Unknown to James A. Seddon, January 29, 1864

Hon. JAMES A. SEDDON, Secretary of War:

DEAR SiR: Your letter of 13th instant was about ten days on its way and reached my office during my absence in Southwestern Georgia. In reply I have to state that the troops organized under your call for six months cannot be relied upon to relieve General Beauregard. The term of service of part of them has already expired, and they have been mustered out and discharged. On the 4th of February, only five days hence, the term of nearly all the others expires, and they will also be discharged.

Your requisition and their muster-rolls called for a six-months’ term from the time they were mustered in, and not a six-months’ term of active duty. The law of Congress under which you made the call declares them to be part of the armies of the Confederacy, but gives them pay and rations only while they may be in active service. Hence the time ran in their favor from the time they were mustered in, whether in active service or not.

The failure of the Government to keep its faith with that part of the State Guard who were called out early in September last and kept constantly in the field, when no raid was approaching Georgia, and no sudden emergency called for their services, has not only seriously injured our prospect for a supply of provisions the ensuing year, but it has caused great dissatisfaction with and great distress of the Government, and has engendered a feeling which will render it very difficult to enlist another similar force in the State. During a greater portion of the time there has been no use whatever for the troops at the points where they were kept.

They were organized to repel raids, meet sudden emergencies, &c., and were promised that when they were not needed for these and like purposes they should have the privilege to be at home, attending to their ordinary business as producers. After they were ordered into camp they were compelled to remain there during the balance of the term as regular troops. While they were thus kept in camp eating out our too limited supply of provisions, and were deprived of the privilege of sowing their wheat and preparing for another crop, they saw no enemy, there was no raid, no sudden emergency, and no use for their services. They felt and knew that this was a violation of both the letter and spirit of the contract. In their behalf I protested against it, but to no effect.

If we expect to continue to conduct the war successfully, we are obliged to have a producing class at home as well as a fighting class in the field. The one is as indispensable as the other. Weare already eut off from a large part of the most productive lands in the Confederacy, and we must fail to keep up our supplies if the productive interests of the portion we yet hold are seriously crippled. Thus far the State of Georgia has been able to meet the calls made upon her without paralyzing to a very great extent her agricultural interests, except in that part of the State where there are but few slaves. But I feel it my duty to inform you that we shall not be able to meet the increasing demands made by the Confederate Government through its conscript officers, and spare a large additional force for constant service in or out of the State without so crippling the planting interests that a support cannot be made another year for the Army and the people of the State.

Many of our fields now lie uncultivated, and if large additional levies of troops are to be made for constant service many more must be neglected. How, then, are we to make a support for another year?

I have lately been through the upper, middle, and southwestern portions of the State, which are its more productive portions, and I tell you in all candor that the country is becoming so far drained of supplies that if relief cannot be had from some other source I do not see how it is possible to supply the people and the Army with bread till another crop is made, while the supply of meat is entirely inadequate.

The cattle have been so generally taken for the Army as to leave a still less encouraging prospect for meat another year, and if heavy calls are to be made for troops to be taken from the agricultural pursuits the prospect for bread will indeed be gloomy.

If it is the policy of the Government to put the whole people, or any great additional number of them, into military service, the struggle for the future must necessarily be short. We cannot expect to conquer the enemy in a few months, and if we fail to make a crop it is only necessary for them to continue the war till we consume our provisions, and they must conquer us.

But you may inquire how, then, we are to get troops to meet the large armies of the enemy. It is not my wish to dictate, nor do I desire to annoy you by voluntary advice, but in view of the perils which surround us, and the responsibility of my position as the

Executive of one of the States of the Confederacy, I venture to suggest that it would be infinitely better to make but little further drafts upon the producing class, and put the troops whose names are now on the muster-rolls and who are in the pay of the Government, and especially the almost countless swarm of young, able-bodied officers, who are to be seen on all our railroad trains and in all our hotels, into the Army—a place where many of them are seldom found. This would increase the armies from 25 to 50 per cent. and make them strong enough, if well fed and sustained, to meet, with all the advantages which we as the invaded party possess, any force the enemy will be able to bring against us. Almost every little railroad village has become a military post, and a number of officers in brass buttons and gold lace can be seen idling about, each out of the reach of danger, with troops enough to supply each with a command. The Quartermaster’s and Commissary Departments are thronged with ablebodied men, subject to conscription or detailed from the Army, who are acting as clerks, purchasing agents, impressment agents, &c. From these and similar causes 50 per cent. of the Army are not in camp to answer to roll-call, and further drafts must be made upon the producing class to supply the places of the absentees, who ought to be kept at their places in the Army.

It is easy to foresee the result of this policy if persisted in. As the enemy has over three times aS many men able to do military service as we have, it is impossible for us to keep in the field as many troops as he does. Nor is this necessary. As the invaded party, having the inner lines of communication and other advantages incident to our position, if our people are united and determined and our Government acts with wisdom and prudence, we can defend successfully against a vastly superior force in point of numbers.

In conclusion I have only to state that Georgia has always done her whole duty and furnished more than her full share of men and means, and I doubt not she will still do her just part to the utmost of her ability as long as the enemy desecrates the soil of the Confederacy.

very respectfully, your obedient servant, AN ACT to regulate the collection of the tax in kind upon tobacco, and to amend