Unknown to Simon Cameron, November 25, 1861

SIR:

My current series of dispatches has informed the commanding general of the principal military events in this department, including those which have occurred on this line since our return from Sewell; but to give the whole connectedly and in detail I now respectfully submit a report, consisting of abstract, details, map, and appendix :* The first thing after the battle of Carnifix was to unite the forces on the Lewisburg road and follow it up as far as practicable. This was done; the enemy’s intrenched position beyond Big Sewell reconnoitered, his force ascertained, and on the 5th of October the troops fell back towards Gauley Bridge, to be near their clothing and supplies. The next thing was to clothe, equip, and pay the troops. This was progressing vigorously when Floyd, with eight regiments, 700 cavalry, and several pieces of artillery, variously stated from two to eight, appeared in the angie west of New River, on the Fayette road, while it was stated, on information entitled to great weight, that Lee was preparing to combine an attack on our front, while Floyd was to cut off our communications down the Kanawha.

It now became necessary to guard against Lee, secure our communications, dislodge, and, if possible, cut off Floyd’s forces. The operations for this purpose took up the time from the 1st of November to the 15th of November. One of the plans for capturing Floyd failed on account of the high water, and the other, while it was successful in dislodging the rebels and driving them from this part of the country, failed to capture and destroy their force for want of vigorous and energetic execution of plans confided to General Benham.

The special history of these movements is given in the subjoined details, illustrated by the map and appendix. :

After the battle of Carnifix the troops brought down by the Summersville line passed over on to the Lewisburg road, uniting with the Kanawha Brigade. The head of this column advanced to the top of Big Sewell, 34 miles from Gauley Bridge, on the 28th of September.

* Appendix consists of the subordinate reports following.

Two and a half regiments, under Generals Schenck and Benham, came as far as the foot of Sewell to support the advance, which acted as a corps of observation. After reconnoitering the enemy’s fortified position from 2 to 4 miles in front on top of Sewell, on Lewisburg road, supported by fortifications at Meadow Bluff, 15 miles this side of Lewisburg, ascertaining his strength to be from twelve to fourteen thousand, and finding that the country beyond was measurably stripped of forage and subsistence, our force (5,200) retired towards Gauley Bridge gradually, and encamped at the positions shown on the accompanying map;

Schenck’s Brigade being 10 miles from Gauley Bridge, McCook’s 8 miles, Benham’s 6 miles, while General Cox was posted, one regiment at Tompkins’ farm and remainder at Gauley Bridge, with detachments for guarding steamboat landing below.

Our object in taking this position, as reported, was to be near enough to water transportation to enable our transportation to bring forward not only forage and subsistence, but the clothing of the troops. Orders were also immediately dispatched to have the paymasters come and pay them, none having received any since they entered the service. The clothing of all, with the exception of the cavalry, was completed by the 1st of November. The paying went on much more slowly, in consequence of the difficulties in getting the rolls and the inexperience of the paymasters, and is not yet completed,

. No military movements were or eould be undertaken that would interfere with these primary objects. The enemy’s motions at Meadow Bluff were watched. The militia, which all summer long had occupied the region west of the New River and south of the Loop Creek Hills, ` (see map and accompanying memoir, marked A),* showed themselves

opposite Miller’s Ferry, near McCook’s brigade, about the 18th of October, when they were, as we learned, to be assembled at Fayette for

the purpose of being paid off, but as we then supposed and since ascertained with the real object of rallying them if possible. Colonel

MeCook was therefore directed to pass over with a suffieient force to

eapture or disperse them, and oceupy or treat the country as circumstances might indicate to him best. He passed over, had a slight skirmish with a small militia force, occupied Fayette, reconnoitered the roads in the vieinity, satisfied himself that there was no force except the bushwhacking militia, secession residents of the country, and re-. tired oyer Miller’s Ferry without leaving a guard on the other side. On reporting the result of his expedition the commanding general expressed

a regret that he did not leave a company to cover Miller’s Ferry on the

other side. Esteeming it of little consequence, he was so dilatory, that

when he attempted it he found the cliffs occupied by a force of sharpshooters, which rendered crossing dangerous to a small force, and so reported to me. This was about the 25th of October.

