W. T. Shesman to Ulysses S. Grant, January 17, 1863

On board Forest Queen, Napoleon, Ark., January 17, 1863.

Maj. Gen. U. 8. GRANT, Commanding Department of Tennessee:

DEAR GENERAL: I take a liberty of writing you direct semi-officially. Official reports will convey to you a pretty clear idea of our success at the Post of Arkansas.

I infer from a remark made by General McClernand that you have disapproved the step. If I could believe that Banks had reduced Port Hudson and appeared at Vicksburg during our absence I would feel the force of your disapproval, but I feel so assured that we will again be at Vicksburg before Banks is there that I cannot think any bad result of this kind can occur. As long as the Post of Arkansas existed on our flank, with boats to ship cannon and men to the mouth of the Arkansas, we would be annoyed beyond measure whilst operating below. The capture of the Blue Wing was a mere sample. We were compelled to reduce it. Its importance to the enemy cannot be doubted by one who has seen their preparations and heard the assertions of its garrison that it was deemed impregnable. The fort proper was constructed with great care and its armament as good as it could be made. The Post of ArCuar. XXIX.) CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.—UNION. 571

kansas could only have been taken by a strong force, both by land and water, as we took it, and had we given any previous notice it would have been strongly re-enforced. They had huts built for full 10,000 men, and with 15,000 they could have held the levee as far down as the Notrib house, and our landing would have been resisted. Could we have followed up, the capture of Little Rock would have been easy; but even as it is the enemy up the Arkansas can be he’d in check by a single wooden gunboat. I assure you when next at Vicksburg I will feel much less uneasiness about our communications.

We leave here to-morrow, and will be at Milliken’s Bend or Young’s Point by the next day, and if Banks has taken Port Hudson and appeared below Vicksburg we can easily communicate across; but I do not expect he will be there for some time.

It may be we can put some guns in position alone the shore of the Mississippi at a point where I had my pickets, whicb might occupy the attention of one set of batteries, and if the gunboats will assail the city in front we might possibly land right under the gras, or we may try Haines’ Bluff; but as to forcing a passage at any point along the Yazoo from its mouth to Haines’ I doubt it. I wish you world come down and see. I only fear McClernand may attempt impossibitities.

Again, if Banks does come up it may be the appro?ch from the south may be better; but all their old defenses of last year took to the south. I saw enough to convince me they have about ten fold batteries, and I should estimate their siege guns at fifty; I saw abeut thirty.

The importance of Vicksburg cannot be overestimated, and if possible a larger force should somehow reach the ridge between the Black and Yazoo, so as to approach from the rear.

Please give much attention to the quantity of amm*nition and tools. I carried down with me 1,200 axes, picks, and spades. but in spite of all efforts many are lost. We built batteries at Yazoo and up at the Post, and you know how details of our careless men neslect tools.

We havea good deal of real sickness and still more of that sort which develops on the approach of danger.

An attack on Vicksburg will surely draw thither the Grenada force, so that I think you might safely join us and direct our ovements.

with great respect, your obedient servant,

Major-General, Ornmanding.