Unknown to Abraham Lincoln, June 15, 1862

I respectfully remind the President that when assigned to this command I was informed that I should have a corps of 35,000 men. I now ask from the President the fulfillment of this understanding, and ask it only because, under the conditions of the war here, I should be able to render good and immediate service. Such a force would enable me to take Staunton, hold the railroad there, go down through Lexington, seize the railroad between Lynchburg and Newbern, and hold it for General Banks’ troops, or destroy it, according to circumstances. Whether from Richmond or elsewhere, forces of the enemy are cer. tainly coming into this region, which the great wheat crop makes a granary for him, and which he will not abandon without a struggle. Casualties have reduced my force to such numbers in many of the regiments as 176, 250, 300, and so on. This makes me very weak, and the small corps scattered about the country, not being within supporting distance of each other, as the topography of the country will show, are exposed to sudden attack by greatly superior force of an enemy, to whom intimate knowledge of country and universal friendship of inhabitants give the advantages of rapidity and secrecy of movements. I respectfully submit this representation to the President, taking it for granted that it is the duty of his generals to offer for his consideration such impressions as are made by knowledge obtained in operations on the ground. J. C. FREMONT, Major-General. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President United States. Wak DEPARTMENT, Washington Oity, D. C., June 15, 1862. Major-General FREMONT: My DeEAR Sir: Your letter of the 12th, by Colonel Zagonyi, is just received. In answer to the principal part of it I repeat the substance of an order of the 8th and one or two telegraphic dispatches sent you since: We have no indefinite power of sending re-enforcements; so that we are compelled rather to consider the proper disposal of the forces we have than of those we could wish to have. We may be able to send you some dribs by degrees, but I do not believe we can do more. As you alone beat Jackson last Sunday I argue that you are stronger than he is to-day, unless he has been re-enforced, and that he cannot have been materially re-enforced, because such re-enforcement could only ‘ have come from Richmond, and he is much more likely to go to Richmond than Richmond istocometohim. Neitherisvery likely. I think Jackson’s game—his assigned work—now is to magnify the accounts of his numbers and reports of his movements, and thus by constant alarms keep three or four times as many of our troops away from Richmond as his own force amounts to. Thus he helps his friends at Richmond three or four times as much asif he werethere. Our game is not to allow this. Accordingly, by the order of the 8th, I directed you to halt at Harrisonburg, rest your force, and get it well in hand, the objects being to guard against Jackson’s retarning by the same route to the Upper Potomac, over which you have just driven him out, and at the same time give some protection against a raid into West Virginia. Already I have given you discretion to occupy Mount Jackson instead, if, on full consideration, you think best. I do not believe Jackson will attack you, but certainly he cannot attack you by surprise; and if he comes upon you in superior force you have but to notify us, fall back cautiously, and Banks will join you in due time. But while we know not whether Jackson will move at all, or by what route, we cannot safely put you and Banks both on the Strasburg line, and leave no force on the Front Royal line, the very line upon which he prosecuted his late raid. The true policy is to place one of you on one line and the other on the other, in such positions that you can unite on either once you actually find Jackson moving upon it. And this is precisely what we are doing. This protects that part of our frontier, so to speak, and liberates McDowell to go to the assistance of McClellan. I have ar- ‘ranged this, and am very unwilling to have it deranged. While you have only asked for Sigel I have spoken only of Banks, and this because Sigel’s force is now the principal part of Banks’ force. About transferring General Schenck’s command, the purchase of supplies, and the promotion and appointment of officers mentioned in your letter, I will consult with the Secretary of War to-morrow.

662 OPERATIONS IN N. V. A., W. V. A., AND MD, = (Cuar. XXIV