La Paz and conference with the Bolivian minister of foreign affairs was opportune and productive of good results. A great deal of importance was apparently attached by the Bolivian Government to the protocol signed on the 11th of February last by yourself and Señor Balmaceda. The purport of this paper had been, according to what Señor Zilveti and Señor Carrillo stated to me, greatly misunderstood, and they expressed themselves as pleased with my explanation and with what they at once admitted to be the just and true meaning of the protocol. I am inclined to think that the sensitiveness, natural to a small country like Bolivia, accounted in large measure for the feeling of the government upon this subject. In all our diplomatic correspoudence, in the comments of the press of the United States and of Europe, the war has been constantly spoken of as one between Chili and Peru, and the implied slight had, in Bolivian public opinion, been aggravated by the fact that Bolivia was, in the protocol, referred to only in the most casual manner. This feeling was sensibly diminished by the fact that you had, on leaving Chili, at once sent me to La Paz, being unable at that time to make the journey in person, as I took care to explain to Señor Zilveti.
• Second. While the war has, up to this time, not been carried on within the limits of Bolivia, and she has for this reason suffered, in comparison with her ally, but slight direct injury, yet it is of very great importance to the country that either a truce or peace should be made as speedily as possible. Business is at a stand-still; exports from the country, which were for a time entirely suspended, are now permitted by the Chilian authorities only upon payment of onerous duties, and imports are, I think, still, or at all events were very recently, absolutely prohibited. As the government depends for the larger portion of its revenues upon foreign commerce, and as, owing to the state of war, a larger army than usual is now being maintained, the taxation is necessarily increased, and this naturally tends to produce irritation; the danger of revolution (always great) is enhanced, and the continuance of orderly government imperiled. The war has, however, taught the Bolivians (if such a lesson can be learned in so short a time as has elapsed since the downfall of Daza, and if I am to believe the statements of Senor Zilveti) that constitutional and honest government is a possibility, and the men who are truly patriotic, and who desire a well-established state, profess themselves as being greatly encouraged by the present public feeling in Bolivia.
• Third. Should it prove impossible to save her present littoral (the province of Atacama) to Bolivia, and I do not see how this can be done—and if, as Señor Del Valle and as other prominent Peruvians with whom I have conversed think, Peru is not willing to sell or exchange for other territory a portion of her sea-coast—if, in short, as the result of the war, Bolivia is to be altogether shut out from the Pacific, then the years of Bolivia’s existence as an independent nation are few in number. It is true that Bolivia might rind an outlet for a large part of her products, and perhaps an inlet for imports by the river Amazon and the Atlantic Ocean, but for this a large expenditure of money in the construction of railways and the deepening of rivers and the lapse of many years for the completion of the undertaking is necessary; even then her commerce in going to and from the ocean must pass through other countries, and those countries may see fit to impose vexatious duties, and impose other restrictions upon her trade, which would seriously hamper if not destroy it. Nor, supposing this untrue, are the financial resources or public credit of Bolivia equal to this undertaking; and it is more than probable that before its completion, surrounding states, covetous of her territory, would have secured her partition.

Moreover, the geographical position of Bolivia requires, in any event, an outlet upon the Pacific. I am aware that for many years her commerce has not sought ingress and egress by way of her own sea-coast. The ports of Mollendo and Arica have offered superior advantages, but Atacama has proved a valuable check upon Peru, and has prevented her from seriously overtaxing Bolivian imports and exports, fearful lest, should she do so, the country’s trade would desert Mollendo and Arica and find refuge in Antofogasta and the other sea-ports of Bolivia. Compacts and agreements were made between the two countries, by which a certain portion of the revenues collected from Bolivian goods at Peruvian ports was to be paid to the former country. At the outbreak of the war, Peru owed Bolivia on this account more than four hundred thousand silver soles (Peruvian dollars). This fact serves to show how unsatisfactory in the past, and how probably unsatisfactory in the future, would be any commercial treaties giving to Bolivia only outlet and inlet through Peru.

Without considering the question as to whether it is best for the interests of the United States and of the world that the nationality of Bolivia should be preserved, I venture to express the opinion that the most feasible way by which, at the present time, her dismemberment can be avoided is by a strong and effective confederation between Peru and Bolivia, preserving to each an independent national existence, but making such an identity of interest as shall render imperative the strict fulfillment of any obligations and treaties into which they may enter. It seems to me that the self-interest of those countries would tend to such an end. Peru fears gradual absorption of her territory by Chili; Bolivia fears her own dismemberment by and division among surrounding nations. Traditions and natural national jealousies would render impossible any close union; self-preservation and resultant benefit would strongly urge upon each the course which I have suggested. I am not unaware of the fact that the interest of Chili would lead her to strongly oppose such a confederation, but, as I have offered this merely in the nature of personal opinion, and as you are better informed than myself, and a better judge of the advantage and practicability of such a political step, I do not consider it necessary to discuss the subject further.

In conclusion, permit me to observe that I cannot but think it of the greatest importance, both to ourselves and to the belligerents, that the United States should, as speedily as practicable, decide what course it will take with regard to the war of the Pacific. It was most embarrassing not to be able to inform Señor Zilveti and Señor Carrillo of the views of my government, as I felt that the great interests of Bolivia now at stake entitled them to ask and to expect a speedy answer, and I think that, both for our own prestige and as a matter of justice, Bolivia should not be compelled to wait for longer time than is necessary for a definite decision on the part of the United States.

I further recommend that for the future our minister to Bolivia should be kept fully informed as to the policy of his government and of any action which may be taken by his colleagues at Lima and at Santiago. The unfortunately almost directly contradictory official communications made at one time by our ministers to Chili and Peru would have made the position of General Adams, in Bolivia, had he not fortunately been absent on leave, extremely embarrassing. Without full knowledge and concert of action on the part of our diplomatic representatives any final settlement by our government or any assistance in the solution of this question is rendered almost impossible.

I have the honor, &c.,