Meanwhile the paying and clothing of the troops was going on, and it was deemed best to complete that before occupying the Fayetteville side of New River in force. It was, moreover, judged best to allow whatever force the rebels could gather to assemble and gain some confidence before attempting anything against them which would be something more than a chase. About the 27th of October information reached me that Floyd was moving from Raleigh down to cut off my communications, and these rumors, coupled with a knowledge of the country west of the Kanawha and below us, soon rendered it certain that whatever the rebel force was, it would come in by Fayetteville. It

* Memoir not found. Map to appear in Atlas.

was therefore determined to draw them in and capture them. This would not interfere in the least with having our troops clothed and paid.

Camps and smoke began to appear opposite Miller’s Ferry and signs of considerable force. The New River gorge and the crests of the adjacent hills protected their encampment and movements from observation, but we learned that Floyd had about 4,000 men; at the same time that orders had been given at Meadow Bluff to Loring and Tompkins to make a secret move, and Lee had said to a person who told him I had intended to occupy Kanawha valley, very significantly, “if he can.” A flag of truce also came from Meadow Bluff, the headquarters of Lee, signed by Col. J. Lucius Davis, showing that Lee was absent.

These and other circumstances rendered it probable that the enemy was about to attempt to dislodge us from this position, and as a combined movement on both sides of the river above appeared most likely to succeed, it became necessary to provide for that contingency.

On the 29th of October the rebels chased our outposts on the Fayette road down near the mouth of Great Falls Creek, and on the 1st of November appeared on the heights of Cotton Hill, opposite Gauley Bridge, with a 6-pounder rifled piece and with another opposite Montgomery’s Ferry (see map), and opened firé with shot and shell. We discontinued running the ferry during the day, for fear it might be struck. General Cox was directed to put pieces in position which replied to the fire. The trains were passed during the night, to avoid exposure.

The plan of operations was now decided as follows : :MeCook opposite Miller’s Ferry, to remain for the purpose of threatening a passage there, while his force would serve to hold in check anything that Lee would bring on the Lewisburg road; Schenck to prepare for and effect a crossing above at Bowyer’s Ferry or some point this side; Benham encamped below McCook, whose camp could be moved without exciting suspicion to pass down by night to Gauley, and thence to a point nearly opposite the mouth of Loop Creek, where he was to cross over, be re-enforced, – and reconnoiter the roads which by way of Loop Creek would lead to the flanks and rear of the enemy’s position. A contingency was that if – a scout then out and to return on the night he moved down should report the enemy’s force and access thereto favorable, Benham’s brigade, with General Cox’s force, might cross at the falls. Result of scout was unfavorable to this. General Benham’s force passed below, crossed the river, and occupied, as directed, the mouth of Loop Creek and the road 6 or 7 miles up beyond Taylor’s.

MOVEMENTS OF GENERAL SCHENCK’S BRIGADE.

Reconnaissances showed but three accessible points of crossing above . Miller’s Ferry, viz: Bowyer’s Ferry, 17 miles up, 15 miles from Sewell, guarded by a force of infantry, and provided with but one boat—an old canoe; crossing called Townsend’s Ferry, 53 miles up, apparently unknown and unthought of; Claypoole’s Hole, between that and Miller’s Ferry, coming out near the enemy’s camp.

November 6, I detached Major Crawford, as acting aide, to report to General Schenck and examine Townsend’s Ferry. Hefound the accesses exceedingly difficult, but evidently unwatehed. Determined the possibility of constructing, by means of wagon beds and eanvas, and by bull-boats and some skiffs, the apparatus for crossing the troops. This apparatus was completed on the 9th instant. (See Crawford’s report) [No. 3]. Meanwhile the river rose so as to be impassable, and its conCHAP. XIV.) KANAWHA AND NEW RIVER, W. VA.

dition was watched with solicitude from hour to hour. General Sch enck, whose judgment in the matter I relied upon, being unwilling to abandon the plan of crossing his force in the enemy’s rear, no movement was made in front that would preclude this, which promised, if effected, the most complete success.

On the 10th I dispatched to General Schenck as follows:

Benham concealed near mouth of Loop Creek with 3,000 men, posting himself on all the roadways. If you can cross above, he will attack them in front and left flank,

while you will take the rear. If you cannot cross, you will come down and attack by front, while Benham will cut off their retreat.

