Unknown to Schriver, August 15, 1864

Colonel SCHRIVER, Inspector-General, Army of the Potomac, Judge-Advocate, §:c.:

COLONEL: You will remember that in answering the last question put to me, as to the reason none of my division commanders went into the crater, I made some explanation after saying ”I don’t know;” but it was finally decided to let the answer be “‘T don’t know.” Lest it may be understood to be a censure upon those officers, I beg to add to the answer the following: “I think General Potter was in the crater, and I am satisfied that the others felt they were in the best position to command, except General Ledlie, who, I understand, was sick. The Court can determine.”

Please lay this before the Court, and believe me,

Yours, very truly, A. E. BURNSIDE, Major-General.

These officers, with the exception of General Ledlie, have served with me long and gallantly, and I do not desire to do aught to injure their well-earned reputation.

Maj. J. C. DUANE, Engineer Corps, sworn, says: Questions by the JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. Were you present at the assault of the 30th of July, and in what capacity did you serve? Answer. I was on the Fifth Corps front, assisting in directing the artillery fire.

Question. Can you produce maps showing the lines then occupied by the armies?

Answer. Yes, sir; I here produce two maps showing the general positions of the armies and the position of the Ninth Corps in detail.

(These maps are marked Nos. 65 and 66 Appendix.)

Question. What in your opinion were some of the causes of failure on that occasion?

Answer. One cause was that the troops, instead of moving up by division front, (column of division), moved up by the flank. Another was that they stopped in the crater instead of pushing immediately forward. The points between which they could have taken on the ridge are the points on the map between Clark’s house and Cemetery Hill. Those being taken, Petersburg was in our possession. I have no doubt the enemy had guns in that position, but I do not know that he had any works. If there were any works there they were screened by the trees. No guns were opened immediately after the assault. The distance from the crater to the crest is about 500 yards.

Question. Could the troops have gone forward by division front?

Answer. I think they could if proper working parties had been sent to remove the abatis.

Question. Were there any working parties with them?

Answer. I do not know. I was directed not to interfere with General Burnside in his operations. I had no control over the operations in that part of the line,

Question. Were there engineer officers to lead or direct the assaulting columns?

Answer. Lieutenant Benyaurd, of the Engineers, was on duty on that front, and was available in case the general commanding that corps wished to make use of an engineer. Captain Farquhar was also on duty with the Eighteenth Corps, and was present, but not under my orders.

Question. What arrangements were made forfacilitating the débouché of the troops from our lines and passage over the enemy’s parapets?

Answer. I do not know.

Question. Were the obstructions at the enemy’s line formidable—of what did they consist?

Answer. They consisted of a strong rifle-pit with a good abatis in front. Such obstructions are formidable in case there are troops behind the parapets to defend them. In this instance there did not appear to be sufficient force behind the parapet to prevent those works being carried.

Question. How was our artillery fire as to effectiveness on that occasion?

Answer. It completely silenced the batteries of the enemy that were in position and had been in position previous to this day on the Fifth Corps front. I had nothing to do with the right, which was on the Eighteenth Corps line.

Question. In your opinion was the point of attack a judicious one?

Answer. I did not consider it so, although there was a chance of success. The point of attack was on are-entrant on the line, which exposed an attacking column to a fire on both flanks and front.

Question. Did you at any time make that known to the authorities? Answer. I did, two or three days previous to the attack. Question. In written or verbal communications?

Answer. J had frequently made it known verbally—two days previous to the attack, in writing—to the general commanding the Army of the Potomac.

Question. Can you produce that report? Answer. I can; and I will hand it to the judge-advocate. (It is marked 67.)

Question. What is your opinion of the mine as a means of assault?

Answer. It is a very unusual way of attacking field fortifications. I do not think that there was any reasonable chance of success by such an attack.

Question. Had the engineer department anything to do with it? Answer. It had not.

Question. Please to state what advantage would have resulted from holding the crater, simply.

Answer. No advantage. By the Court: Question. Did you see this explosion and assault?

Answer. I saw the explosion. I did not see the assault distinctly ; I was too far to the left. ;

Question. You could not see how far to the right or left the enemy’s parapet was abandoned, from any fire that came from it?

Answer. No, sir. Question. What artillery of the enemy did you see open and play

upon that assaulting column within the first fifteen minutes after the explosion?

Answer. J did not see any. They opened on our batteries, but I did not see them open on the column. I did not see them open on the column, and do not think they did. They opened with 30-pounders on us.

Question. Although you did not think the mine, as a means of assault, promised much success, do you believe, from the circumstances that transpired, it would have been a success had the troops gone to the top of the crest?

Answer. I believe it would.

