Unknown to Abraham Lincoln, December 16, 1862

December 16, 1862—5.30 p.m. (Received 6 p. m.)

Your dispatch is received. The army was withdrawn to this side of the river because I felt the positions in front could not be carried, and it was a military necessity either to attack or retire. A repulse would have been disastrous to us. :

I hope this explanation will be satisfactory to the President. The army was withdrawn at night, without the knowledge of the enemy, and without loss either of property or men.

I have sent Colonel Aspinwall to you this afternoon, who can give you full accounts of the affairs at the present moment. I will send youa more full dispatch to-morrow.

Major-General, Commanding. Major-General HALLECK.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE Potomac, December 17, 1862.

I have the honor to offer the following reasons for moving the Army of the Potomac across the Rappahannock sooner than was anticipated by the President, Secretary, or yourself, and for crossing at a point diffore from the one indicated to you at our last meeting at the President/s:

During my preparations for crossing at the place I had at first selected, I discovered that the enemy had thrown a large portion of his force down the river and elsewhere, thus weakening his defenses in front; and I also thought I discovered that he did not anticipate the crossing of our whole force at Fredericksburg; and I hoped, by rapidly throwing the whole command over at that place, to separate, by a vigorous attack, the forces of the enemy on the river below from the forces behind and on the crests in the rear of the town, in which case we should fight him with great advantages in our favor. To do this we had to gain a height on the extreme right of the crest, which height commanded a new road, lately built by the enemy for purposes of more rapid communication along his lines; which point gained, his positions along the crest would have been scarcely tenable, and he could have been driven from them easily by an attack on his front, in connection with a movement in rear of the crest.

How near we came to accomplishing our object future reports will show. But for the fog and unexpected and unavoidable delay in building the bridges, which gave the enemy twenty-four hours more to concentrate his forces in his strong positions, we would almost certainly have succeeded; in which case the battle would have been, in my opinion, far more decisive than if we had crossed at the places first selected. As it was, we came very near success. Failing in accomplishing the main object, we remained in order of battle two days—long enough to decide that the enemy would not come out of his strongholds and fight us with his infantry. After which we recrossed to this side of the river unmolested, and without the loss of men or property.

As the day broke, our long lines of troops were seen marching to their different positions as if going on parade; not the least demoralization or disorganization existed.

To the brave officers and soldiers who accomplished the feat of this recrossing in the face of the enemy I owe everything. For the failure in the attack I am responsible, as the extreme gallantry, courage, and endurance shown by them was never excelled, and would have carried the points, had it been possible.

To the families and friends of the dead I can only offer my heartfelt sympathy, but for the wounded I can offer my earnest prayers for their comfort and final recovery.

The fact that I decided to move from Warrenton onto this line rather against the opinion of the President, Secretary, and yourself, and that you have left the whole management in my hands, without giving me orders, makes me the more responsible.

I will visit you very soon and give you more definite information, and finally will send you my detailed report, in which a special acknowledgment will be made of the services of the different grand divisions, corps, and my general and personal staff departments of the Army of the Potomac, to whom I am much indebted for their hearty support and co-operation.

I will add here that the movement was made earlier than you expected, and after the President, Secretary, and yourself requested me not to be in haste, for the reason that we were supplied much sooner by the different staff departments than was anticipated when I last saw

Our killed amounted to 1,152; our wounded, about 9,000; our prisoners, about 700, which have been paroled and exchanged for about the same number taken by us.* The wounded were all removed to this side of the river before the evacuation, and are being well cared for, and the dead were all buried under a flag of truce. The surgeon reports a much larger proportion than usual of slight wounds, 1,630 only being treated in hospitals.

I am glad to represent the army at the present time in good condition.

Thanking the Government for that entire support and confidence which I have always received from them, I remain, general, very respectfull our obedient servant Samed A. E. BURNSIDE,

Major-General, Commanding Army of the Potomac. Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief, Washington, D. O.

Message from President Lincoln to the Army of the Potomac. EXEOUTIVE MANSION, Washington, December 22, 1862. To the Army of the Potomac:

I have just read your commanding general’s report of the battle of Fredericksburg. Although you were not successful, the attempt was

_* But see revised statement, pp. 129-142.

not an error, nor the failure other than accident. The courage with which you, in an open field, maintained the contest against an intrenched foe, and the consummate skill and success with which you crossed and recrossed the river, in the face of the enemy, show that you possess all the qualities of a great army, which will yet give victory to the cause of the country and of popular government. a ;

Condoling with the mourners for the dead, and sympathizing with the severely wounded, I congratulate you that the number of hoth is comparatively so small. ‘

I tender to you, officers and soldiers, the thanks of the nation.