Benham’s movements from the 3d to the 10th were regulated as far as they could be by a series of twenty-three telegraphic dispatches and one written, all appended hereto, the general tenor and object of which was to inform him that he would be re-enforced by detachments from the Seventh, Thirty-seventh, and Forty-fourth Ohio Regiments; that he was to cross over to Loop Creek, occupy it up as far as Taylor’s, establish himself firmly, make his men comfortable, see that they were well supplied with rations from three to five days ahead, reconnoiter the passes from Loop Creek to the enemy’s position by Cassidy’s Mill, and to his rear by the same, and up Loop Creek by Kincaid’s, Carter’s, and Light’s Mill to the Raleigh road, and to hold himself in readiness to act aS soon as it was determined whether we could cross New River above Schenck’s position. On the 6th General Benham crossed with his brigade. In short, the whole tenor of the dispatches from November 5 to November 8, as will be seen by reference to them, was to enforce upon his attention the necessity of knowing the passes from his position to the flank and rear of the enemy, especially the one by Cassidy’s Mill; that, if Schenck could cross to take enemy in rear, his work would be to attack by that route on the flank or by the front and flank, and that, should the river prevent Schenck’s passage, he would be called down and would operate in a combined attack on the front, flank, and rear, or flank and rear; that is, as it might be found more or less practicable to move Schenck’s troops directly by the Fayette road or by the way of Cassidy’s Mill. These points appear in dispatch . No. 23, November 9, appended hereto, wherein it is said, among other things:

In that case Schenck will cross 3,000 men, seize Fayette, and advance down the road. You will take them by the Laurel Creek route only or by the Nugent path only, or by both, as may be determined by the nature of the ground, which you will learn from your seouts, and communicate to me your opinion thereon when they come in as soon as practicable.

POSITION OF THE TROOPS ON THE MORNING OF THE 10TH.

Schenck at Camp Ewing; means of crossing ready; river too high. McCook at Camp Anderson; enemy in force at Dickerson’s, opposite Miller’s Ferry, firing at the ferry, as for the last twenty days. General Cox, with the Second Kentucky, at Tompkins’ farm ; remainder at Gauley. General Benham at mouth of Loop Creek with main body; strong detachment up Loop, in vicinity of Taylor’s and on road towards Cassidy’s Mill. Rebels ceased firing with their cannon at Gauley and Tompkins’ farm and McCook’s camp, which they had tried two or three times to disturb by firing shot and shell across the river. .

On that morning General Cox detached Colonel De Villiers with 200 men to cross New River at a ferry which he had rigged just above the mouth of Gauley, and Lieutenant-Colonel Enyart, with 200 of the First Kentucky to cross the lower ferry, to reconnoiter and occupy if practicable the Fayette road as far up as possible. Colonel De Villiers crossed, and after a sharp skirmish drove the enemy from the front hills and beyond Blake’s farm. The rebels re-enforced this outpost 200 strong and repelled De Villiers to the margin of the woods near Blake’s farm, where ‘he remained until evening, when six companies of the Second Kentucky passed over and re-enforced him, and during the night drove the enemy entirely from the hills in front of New River and occupied the ridge. .

On the morning of the 11th Colonel De Villiers, with the Eleventh Ohio and Second Kentucky troops, by General Cox’s orders, pushed forward and drove the enemy from the heights towards Cotton Hill, where his baggage train was seen moving on the Fayette turnpike from the camp which he had occupied at Huddleston’s, 14 miles from the river up the Fayette road, supposed to be about two regiments. A party of the First Kentucky followed up the Fayette road at the same time until the main force occupied the position marked T (Exhibit B.)* “Thus, after a vigorous and brilliant skirmish, with intervals, during thirty hours, about 700 men of General Cox’s brigade drove the rebels from the front of Cotton Hill and their camp at Huddleston’s, and held the entire ground for near 3 miles between the Fayette road and New River, with a loss of 2 killed, 1 wounded, and 6 missing. One of the missing was afterwards retaken, having lost an arm. exis

About 9 o’clock on the morning of the 11th, the other troops remaining in position, the enemy was seen to break camp at Laurel Creek and retire to Dickerson’s, where they were observed busily fortifying. As soon as the movement of the enemy’s camp was observed, information thereof was dispatched to Generals Schenck and Benham.

