Van Valkenbubgh to William H. Seward, February 18, 1868

Mr. Van Valkenburgh to Mr. Seward.

Sir: I have the honor to inform you that M. Leon Roches, the minister of his Majesty the Emperor of France, on the 9th instant, suddenly announced his intention of leaving Japan, and returning to his country upon permission he had some time since received from his government. He sailed on the same evening in the Laplace, for Yokohama, on his way home, leaving Baron Brin as chargé d’affaires ad interim.

His last official act here was the uniting in the demand made for reparation for the attack on the foreign community, on the 4th instant, which he signed previous to his departure.

In announcing to his colleagues this intention, which surprised us all, he remarked that the reasons were personal to himself; that he had been a warm supporter of the Tycoon, and that having been driven from this part of the country, and pronounced in rebellion by the Mikado, he felt it his duty to return to France and make his explanations to his government in person; that in leaving Baron Brin as chargé d’affaires, he gave him instructions to act in concert with his colleagues, and that our conferences hereafter would be as unanimous as heretofore.

* * * * * * * *

Our official and personal relations had been pleasant, and in no one instance that I am aware of did he fail to unite with his colleagues in those resolutions which we deemed to be just and necessary.

Two days before his departure he furnished to each of his colleagues a memorandum of his views of the situation of affairs in Japan, a copy translation of which I inclose, marked No. 1.

He undoubtedly desired to sustain the Tycoon, but since the demand made by the foreign powers for the ratification of the treaties by the Mikado, and their ratification by him in 1865, we have certainly recognized his supreme authority, and held the Tycoon only as subordinate. We cannot close our eyes to the fact which is now well understood, that the Tycoon was the creature of the Mikado, and subject to his orders, receiving from him his position and power, and subsequently resigning that position and power to him. I believe we have nothing politically to do with the several Daimios of the country, but must look to the government.

I believe, also, that it would be impolitic to ask for the opening of more new ports at present. We may be asked to accept them. It may, and probably will be necessary, under the circumstances, the difficulties by which we are at present surrounded. The trouble of protecting our countrymen in the midst of a war, the duration of which it is now impossible to tell, to postpone the opening of Yedo and Ne-egata for a time, the advent of foreigners at these places, in the present excited and disturbed state of affairs, would but complicate our troubles.

To the conclusion of this memorandum I assent, and have acted upon it, providing only for the security of our rights and interests under the treaties, holding communication with the government de facto, at the open ports, and observing so far as is possible the same rules that would be observed in any other country.

This statement upon the part of Mr. Roches was elicited by the production by the Prussian chargé d’affaires, Mr. Von Brandt, at our conference on the 6th instant, of a paper, a copy of which I inclose marked No. 2.

This paper, however, was not signed by the representatives, although we all assented to the general principles and conditions therein contained, and have unitedly acted upon them since.

I inclose, marked No. 3, Mr. Roches’s letter addressed to me announcing the appointment of Baron Brin; No. 4, copy of his instructions left with the baron as charge d’affaires ad interim; and No. 5, copy of my letter in answer to such communication.

I have the honor to be, sir, your very obedient servant,

[Untitled]

Since the abandonment of the cattle at Osaka by the Tycoon, and the reception from his ministers of the communication dated 30th January, 1868, the undersigned have no knowledge of the existence of a general government in Japan.

The government of the Tycoon, which appeared able to give some guarantees for the faithful execution of the treaties, and to which for this reason the undersigned have always given their moral support, has broken down in the course of a few days, and the open ports of Osaka and Hiogo have been abandoned by the troops and officials of the heretofore so-called government, while the apparently victorious party has not yet thought fit to communicate with the foreign representatives.

The undersigned, therefore, think it their duty to lay down in a few words the principles by which their future action will be guided. They wish to preserve a perfect and faithful neutrality between the contending parties, concentrating all their efforts upon the protection of the lives and interests of their countrymen. They will neither treat with any single prince or coalition, nor support the former Tycoon against his enemies, but will only enter into communication with the Mikado or such de facto governments as hold any of the open ports. They agree between themselves not to accept any communication from any of the contending parties not addressed to all the foreign representatives, or to negotiate separately with them, but to act conjointly for the best of the general and common interests they represent.

The bases on which they will enter into communication with such party as may offer sufficient guarantees to them for the execution of its engagements are—

1st. The full and unreserved recognition of all treaties, conventions, and agreements concluded between their respective governments, or their representatives, and the government of the Tycoon up to this day.

2d. A reliable guarantee for the execution of the stipulations contained in such treaties, &c., and for the safety of the lives and property of their countrymen, as well as for the re-establishment and protection of their commercial interests.

3d. Full and ample satisfaction for the outrage committed on the 4th of February, 1868, by Japanese troops at Kobé, and a guarantee that no similar outrage shall hereafter be committed.

Note.—This memorandum was not signed, but the general principles and conditions were assented to by all the representatives, and have in a great measure governed our subsequent action.

February 18.