Unknown to Benjamin Franklin Butler, February 23, 1862

Washington, February 23, 1862.

GENERAL:

Youare assigned to the command of the land forces destined to co-operate with the Navy in the attacks upon New Orleans. You willuse every means fo keep your destination a profound secret, even from your staff officers, with the exception of your chief of staff and Lieutenant Weitzel, of the Engineers. The force at your disposal will consist of the first thirteen regiments named in your memorandum handed to me in person, the Twenty-first Indiana, Fourth Wisconsin, and Sixth Michigan (old and good regiments from Baltimore). : E A > 3

The Twenty-first Indiana, Fourth Wisconsin, and Sixth Michigan will await your orders at Fort Monroe. ; :

Two companies of the Twenty-first Indiana are well drilled as heavy artillery. The cavalry force already en route for Ship Island will be sufficient for your purposes. .

After fall consultation with officers well acquainted with the country in which it is proposed to operate, I have arrived at the conclusion that two light batteries fully equipped and one without horses will be all that are necessary. This will make your force about 14,400 infantry, 275 cavalry, 580 artillery; total, 15,255 men. The commanding general of the Department of Key West is authorized to loan you, temporarily, two regiménts; Fort Pickens can, probably, give you another, which will

. bring your force to near 18,000. $ The object of your expedition is one of vital importance—the capture of New Orleans. The route selected is up the Mississippi River, and the first obstacle to. be encountered (perhaps the only one) is in the resistance offered by Forts Saint Philip and Jackson. It is expected that the Navy can reduce these works; in that case you will, after their capture, leave a sufficient garrison in them to render them perfectly _ secure; and it is recommended that, on the upward passage, a few heavy guns and

some troops be left at the pilot station (at the forks of the river) to cover a retreat in the event of a disaster. These troops and guns will.of course be removed as soon ~ as the forts are captured. Should the Navy fail to reduce the works, you will land your forces and siege train, and endeavor te breach the works, silence their fire, and carry them by assault. A

The next resistance will be near the English Bend, where there are some earthen batteries. Here it may be necessary for you to land your troops and co-operate with the naval attack, although it is more than probable that the Navy unassisted can accomplish the result. If these works are taken, the city of New Orleans necessarily falls. In that event, it will probably be best to oceupy Algiers with the mass of your troops, also the eastern bank of the river above the city. It may be necessary to place some troops in the city to preserve order, but if there appears to be sufficient Union sentiment to control the city, it may be best for purposes of discipline to keep your men out of the city.

After obtaining possession of New Orleans, it will be necessary to reduce all the’ TOES guarding its approaches from the east, and particularly to gain the Manchac

Baton Rouge, Berwick Bay, and Fort Livingston will next claim your attention.

A feint on Galveston may facilitate the objects we have in view. I need not call your attention to the necessity of gaining possession of all the rolling stock you can on the different railways and of obtaining control of the roads themselves. The occupation of Baton Rouge by a combined naval and land force should be accomplished as soon as possible after you have gained New Orleans. Then endeavor to open your communication with the northern column by the Mississippi, always bearing in mind the necessity of occupying Jackson, Miss., as soon as you can safely do so, either after or before you have effected the junction. Allow nothing to divert you from obtaining full possession of all the approaches to New Orleans. When that object is accomplished to its fullest extent, it will be necessary to make a combined attack on Mobile, in order to gain possession of the harbor and works, as well as to control the railway terminus at the city. In regard to this I will send more detailed instructions as the operations of the northern column develop themselves. ‘

Imay briefly state that the general objects of the expedition are, first the reduction of New Orleans and all its approaches; then Mobile and its defenses; then Pensacola, Galveston, &e. Itis probable that by the time New Orleans is reduced it will be in the power of the Government to re-enforce the land forces sufficiently to accomplish all these objects. In the mean time you will please give all the assistance in your. power to the army and navy commanders in your vicinity, never losing sight of

aes that the great object to be achieved is the capture and firm retention of New

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, : Major-General, Commanding U. S. Army. Maj. Gen. B. F. BUTLER, U. S. Volunteers. ies

The plan indicated in the above letters comprehended in its scope – the operations of all the armies of the Union, the Army of the Potomac as well. It was my intention, for reasons easy to be seen, that its various parts should .be carried out simultaneously, or nearly so, and in co-operation along#the whole line. If this plan was wise, and events have failed to prove that it was not, then it is unnecessary to defend any delay which would have enabled the Army of the Potomac to perform its share in the execution of the whole work. But about the middle of January, 1862, upon recovering from a sévere illness, I found that excessive anxiety for an immediate movement of the Army of the Potomae had taken possession of the minds of the administration. A change had just been made in the War Department, and I was soon urged by the new Secretary, Mr. Stanton, to take immediate steps to’ secure the reopening of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and to free – the banks of the Lower Potomac from the rebel batteries, which annoyed . passing vessels. Very soon after his entrance upon office I laid before him verbally my design as to the part of the plan of campaign to be ex- -ecuted by the Army of the Potomac, which was to attack Richmond by the Lower Chesapeake. He instructed me to develop it to the President, which I did. The result was that the President disapproved it, and by an order of January 31, 1862, substituted one of his own. On the 27th of January, 1862, the following order was issued, without consultation with me: a