All movements up tọ this time had been made with a view to dispose our troops to hold in check any attempt that might be made on the Lewisburg road, and to make sure of beating and capturing the rebel force on the Fayette side, either by Schenck crossing above taking them in rear while Benham should attack them in front and flank, the latter always insisted on as preferable, or should Schenck’s crossing fail, to. bring his brigade down to aid in the front and flank attack while Benham should take his rear. (See dispatches Nos. 22, 25, 26, to Benham [post], and dispateh of 10th to General Schenck.)t

The occupation of the hills between the Fayette road and New River was a preliminary tightening of the chain, securing to us the debouches for a front attack and feeling the enemy to see if he had force enough to press well down against us. His movement to Dickerson’s alarmed me, lest he should retreat; his commencing to fortify there in some degrec reassured me. I therefore, on the 11th, after informing General Benham of the enemy’s position and our occupancy of Cotton Hill, directed him to occupy as soon as practicable Cassidy’s Mill with 1,000 men, and dispose the rest of his force to move, stating to him that I only awaited the information from him as to the practicability of the Cassidy’s Mill route to say whether he was to come in on the north side of Cotton Hill on their front or take them in flank and rear. Failing to furnish the information called for, and for which final orders for the movement of his main body had been deferred, he was informed at

*Inelosure to General Cox’s report, No. 2. t Quoted on p. 255, clock at night that General Schenck had by no means abandoned the

plan of crossing at Townsend’s Ferry, and directed as soon as practicable to occupy Cotton Hill, which movement began early on the morning of the 12th instant.

His failure to furnish me with the information so often required about the roads by Cassidy’s and other routes to the enemy’s rear, and many other signs of unsteadiness, had impaired my confidence in his management.. Nevertheless, after the reiterated dispatches sent him, I indulged

the hope that he would fully appreciate his position and the decisive

results to be expected from a movement by the enemy’s left flank to his rear on the Fayetteville road. Here referring to former instructions directing him on his arrival to

. open immediate communication with his foree at Cassidy’s Mill and to

know well the route between there and beyond, I informed him that if General Schenck could not cross by the evening of the 12th, he would be ordered down and cross below.

General Benham received these general directions in the afternoon of the 11th. He was informed that Major Leiper would report to him at the mouth of the Fayette road, and explain to him what he knew of the rebels and the position occupied by the troops of General Cox.

About 3 o’clock p. m. of the 12th General Benham’s main force reached

. the extremity of Cotton Hill, 8 miles from Loop, towards Fayette. About

= 17:R.R=VOL Y the same time his detachment, which did not march as had been ordered on the previous day, swelled by some mistake from 1,000 to 1,300, reached Cassidy’s Mill. : -A slight skirmish ensued between a few advanced companies of General Benham’s brigade and the rebels. The command of General Benham halted, and bivouacked on their arms. General Benham reported to me by a courier, stating his position, and complaining of the weakness of his main force compared with the supposed force of the enemy, and asking re-enforcements, that he might attack them, evidently uneasy at his position, and apparently apprehensive that he might be attacked before he could get re-enforcements. Calling his attention to former dispatches and the Cassidy’s Mill route, informing him the enemy was still at Dickerson’s, I directed him again to watch the enemy’s movements closely, saying if he did not move, our success was certain; if he did, which I thought he ought to do, General Benham should intercept him by the rear, and throw his entire force, except 500 men, by the way of Cassidy’s Mill, on the Raleigh pike. The enemy’s intrenchments were but from 23 to 3 miles from General Benham’s position. By some mistake he had at Cassidy’s Mill 1,300 instead of 1,000 men. This mill was but from 24 to 3 miles from the Fayette road. . General Benham had been instructed ad nauseam to look to that way of cutting off the enemy’s retreat, which began at 9 o’clock on that might. General Benham did not find it out, according to his report,

until 4.30 o’clock the next afternoon. That is to say, while the last remnant of the rebel force had left Fayette early in the morning of the 13th, according to General Benham’s report, his boldest scouts were desperately engaged from daylight until late in the afternoon in finding their way over a distance of 24 miles that separated his bivouac from the enemy’s deserted intrenchments. His force at Cassidy’s Mill had a

company in Fayetteville at 9 o’clock next morning fully informed of »

the retreat of the enemy, and, as the captain of that company states, he

dispatched messengers back to Cassidy’s Mill and to General Benham immediately; yet General Benham did not learn of the retreat, though KN