Question. Do you believe that there was any difficulty in the way of the troops going to the crest during the first fifteen minutes?

Answer. I do not think there was the slightest difficulty.

Question. Do you think that immediately after the explosion, had there been proper working parties at work, the parapet of the enemy could have been cleared of sufficient of the obstructions and abatis within the first fifteen minutes to have allowed a brigade front to have passed over?

Answer. Yes; I think there could.

Question. There was no other difficulty in crawling over the parapet except the fire?

Answer. No, sir; and the abatis was a loose abatis of limbs pitched over the parapet. In some places it was a rail abatis—rails inclined forward.

Question. What should the storming party have done when they reached the crest had they reached it; what should have been their first operation—to have proceeded to Petersburg or intrenched themselves ?

Answer. IJ think they should have intrenched on the crest. I do not think they could have staid in Petersburg, as it was commanded.

Question. Had you ever been called upon for any gabions or any material for making a parapet upon the enemy’s intrenchments?

Question. Were any gabions prepared in this army except by the engineer department for those works?

Question. Nor any other material of that kind, fascines and so-forth, to assist in making a parapet?

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. General, were you present at the assault on the 30th of July, and had you facilities for seeing the progress of affairs on that day?

Answer. My division was a part of the command of the Fifth Corps, massed upon the right of the Fifth Corps, and upon the left of the Ninth Corps in the railroad cut, for purposes indicated in the order of assault. I was directed by General Warren to make my headquarters with his at the five-gun battery in the corner of the woods in front of the Avery house. I was in that position when the mine was sprung and the assaulting columns went forward. The general directions of those columns, as they marched for qgecds were visible from this position. As the troops filed out we could seé them distinctly. After quite a large force filed out there, they seemed to have formed a line of battle at one time along in or near the enemy’s rifle-pits adjacent to the mine. A body of troopsalso filed behind that line to the left as we looked at them appar- ently to march around the line and advance to the crest, which was the object to be gained —Cemetery Hill. After atime I saw those troops go back again toward the right, coming in still behind that line of battle standing. Directly after this I was requested by General Warren to ride to the fifteen-gun battery to see what chance offered me to put my division in on the left of the troops still standing as I described. I went there, made an examination, turned to General Warren and stated to him that as the troops were massed in our old line in rear of the mine in great crowds it would be very difficult to march my division through there unless they made a way for me, but if a way was made I could march my division by the flank, face it to the left, sweep down to the left, carry a certain battery there was firing across, and clean out the riflepits they occupied. General Warren rode with me a second time there, immediately after this; first my division was ordered to be closed up as soon as possible to be in readiness; then we rode together to the fifteen-gun battery. As we crossed the field between this five-gun battery and the fifteen-gun battery I saw the negro troops coming back to the rearlikeasandslide. By the time we got to the corner of the fifteen-gun battery numbers of them were sweeping through that, sweeping arowad from different quarters, some one side and some another, some into the covered ways, and some into the field between. A close observation assured me that that line of battle which I first described was replaced by the enemy in the rifle-pits on the right of the mine; I saw their battle-flags, and their bullets fell around us. Some one then proposed that General Warren should immediately put in the Fifth Corps at that moment; General Warren and myself concluded that the time was passed; they had lost what they had excepting those men who were left in the crater; and immediately after that we rode to our position at the five-gun battery, and I received notice that the movement was suspended, and a few moments after orders to send my division to its camp.

Question. Please to relate some of the chief causes of failure on that occasion ?

Answer. Firstly, those troops that went to make their attack seemed to be going out simply by the right flank from two covered ways; therefore the heads of regiments arrived at the crater in that condition, when there should have been a line of battle arriving there. These men rushed into the crater, and a considerable amount of time was lost in endeavoring to get troops in some formation to advance properly in line of battle. Arrangements should have been made that when that mine was sprung the troops which were to make the assault to carry the crest, which looked down upon the city, should advance in line of battle, so that they would have been in hand and subject to the command of their officers. That, in my judgment, was the principal cause of the failure. The commencement of the assault, in my judgment, was the cause of its entire failure. If those dispositions had been made, and those troops had advanced in line of battle instead of in columns of regiments, I believe they would have taken that crest. There was a great deal of work which should have been done along our old line nearest to the crater, and to the south of the line of the gallery, so that troops could have readily marched forward at least in two regiments abreast. That being done, and those troops advanced as I described, I believe they would have taken that crest readily, and I believe that then the supports would have been thrown in promptly, that crest would have been held, and success would have crowned the operation. After it was clear that the thing had failed I think that prompt orders should have been given to withdraw, in one rapid movement, all the troops left in the crater, to bring them out in bod, i ser ae: ; g one body rapidly, back

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. General, were you present at the assault on the 30th of

July, the day the mine was sprung, near this place, and, if so, in what capacity ?

