Unknown to Colonel, July 12, 1862
COLONEL: I herewith inclose a report of the operations of my brigade from the morning of June 26 to the morning of July 2 inclusive, in obedience to circular from Headquarters Department of Northern Virginia, July 10, 1862:
After the fight had ceased on Wednesday night, June 25, Colonel Vance’s North Carolina regiment, of Ransom’s brigade, was placed on picket duty on the right of the Williamsburg road, and my own brigade retired to the rifle pits for rest and refreshments, General Armistead having picketed the left of the road.
On Thursday morning, June 26, I ascertained that Colonel Vance’s regiment had during the night fallen back from our advanced picket line, and that the enemy had again occupied it. I ordered Colonel Jones’ (Twenty-second Georgia) regiment, of my brigade, to advance to the support of Colonel Vance and retake our original picket line. This was accomplished without serious loss on our side. Upon regaining our line we discovered that the enemy had already begun a line of rifle pits through the woods and had considerably advanced their works, when we forced them to retire, leaving a large number of axes, spades, shovels, and picks, and quite a number of small-arms, all of which fell into our possession. We also captured a few prisoners.
During the night following and the succeeding two days (Friday and Saturday, the 27th and 28th) a continuous attack was kept up by the enemy on our pickets, which from its continuation and violence greatly fatigued and worried my already small command. Our actual loss during this time was very light.
On Saturday night, the 28th, Col. George Doles, Fourth Georgia Regiment, was ordered on picket duty on the right of the Williamsburg road (General Armistead still picketing on the left), with instructions to keep a close watch upon the enemy, to throw scouts and flankers out in advance of his picket line, push them up to the enemy’s works, and give me immediate notice of any movement on the part of the enemy, who it was thought would either attack us or fall back from their intrenchments early on the succeeding morning (Sunday).
I received no report from Colonel Doles until about sunrise on Sunday morning, when he sent. me word that nothing unusual had occurred during the night, and that he was still occupying our old picket lines. I immediately sent Captain Girardey, my assistant adjutant-general, to order Colonel Doles to advance his scouts quickly up to the abatis in front of the enemy’s redoubts and observe their action and their movements. I was still confident, from the results of the fight on our left the two days previous, that the enemy would be forced to make some important movement this morning, and I directed Captain Girardey to accompany Colonel Doles’ advance and ascertain what the enemy were about. At about 8 a. m. Captain Girardey returned with the information that the enemy had retired from their intrenchments, and that their main body had got entirely off, leaving only their rear guard and a few stragglers.
I immediately put my brigade in motion and pushed forward into the enemy’s deserted works, intending to fall upon his rear and give him battle. After reaching the enemy’s works I found Maj. Gen. B. Huger on the field and reported to him for instructions and orders. I was directed to return to our camp (about 14 miles), let the men get breakfast, and then move across to the Charles City road and go down that road, cautiously feeling for the fleeing foe. Soon after getting in line, preparatory to moving across the Charles City road, I received orders from General Huger to proceed immediately down the Williamsburg road to the enemy’s intrenched camp again, as they were reported to be still in the rear of their advanced works in considerable force. This order I instantly obeyed, and again reported in person to General Huger, in the enemy’s intrenched camp. After a very inconsiderable delay here I was again ordered to move back with my command, and, crossing over to the Charles City road, to proceed down that road until I should fall upon the enemy. I commenced this movement, and had proceeded about 2 miles, when I received another order from General Huger to return quickly to the intrenched camp of the enemy, as General Magruder had informed him that the enemy in great force was about to advance upon him (General Magruder). I immediately retraced my steps, and, taking a by-path, soon the head of my column marched into the enemy’s deserted intrenchments. Here I received orders to wait for further instructions.
About 2 p. m. I received orders to again take up my march for the Charles City road, which I instantly obeyed, and, putting my command in motion, moved across White Oak Swamp and fell into the Charles Jity road about 2 miles above White’s Tavern, and thence proceeded down that road to a point just below the tavern, when, coming upon the rear of General Ransom’s brigade, Huger’s division, at a halt, I also halted and sent to General Huger for instructions. It was now quite dark, and I was instructed to throw out skirmishers and pickets to the left of the Charles City road until I reached what was called the New road, and then down that road as far as might be necessary. _
That night (June 29) I received orders to move my brigade at daylight next morning across to the New road (about 14 miles to the north ot the Charles City road and running parallel to it), and follow down that road toward White Oak Bridge, feeling cautiously for the enemy, then supposed to be on some of the numerous islands or farms in White Oak Swamp. Captain Ross’ battery, of Lieutenant-Colonel Cutt’s artillery, had been the day before attached to my brigade, and leaving this on the Charles City road, with instructions to follow as soon as I should need them, at early dawn on the morning of June 30 I moved my brigade across the woods and fields until I fell into the New road near Hobson’s house. Here I learned that the enemy, in considerable force, under General Kearny, late the evening before had passed down the road toward the north fork of White Oak Swamp.