NS only 23 miles off, until 4.30 p. m. of the 13th, and did not reach Fayette

until 12 o’clock at night of the 13th, being twenty-seven hours from the

time Floyd commenced his movement. So little attention had he paid to the reiterated instructions, all tending to enforce the one idea that the real blow ought to be struck at the enemy’s rear by the Cassidy?s

Mill route and that a front attack was only desirable in ease General _

Schenck could cross above or in case the enemy stood fight, and that even in this latter event General Schenck was to attack him in front while he was to attack the flank and rear he ordered the entire force from Cassidy’s Mill, instead of striking across to the Raleigh road, to join him by moving down Laurel Creek and then to Fayette, thus imposing on it a fatiguing march of 7 or 8 miles. oe l

Advised of all this, and,knowing the wretched condition of the roads, and taught by experience that orders for carrying three or more days rations were never obeyed, 1 looked upon the game as up and the

pursuit of Floyd as not promising much; but, on the suggestion of .

General Benham that they might have stopped to sleep, dispatched him to use his discretion in the pursuit. –

General Schenck had moved down on the 13th, crossed the Kanawha, and bivouacked at Huddleston’s, on the Fayette road, and sent forward messengers to General Benham announcing his position. General Benham pursued and overtook some of the enemy’s rear guard about 9.30 o’clock in the forenoon of the 14th, killed Colonel Croghan, reported at 11.30 o’clock that the enemy was in force, and asked General Schenck to come up, who had made a forced march to reach ‘Fayette after having marched all the preceding day. At 4 o’clock in the afternoon General

Benham had reached a point about 12 or 14 miles from Fayetteville ‘

without overtaking them. Dispatched General Schenck that the roads were so bad and his men so weary that it was impossible to pursue .them farther; that he proposed to bivouac on the ground, and if General Schenck deemed it advisable, and it were possible to come forward, they might drive the enemy through Raleigh. Nevertheless he says

that there was a report from one of the lieutenants of Stewarts cavalry —

that he had seen a train of wagons coming on the Bowyer’s Ferry road,

according with information of a negro at McCoy’s Mill, which indicated —

that Lee was coming down with a force of 5,000 men to re-enforce Floyd and attack. He therefore concluded that as this was possible, it might be better for him (General Benham) to return, unite with General Schenck, and drive Lee.

General Schenck, knowing that General Benham’s troops were about

if not altogether out of provisions, and that none could be brought up `

in time on the roads, and presuming that Floyd, with twenty-seven hours the start, would not be very easily caught, directed General Benham, after pursuing thus far, to return, which he accordingly did on the 15th instant,

_ At the close of these details I respectfully submit to the commanding general that, considering the weather and the roads, the operations of this column have been as active as those in any other department..

The troops have suffered from the climate severely. They have sub- `

« mitted to many privations with cheerfulness and performed their duties with alacrity. If they have not accomplished all that could have been

desired in the annihilation of Floyd’s force, they have practically driven the enemy not only from the Kanawha, but from all the country west of Meadow Bluff and north of Raleigh, and the country is now more:

Ex í gor nearly pacified and disposed to return to the Union than they ever

have been since the commencement of the war. . It has been with great regret that I have found it necessary to cen- . sure a general officer for the failure to capture the rebel forces who were justiy ours.

It is a great pleasure to say to the commanding general that I have found General Cox prudent, brave, and soldierly, and I specially commend his prudenee and firmness in occupying Cotton Hill, details of which are given in his report in the appendix.

I bear cordial testimony to the courage and promptitude of General Schenck, and Only regret that his exposure, when he first came here, has deprived me for the present of his services. It is my duty also highly to commend Major Crawford, not only for the signal ability with which he recomnoitered Townsend’s Ferry and prepared the means of crossing, laboring day and night in the most inclement weather to get everything in readiness. To his exertions mainly the accomplish-

‘ment of this difficult and arduous task is chiefly due. I have also

` made special mention of the daring reconnaissance made by Sergeant

Haven, of the Twenty-third Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, who erossed the river at the ferry, and reconnoitered alone the road the other side, clear into the enemy’s camp at Fayetteville. For the mention of others especially distinguished I refer to the subreports in the appendix ; and if I have forborne to signalize the individual members of my staff, it is not because they do not deserve special mention, but because such mention as that has become stereotyped, and everybody expects to see

. it at the close of a report.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,