Answer. I was there in command of the Fifth Corps.

Question. Will you please to state what in your opinion were some of the chief causes of that failure? :

Answer. To mention them all at once, I never saw sufficient good reas i should succeed. I never had confidence in its success. The postion som ed in reverse by batteries, and we must, as a matter of course, have expected a heavy fire of artillery when we gained the crest, thongh we did not get near enough to develop what that would be. I never should have planned it, I think.

Question. As it was planned, had you an opportunity of seeing whether the plan was carried out in the best manner, the plan having been adopted?

Answer. I can mention some faults. There was great defect, I think, in the preparation for the movement of the assaulting column; I judge so from the way the column moved, as I did not visit the exact point. And, second,I think the first force, instead of moving straight on to the hill, should have cleared the intrenchments right and left of the crater, so as not to have exposed the advancing column to a flank fire. I tried to make a similar assault there on the 18th of June, and that very same battery that operated on the left flank of Burnside’s force that day was in operation on the previous occasion, and stopped all my efforts.

Question. Could you mention that battery particularly by showing iton the map, or designating it in some way?

Answer. It is the first-battery on the south side of the mine. Question. Was our artillery fire effective on that occasion?

Answer. As much so as it could be. ‘I heard Colonel Abbot complain that a group of trees in front of one of his large batteries was left standing, and it was his desire to have it cleared away.

Question. Did he say whose business it was to clear itaway? Did he find fault with any one? In whose front was it?

Answer. In General Burnside’s front. I remember he said General Burnside had told him that he was afraid clearing it away might disclose his intention, but I do

not think that he said whose fault it was that it was not done, or whether it was a fault, except in interfering with his batteries.

By the Court:

Question. Aside from any general principle with reference to the matter upon which you predicated the chances of success, do you think that after the mine exploded there really was a chance of success?

Answer. There are so many if’s init. If we could have carried that first line of rifle-pits, and then maintained ourselves after we got to the crest, we would have had success; but I do not believe any troops will stand on an open plain, with artillery covered by redoubts playing upon them, and I think that is what the enemy had then, or ought to have had, if they did not. Ifthey have been there all this time without that preparation they are much more unprepared than I think they are.

Question. Did they open much artillery fire for the first fifteen minutes or half hour after the explosion?

Answer. Ishould say not a great deal—not where I was; only avery little. There was no particular danger in my vicinity for a group of horsemen standing right out in plain sight, as we did all the time. Their batteries were mainly placed for enfilading any line attacking, and probably reserved their fire until that line approached.

Question. Aside from that operation of the Ninth Corps, if the Fifth Corps, supported by another, could have been thrown round on the enemy’s right, occupying those two railroads and turning his right, what was the chance of success in that direction?

Answer. It would be impossible for me tosay. I do not know what the nature of their defenses were in that direction. I believe from what I have heard that the very brigade which repulsed General Burnside was located there in the morning, and my corps at that time had no force in reserve except General Ayres’ division, and a brigade of General Crawford’s, and a brigade of General Cutler’s.

Question. Was there any force of the enemy there strong enough to resist the number of troops we had disposable, had they been put in properly after the first assault had failed?

Answer. I can answer that question and cover a little more: When we attacked in the first operation on Petersburg, we had more force than on this occasion and the enemy had about the same, I think, and I don’t believe that the blowing up of the mine made up for the difference in the increased strength of the earthworks as they were on the 18th of June and the 30th of July; and if the operation of the 18th of June decided anything I think it decided that the operation of the 30th of July would have met with the same result.

Question. Did you feel the want of any person on the field who could see for himself and give commands on the spot; had that any effect upon the result; or do you think that any person ought to have been present who should have had command of the storming party, and all the troops ready to take part in the operation?

Answer. I think some one should have been present to have directed my command

as well as General Burnside’s and General Ord’s, some one person; but whether that would have affected the result or not I am not prepared to say.

Question. Did you experience any uncertainties and doubts for the want of such a person’s presence there?

Question. Were there moments when such a person’s presence was necessary in order to decide at once what should be done?

Answer. I think it was necessary that some one should have been there. If you have my official report it will show you that I was in doubt whether to move to the left or move to the right to help General Burnside, and that I had to await the transmission of dispatches and corresponding answers. My reportshows how much, but I do not know that that would have affected the main result at all. My report is 2 complete answer to your question. Sometimes in these badly planned or badly inaugurated assaults the longer and better they are pressed the worse we are off, great losses being sustained after the time and chance of success are gone.

The Court adjourned to meet at 10 a. m. on 30th of July [August].