I passed on, and at 8 o’clock my line of skirmishers had reached the crossing on the north fork of White Oak Swamp, when we encountered the enemy’s pickets, posted a short distance in advance of the crossing. The passage across the swamp here was over a log bridge, the approach to which was thoroughly obstructed by the felling of trees, the bridge itself being torn up and thrown in masses across the road. I ordered my line of skirmishers to advance and drive in the enemy’s pickets, while Lieutenant Luckie, of the Third Georgia Regiment, was ordered to move up the swamp and find a pathway (which my guide informed me was about half a mile distant), cross over, if possible, and reconnoiter the enemy’s position, and give me a speedy report of his observation. Lalso ordered Colonel Doles, whose regiment (the Fourth Georgia) was in advance, to send down a strong party below the road and attempt a crossing, which I learned from the guide was practicable about three-fourths of a mile below the bridge. In the mean time I had advanced my line of skirmishers up to the margin of the swamp, here about half a mile wide, driving the enemy’s pickets before us. In this advance we captured two of the enemy’s pickets, who informed me that the main body of the enemy had left their camp on the opposite side of the swamp (north fork), and were in rapid retreat toward White Oak Bridge (across the main swamp), then about 6 miles distant.
Lieutenant Luckie having returned, and the result of his reconnaissance confirming the prisoner’s statement, I ordered the column forward, and, driving the pickets and rear guard of the enemy before us, we rushed across the broken bridge, and, ascending a hill on the opposite side, found ourselves in the deserted camp of the enemy. Here we captured several prisoners and a large quantity of small-arms, tents, camp equipage, commissary and quartermaster’s stores, which in their haste the enemy had failed to destroy. Wealso captured a large number of intrenching tools and a very considerable quantity of medical stores. Leaving asmall guard here to take charge of the prisoners and to protect the public property in the camp I passed on, and for three hours my march lay through a succession of the enemy’s camps, in all of which immense quantities of small-arms were found, with considerable amounts of commissary and quartermaster’s stores. All along the route of the fleeing foe was strewed with guns, knapsacks, cartridge boxes, clothing, and ammunition. Moving rapidly forward captured quite a large number of prisoners, but owing to some misunderstanding of orders they were moved off to Richmond in the evening without proper lists having been retained. I am, consequently, unable to give you the exact numbers.
At 2.30 p. m. I reached White Oak Bridge, when I met General Jackson, who, with his command, had just arrived. I reported to him for orders, and he instructed me to move along up the swamp and, if possible, effect a crossing, the enemy being in large force and obstinately disputing the passage over White Oak Bridge. In obedience to these instructions I retraced my steps for about 1 mile, when, through the assistance of my guide, I discovered a crossing over the swamp, which had evidently been used by a portion of the enemy’s forces. I threw forward Captain Greer’s company (C), of the Third Georgia Regiment, and Captain Armistead’s company (C),* of the First Louisiana Regiment, as skirmishers on the right and left of the road, respectively, and moved my column on. Accompanying my line of skirmishers, I soon discovered that the enemy, after crossing, had destroyed the bridge, and had completely blockaded the road through the swamp by felling trees in and across it. Pushing the skirmishers through the creek and over the net-work of fallen timber I soon encountered the pickets of the enemy, posted in the margin of the swamp and protected by a rail fence and ditch in front. My line of skirmishers steadily advanced, and, driving the enemy’s pickets from their position, took possession of it. From this point Iwas enabled to make a good reconnaissance of the enemy’s position and force. I ascertained that the road debouched
* Under command of Lient. J. A. Lamkin, of Company H, same regiment.
from the swamp into an open field (meadow), commanded by a line of high hills, all in cultivation and free from timber. Upon this range of hills the enemy had posted heavy batteries of field artillery, strongly supported by infantry, which swept across the meadow by a direct and cross-fire, and which could be used with terrible effect upon my column while struggling through the fallen timber in the wood through the swamp. ‘Two prisoners, whom we captured here on picket, confirmed by their statements my own observations of the enemy’s force and position, and having no artillery with me to support my infantry while crossing, I determined to withdraw from this point and seek a crossing higherupthe swamp. Skirting along the northern margin of the swamp about 3 miles I discovered a cow trail, which led across not far from and in rear of Fisher’s house, on the Charles City road. This trail I took, and at dark halted my brigade for the night on the Charles City road near to Fisher’s house.
