William T. Sherman to Ulysses S. Grant, July 8, 1862

Assistant Adjutant-General to General Grant, Memphis:

Siz: My last report of the operations of this and General Hurlbut’s (Fourth) divisions was made to Col. J. C. Kelton direct, it being of date June 23, about the time of the change of command from General Thomas to General Grant. My future reports will of course be addressed to your headquarters.

My original orders from General Halleck direct were to move with mine and Hurlbut’s divisions from Chewalla to Grand Junction, and thence repair the Charleston and Memphis road west to Memphis. The first repairs were made on some burned trestles in La Grange; next on two large bridges here at Moscow, and lastly two small ones at and near La Fayette. All these bridges were finished and the road ready for cars on June 25, but the accident to the train out of Memphis has prevented its use. For some reason all trains from Corinth and Columbus stop at La Grange, and, as you know, I have been compelled to haul my stores at great labor and risk from Memphis, but General Halleck now informs me that supplies can be had from Columbus, Ky.; I shall not, gonsequently, send any more teams into Memphis, unless in case of accident to the northern road. I have little confidence in railroads running through a country where every house is a nest of secret, bitter enemies.

On the 29th of June I received a dispatch from General Halleck saying that Hamilton’s division of Rosecrans’ army corps had passed the Hatchie the day before, and would be at Holly Springs on Tuesday a.m.; ordering me to co-operate as far as advisable, but not to neglect the protection of the railroad. I accordingly ordered General Hurlbut to leave at Grand Junction and La Grange each a regiment of infantry and section of artillery, with all the sick and feeble of his command, and with his effective force to march on Holly Springs, so timing his march as to be at Coldwater at 8 a.m. Tuesday. I made similar dispositions, leaving a regiment and a section of artillery at La Fayette and Moscow, with all the sick and feeble, and with the remainder, about 4,000 men, marched for Holly Springs.

I met Hurlbut’s division at Hudsonville, and we moved forward to Coldwater, the first and only point where water can be had between the Wolf River and Holly Springs.

Our cavalry found the enemy’s pickets at Hudsonville, drove them across Coldwater, and back toward Holly Springs. About 24 miles out of Holly Springs the advance guard was drawn into an ambush, was fired on, lost 1 man killed and 3 wounded, all of the Fourth [Illinois Cavalry. This cavalry, about 150 men, under command of Major Gibson, was dismounted and drove the enemy out of the woods, killing 1 and wounding others. The enemy’s cavalry, three battalions, in all about wae men, under Colonels Jackson and Pinson, formed in front of Holly

General Denver, commanding the advance brigade, moved forward

Captain Mueller’s battery, which by about 18 rounds dispersed the cavalry, which retreated through and beyond the town. General Denver moved to the edge of town and sent pickets through. There was no enemy at Holly Springs but these two regiments of cavalry, about 1,500 strong. These kept away whenever I sent troops into town, but returned in small squads whenever I withdrew the command. I made my chief camp in Coldwater on account of water, which there was abundant, whilst at Holly Springs it is scarce. I sent a brigade daily to picket to Holly Springs. As soon as I reached Coldwater I endeavored to open communication with General Hamilton, supposed to be advancing on the flank in the direction of Ripley. One messenger sent afoot in disguise has never returned; two others mounted followed General Hamilton to Rienzi, and on the 5th of July I received a letter from General Hamilton saying he was on his return to Corinth, having been within 19 miles of Holly Springs. For several days I could get no dispatches or communication from any quarter; but on the 6th I received General Halleck’s order by telegraph, of July 1, ordering me not to attempt to hold Holly Springs, but to fall back and protect the railroad. I accordingly ordered General Hurlbut to resume his post at La Grange, and I have come here. Each point is equidistant from Holly Springs, say, 25 miles. Each is on the railroad at vital points, and we are within 10 miles of each other. I think we protect the railroad from Junction to La Fayette, but not beyond. Hurlbut has about 300 cavalry without carbines and much used up. I had eight companies Fourth Illinois, now down to about 200 men, and they and horses much used up. Our infantry has suffered some in marching in the heat and dust, but I think I have on the line about 10,000 good fighting men.

There is no large force of the enemy nearer than Tallahatchie, 18 miles south of Holly Springs, although I have vague reports of large masses moving toward Memphis, and Hurlbut reports 300 cavalry and 5,000 infantry moving toward Davis’ Mill, on Wolf River, not more than many indefinite reports, which on examination proved unfounded, that I mistrust them. I also found the negroes on our late march and sojourn at Holly Springs full of false and exaggerated rumors. I prefer to be governed by what I think the enemy should attempt. Ifhe has 30,000 men at his disposal he should interpose between Memphis and this command. He can do so perfectly unobserved by an oblique march by way of the Pigeon Roost road or by Hernando, and he could soon repair the railroad to his rear so as to bring forward his supplies; while we, depending on the Columbus road, may be at any moment cut off, as any family along or near that road, being in their interest and constant communication kept up, could break that line of road. I would much prefer the concentration of our whole force on Coldwater, near where the Memphis and Holly Springs [road] crosses and leave but small detachments along the road itself. Along and on the road our every movement is known and reported, while we can hear nothing. I have sent out no cavalry to North Mount Pleasant, a point where several roads meet to the southwest of this. I also picket all bridges and roads near strong with infantry. I don’t apprehend attack in this position, but may be drawn out on Hurlbut’s alarm or by what would be the enemy’s best strategic move, the interposition of a superior force between us and Memphis. They will not in my judgment remain idle, especially if they have gained the advantage over McClellan which they claim, and I doubt if they will move back on Corinth. The destruction ef the railroads there have destroyed its importance to them as a point, but Memphis, if recovered, would be a magnificent stroke, and in my opinion they will attempt it. I am told that General Curtis is in imminent danger. These interior operations give our enemy great advantages in their knowledge of country and possession of the hearty co-operation of the people.

I will keep my troops as healthy as possible in this warm and dusty weather, and try and fulfill any plan that you or General Halleck may lay down. We should not be idle these moonlight nights, especially if we detect the enemy in motion.

with great respect,