Unknown to R. Drum, U. S. Army, January 12, 1862

Maj. R. ©. Drum, U. S. Army, Assistant Adjutant-General, Department of the Pacific :

MAJOR: We landed here on the 9th instant in a drenching rain. I found the fort filled with the two companies from Fort Seward—oneof the Second California Volunteer Cavalry, the other of the Third California Volunteer Infantry, Major McGarry, Second California Volunteer Cavary, commanding, having been driven here by the want of provisions, as has been already reported to you. As the ground about here was everywhere in a state of partial inundation, it was impossible to put my own two companies into tents, so I directed Quartermaster Swasey to hire buildings enough at Bucksport (about a quarter of a mile hence) to furnish shelter for the troops and for his stores. Finding room at the fort for myself and my staff, I established the command at Bucksport as a temporary post under Captain Douglas, and continued Major McGarry in command at the fort. For particulars in respect to the hire of the buildings and the state of the public property at this post I beg leave to refer to Mr. Swasey’s report by this express to Colonel Babbitt. The horses of the cavalry company are at present entirely unfit for service, being exhausted by continued short forage at Fort Seward, and the great fatigue of reaching here over a route almost impassable from the recent freshets. Some twenty of them, it is thought, will have to be condemned; the remainder may be sufficiently recruited in a month to be fit for service. If this should not be the case, I may have to send the company into the field dismounted. From all accounts the state of the roads (or rather trails) and of the creeks is such that it will take thirty days at least of dry weather to make active operations possible. I have some seven applications already for new posts, and many more it seems are coming in. With the few troops I have, if I establish any new ones it will be only in cases of urgent necessity. The state of things in this district may be summed up in a few words: There are several, perhaps many, thousands of Indians scattered through the forests and mountain gulches with which the whole country is covered. These Indians, or some among them, are constantly committing depredations on the whites, stealing or killing their stock and occasionally murdering them—sometimes for vengeance, sometimes for the sake of getting their arms or clothing. There are white men that associate with them, living with squaws, that are constantly furnishing them with arms and ammunition, and sometimes encourage and join them in their depredations and attacks upon the citizens. These Indians are not divided into any considerable tribes with responsible chiefs, but are made up of numberless rancherias or villages, in many cases speaking totally different languages. There are so many of them, they are so scattered about, and so hard to find, that to bring them all in by sending from time to time small parties or independent detachments after them, it would take about as long as if would to bring in all the coyotes or squirrels. On the other hand, there are many whites that are constantly killing Indians, often making up parties for that purpose, and as they generally find them in their rancherias, they kill as many of the women and children, perhaps, as bucks. Individuals and parties are, moreover, constantly engaged in kidnaping Indian children, frequently attacking the rancherias, and killing the parents for no other purpose. This is said to be a very lucrative business, the kidnapeđ children bringing good prices, in some instances, Mr. Hanson tells me, hundreds of dollars apiece. In deciding what is to be done, the question of which are the aggressors in this chronic warfare—the Indians or the whites—is entirely immaterial. It is plain that they never can live together in peace. The Indians must be all removed for their own sakes and for the sake of the whites, and the sooner they are removed the better. The Klamath, the Nome Cult, and the Mendocino Reservations are all too near. The Indians carried thither have all soon returned to their usual haunts—at least all the wild and more dangerous ones—and these return worse than they went, having acquired the taste for beef and learned to covet many articles they were before ignorant of. If they could be all transported to the Tejon Reservation, or, still better, to one of the Santa Barbara Islands, they could never return hither again. The only question is how to bring them in. This can never be done, in my opinion, by isolated operations by independent detachments—at least it would require years to do it, the sacrifice of many lives, and of much treasure. I have not yet had time to consider the subject maturely, but I cannot help thinking that the object might possibly be accomplished in a certain way in a very short time—say three months. My plan would be a general and vigorous campaign, combined as follows: The Coast Range which bounds this district on the east is in winter covered with snow, which is so deep in all the passes into the Sacramento Valley as to constitute an impassable barrier on that side. In the ocean the Indians would have an impassable barrier on the west also. If while one body of troops was marching southwardly from the north in as many detachments as the number of trails or the nature of the country might require, another body should advance to meet them in a similar manner from the south, say from Sonoma and Napa Counties, the Indians (except a few straggling parties that might escape through the intervals, and whose subsequent capture or destruction would not require much time or effort) would be completely hemmed in, and would be obliged to surrender, whether with or without fighting, and in either case the object would be attained. A small number of troops would probably suffice to watch the few practicable passes that might exist in the Coast Range. By means of the telegraph, which extends as far north as Weaverville, Trinity County, only about 100 miles from this place, the operations of the different corps could be easily combined. If operations be delayed till spring, when the Coast Range will be clear of snow, a much larger force will be required to guard the passes on that side. As to what number of troops would be required to carry this plan into execution I will be better prepared to report when the traveling shall be sufficiently improved to enable me to reconnoiter the country. To save time some other officer might be employed to reconnoiter the southern portion of the district. I would

respectfully