Having reported to General Huger in person, I received orders from him that night instructing me to move early in the morning down the Charles City road, supporting General Armistead’s brigade, which would move down in advance of me.
This order was countermanded early next (Tuesday) morning, July 1, and I was instructed to follow * General Armistead’s brigade, which was directed to move across from the Charles City road in the direction ot James River, skirting along the west side of the Quaker road and closely watching the right of that road. After marching about 24 or 3 miles I halted my brigade, having found General Armistead’s brigade halted upon the intersection of the road we were moving along with the Long Bridge road. Here I remained nearly an hour waiting for the command in front of me to move forward.
Between 8 and 9 a. m. I again moved forward, and following General Armistead’s brigade, I crossed the Long Bridge road, near to the battle-field of the day before, Monday, June 30, and passed on over a blind road in the direction of Malvern Hill.
After moving about 14 miles I was again halted by finding that General Armistead’s brigade had stopped ona skirt of woods about
General Armistead’s line, I proceeded to and found the general in a . deep ravine about 100 yards from and running parallel to Crew’s field fence. Here I ascertained that the enemy in very large force was occupying the crest of the hills in Crew’s farm immediately in front of his farm-yard, and had pickets and sharpshooters advanced near the edge of the woods in which we then lay. No definite idea could be obtained from our scouts of the number or position of the enemy, and I suggested to General Armistead that we go forward to the edge of the field and, under protection of a strong force of skirmishers, ascend a high knoll or hill which abruptly sprang from the meadow below and on our right, from the summit of which we would be able to observe the enemy’s movements.
Having reached this position, we were enabled to get a very complete view of McClellan’s army. Immediately in our front and extending 1 mile stretched a field, at the farther extremity of which was situated the dwelling and farm buildings of Mr. Crew (formerly Dr. Mettert). In front and to our left the land rose gently from the edge of the woeds
*The report of Brig. Gen. A. R. Wright, commanding Third Brigade, Huger’s division, of the battle of Malvern Hill, July 1, 1862, dated July 14, 1862, and addressed to Maj. Gen. J. Bankhead Magruder, is the same as the remainder of this report.
up to the farm-yard, when it became high and rolling. Upon the right the field was proken by a series of ridges and v alley: S, which ran out at right angles to a line drawn from our position to that of the enemy, and all of which terminated upon our extreme right in a precipitous bluff, which dropped suddenly down upon a low, flat meadow, covered with wheat and intersected with a number of ditches, which ran from the bluff across the meadow to a swamp or dense woods about 500 yards farther to our right. This low, flat meadow stretched up to, and swinging around, Crew’s house, extended as far as Turkey Bend, on James River. The enemy had drawn up his artillery (as well as could be ascertained about fifty pieces) in a crescent-shaped line, the convex line being next to our position, with its right (on our left) resting upon aroad which passed 300 yards to the left of Crew’s house on to Malvern Hill, the left of their advanced line of batteries resting upon the high bluff which overlooked the meadow to the right (our right) and rear of Crew’s house. Their infantry, a little in rear of the artillery and protected by the crest of the ridge upon which the batteries were placed, extended from the woods on our left along the crest of the hill and through a lane in the meadow on our right to the dense woods there. In rear of this and beyond a narrow ravine, the sides of which were covered with timber and which ran parallel to their line of battle and but a few rods in the rear of Crew’s house, was another line of infantry, its right resting upon a heavy, dense woods, which covered the Malvern Hill farm on the east. The left of this line rested upon the precipitous bluff which overhung the low meadow on the west of the farm. At this point the high bluff stretched out to the west for of the timber was planted a heavy battery in a small redoubt, whose fire swept across the meadow. These two batteries completely controlled the meadow from one extremity of it to the other and effectually prevented the movement of troops in large masses upon it. The whole number of guns in these several batteries could not have fallen far short of 100. The infantry force of the enemy I estimated at least 25,000 or 30,000 from what I saw. Large numbers, as I ascertained afterward, were posted in the woods on our extreme right and left, and the line of ditches across the meadow were lined with sharpshooters.
Having no artillery with us, it was deemed prudent to keep our little force, amounting to not more than 2 ,200 men in both brigades, concealed in the deep ravine in front of Crew’s field and send to the rear for guns. General Armistead, being the senior officer present, directed me to bring up Grimes’ battery and. place it in position on the crest of the ridge in front of our position. Grimes’ battery was moved up, but the distance being so great only two pieces of his battery (rifles) were put in battery. As soon as Grimes’ guns opened the enemy began a fierce cannonading along their whole line, concentrating their fire upon Grimes’ two pieces.
Returning down the hill after conducting Grimes to his position I met General Armistead’s and my own brigade advancing (Armistead’s some 20 or 30 paces in front of my own on a run up the e hill) and toward the open field, in the far edge of which the enemy was posted. Having received no order for this advance of my brigade, and being convinced the movement was not a judicious one, I ordered my brigade to halt just before emerging from the woods and fall upon the ground, as the enemy’s shells were falling in a pitiless storm all around us. Just as I got my men quiet I was officially notified that General Armistead had ordered the advance, and I moved my brigade on. Emerging from the woods we passed into the open field, set at this point with clover, and continuing the ascent some 50 or 60 yards we reached the summit of the hill, where we found the fire from the enemy’s guns so incessant and well directed that I deemed it prudent to halt and make my men lie down in the high clover. Meanwhile Grimes’ guns had been silenced by the loss of his horses and men and he was forced to retire, leaving one of his pieces.
I immediately ordered my brigade to fall back and seek cover under the woods in the ravine and reported to General Armistead what I had done. In this ill-timed advance my loss was very severe. Part of my brigade—the Fourth Georgia and a small portion of the Twenty-second Georgia, under Major [Joseph] Wasden, and a few of the Third Georgia, under Capt. (Acting Lieut. Col.) R. B. Nisbet—had advanced on the extreme right so far as to pass over the crest of the ridge and were lying in a hollow about 200 yards in advance of the line of woods. These were permitted to remain, as they were comparatively secure from the effects of the enemy’s shell.
General Armistead directing, I ordered up another battery (Moorman’s, I think) and got it in position a little under the crest of the hill in the clover field and opened upon the enemy. The superior number and metal of the enemy’s guns, in addition to his strong position, gave him the decided advantage of us, and very soon this battery was forced to retire.
Meanwhile Captain Pegram’s battery was ordered up, and, taking position 200 yards to the left of Moorman, opened a well-directed fire upon the enemy, which told with fearful effect upon them. But this chivalric commander, by the retiring of Moorman’s battery, was left alone to contend with the whole force of the enemy’s artillery. Manfully these gallant men maintained the unequal conflict until their severe losses disabled them from using but a single piece; even then, with one single piece, they firmly held their ground and continued to pour a deadly fire upon the enemy’s line until, seeing the utter hopelessness of the contest, I ordered them to cease firing until I could get more guns in action.
It was now 3p.m. We had been fighting since 11.30 a. m., and still -the enemy continued to pour volley after volley upon us from their whole line. Another battery was soon ordered up, and again the gallant Pegram opened with his single gun, himself assisting to work it. Still the superior number and caliber of the enemy’s guns enabled him to pour a continuous and galling fire upon our artilierists and keep the skirt of woods in which my men lay wrapt in a sheet of flame and hail from their immense shells.
Again our few guns were silenced, and I rode from the scene convinced that with the small force at our command further demonstrations against the enemy in his stronghold were utterly futile and highly improper. These views I urged upon General Armistead, who entirely concurred in opinion with me and ordered the firing to cease. I immediately reformed the shattered fragments of my brigade, at least that portion of it not already in advance in the hollow in the field.
I regret to state that in reforming I was unable to find the Twenty- second Georgia Regiment or its commander, Col. Rk. H. Jones. After a long search and considerable delay I discovered Colonel Jones approaching from the rear, where he had been some mile or more, without my assent, knowledge, or approval. He had received a slight scrateh in the face from a fragment of shell, left his command, and retired to the rear. I ordered him to collect his regiment and form on the left of the First Louisiana Regiment. This he failed to do, and in the subsequent severe fighting which occurred that afternoon no portion of that regiment was engaged except the small number who, under Maj. Joseph Wasden, had in the first advance got over into the hollow in the field.
Major-General Magruder came on the field about 4 o’clock, and, assuming command, directed the future movements of my brigade. I was ordered by him to advance, supported by Brigadier-General Mahone’s brigade, upon the enemy’s right, and charge upon the enemy’s batteries. This movement was to be simultaneous with an advance upon the enemy’s left and center. I immediately took my brigade around by a flank movement to the right, and by filing to the left under the edge of the bluff got it in line in the hollow already occupied by the Fourth Georgia and portions of the Twenty-second and Third Georgia. Here I formed my line, the Fourth Georgia upon the right, the First Louisiana and a few of the Twenty-second Georgia, under Major Wasden, in the center, and the Third Georgia on the left. I had lost a few men wounded getting into this position, and the enemy, detecting the movement, opened a furious fire upon us, but my gallant soldiers lay quietly upon their faces, ready and eager for the order to advance.
At 4.45 o’clock I received an order from General Magruder, through charge the enemy’s batteries. No other troops had yet come upon the field. J ordered my men forward, and springing before them led my brigade, less than 1,000 men, against a force I knew to be superior in the ratio of at least twenty to one. Onward we pressed, warmly and strongly supported by General Mahone’s brigade, under a murderous fire of shot, shell, canister, and musketry. At every step my brave men fell around me, but the survivors pressed on until we had reached a hollow about 300 yards from the enemy’s batteries on the right. Here I perceived that a strong force of infantry had been sent forward on our left by the enemy with a view of flanking and cutting us off from our support, now more than 1,000 yards in our rear. I iminediately threw the left of the Third Georgia Regiment a little back along the upper margin of the hollow, and suddenly changing [the] front of this regiment, poured a galling fire upon the enemy, which he returned with spirit, aided by a fearful direct and cross-fire from his batteries. Here the contest raged with varying success for more than three-quarters of an hour; finally the line of the enemy was broken and he gave way in great disorder.
In the mean time my front, supported by General Mahone, had been subjected to a heavy fire of artillery and musketry and had begun to waver, and I feared would be compelled to fall back. Just at this moment firing was heard far away on our left, and soon we saw our columns advancing upon the enemy’s center. This diverted a portion of the enemy’s fire from us, and I succeeded in keeping my men steady. We had now approached to within a few hundred yards of the enemy’s advanced batteries, and again I gave the order to charge, which was obeyed with promptness and alacrity. We rushed forward up the side of the hill, under the brow of which we had been for some time halted, and dashing over the hill reached another hollow or ravine immediately in front of and, as it were, under the enemy’s guns. This ravine was occupied by a line of Yankee infantry, posted there to protect their batteries. Upon this we rushed with such impetuosity that the enemy broke in great disorder and fled.
During this little engagement the enemy’s batteries in front of us, and to which we had approached within a few rods, were moved off around and behind the barn and stables which stood [on] the side of the hill, and were again put in position upon the crest of the hill just in front of Crew’s “house. But for our encountering the infantry of the enemy in the ravine we should have certainly captured this battery, but the delay occasioned by the fight there enabled them to move off their guns to a safer and better position. The firing had now become general along the left and center of our line, and night setting in, it was difficult to distinguish friend from foe.
Several of my command were killed by our own friends, who had come up on our immediate left, and who commenced firing long before they came within range of the enemy. This firing upon us from our friends, together with the increasing darkness, made our position peculiarly hazardous; but I determined to maintain it at all hazards as long as a man should be left to fire a gun. The fire was terrific now beyoud anything I had ever witnessed—indeed, the hideous shrieking of shells through the dusky gloom of closing night, the whizzing of bullets, the loud and incessant roll of artillery and small-arms, were enough to make the stoutest heart quail. Still my shattered little command, now reduced to less than 300, with about an equal number of General Mahone’s brigade, held our position under the very muzzles of the enemy’s guns, and poured volley after volley with murderous precision into their serried ranks.
Night had now thrown her black pall es the entire field, and the firing ceased except from a few of the enemy’s guns, which continued at intervals to throw shell and grape around the entire circuit of the field. Our forces had all retired and left us (Mahone and myseif) alone with our little band to dispute the possession of the field with the insolent but well-chastised foe. Upon consultation we determined to remain where we were, now within 100 yards of the enemy’s batteries, and if any of the foe should be left when mor ning dawned to give him battle again. We had lost too many valuable ‘lives to give up the decided advantage which we had won from the enemy.