Unknown to Abraham Lincoln, April 21, 1862

To His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President of the United States :

Sir: In answer to a telegram from the Secretary of War, desiring me to submit to the President my proposed plan of operations for the occupation of Knoxville, I_beg leave to state that my first intention was, after guarding the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the loyal inhabitants of the department with a force of about 10,000, to transport 25,000 men by railroad and the Ohio to Maysville, Covington, and Louisville, Ky. ; thence, partly by rail and partly by turnpike, to Nicholasville, and from that point march directly upon Knoxville, turning the enemy’s position at Cumberland Gap. The difficulties, however, in the way of obtaining the requisite number of troops have led to a change of my plan, which is as follows:

The first base of operations being the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the division of General Blenker, which, from the best information I can obtain, numbers about 9,000 men, will take position at Moorefield. At this point or at Franklin it will unite with the troops now under command of General Schenck, numbering about 3,000. With these, acting in conjunction with General Banks, I propose to move up the valley of Virginia by a course which you will see on the accompanying map, over roads which are as dry and as good at all seasons of.the year as any in Virginia, and through a country where forage is easily obtained. At Monterey I shall be joined by the troops under General Milroy, numbering 3,500 effective men, and can then strike the railroad at or near Salem, while General Cox with his 7,000 men takes possession of Newbern, or can first effect a junction with General Cox, and seize the railroad with a force thus increased to about 22,000.

The base of operations will then be changed to Gauley. To this place, by the Ohio and Kanawha Rivers, abundant supplies for the army can be transported with the means now on hand and being prepared. Having thus destroyed the connection be- tween Knoxville and the army in Eastern Virginia, and perhaps seized some rolling stock, we can advance rapidly along the railroad toward Knoxville, turning the position a; Cumberland Gap. The forces now under General Kelley and the Virginia troops will be left as we proceed to guard the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and to protect the loyal inhabitants of the State from guerrillas. The latter isto be effected by the establishment of a few posts strongly held, from which sudden and frequent attacks can be made upon any organizations existing or forming in the department. Knoxville taken, a third base of operations can be made upon Nicholasville, from which place supplies can be easily obtained and transported over level and good roads. The army will thus be in a position to co-operate in any way in the general plan of operations for the prosecution of the war. :

The original plan above mentioned possesses the advantages of rapidity in execution, the throwing us forward immediately into the heart of the enemy’s country, the striking of the enemy’s railroad in the first instance at the most important point, and a base of operations in a friendly country, through which provisions can bo drawn with comparative safety. The second has been suggested only because it enables us to collect the troops now scattered throughout the department, and thus increase the small force sent.

Respectfull Gage Be J. C. FREMONT,

Major-General, Commanding.

The proposed plan of operations up the valley of Virginia was approved by the President and Secretary of War, but, as subsequently indicated in telegrams from the War Department, it was adopted in view of the ultimate closing in of my columns toward Richmond, rather than Knoxville.*

On the 3d of May I moved with my staff to New Creek, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, my proposed depot of main supply for

‘operations in the field. On the 4th of May I was apprised by the Secretary of War of the evacuation of Yorktown by the rebel forces. Foreseeing by this event and the release of so large a body in the east that the enemy would be enabled to augment westwardly his force along my front, I judged it desirable to get forward and concentrate at an early moment my strongest available supports. Leaving New

* Copy of Frémont’s letter and of the instructions given him were furnished to McDowell by the Secretary of War, under date of April 25, 1862.

Creek on the 5th, and taking with me upon the route the Sixtieth Ohio. a portion of the Highth Virginia, a company of Indiana cavalry, an a body of men sent forward with baggage from Blenker’s division, 1 proceeded toward Petersburg, arriving on the evening of the 7th.

General Schenck, who had been ordered early in April to advance from Romney and Moorefield, to operate on the road leading by Elkhorn to Franklin, in connection with movements with General Banks up the Shenandoah Valley, was already well in advance. Overcoming many obstacles in the form of swollen streams and difficult roads, he had by the 6th of May reached Franklin. j

Farther to the front, and occupying McDowell, a small village about The Blenker division, though ordered on the ist of April, had not so much as entered within the limits of my department until the 4th or 5th of May. ‘Taking into view their ill-provided condition, as reported and set forth in the foregoing, their delay upon the route was less a matter of surprise with myself than had been expressed to me in dispatches from the War Department.

Upon the 7th the brigade of General Stahel being reported at Romney and still in need of shoes, a supply was ordered from New Creek. The issue was made while the men were upon the road, companies halting for the moment to receive what could be spared them.

On the 9th of May the advance of General Blenker’s division joined me at my camp near Petersburg, and by the 11th his whole command had arrived. The division was composed of three brigades, commanded respectively by Generals Stahel and Bohlen and Colonel Steinwehr. Assuming the data as then sent in, General Blenker stated his effective force at over 8,000. Subsequent investigation placed the number of men and officers actually present and fit for duty at considerably below 7,000.

The condition of the men, as exbibited upon review, was not such as could have been desired. They were worn and exhausted by hardships scarcely credible, and in spite of efforts by myself and others to supply their wants, a large proportion were without articles of first necessity – for service in the field. Of shoes, blankets, and overcoats there was especially great need. Wagon and artillery teams, brought forward by the several batteries and regiments, were found on inspection to be very much jaded and weak from the long march and want of forage. The horses of a portion of the cavalry were so nearly starved and broken down as to be well-nigh useless. The number of wagons was much be low the standard for supply on any lengthened route. By report of my medical director, afterward sent in, but about one-fifth of the necessary ambulances had been brought along. One regiment had none.

In the important matter of arms there was great deficiency, Belgian or Austrian muskets of old and indifferent patterns being carried by many of the regiments. Having fortunately at hand a superior lot of Enfield rifles, 1 was enabled to rearm the corps most needing them. Ammunition was also supplied as far as resources would then permit.

A pontoon train having been previously ordered from Pittsburgh upon my personal responsibility, though the Government afterward sanctioned the contract, and being already well upon its way to Petersburg, it was of less moment that none was found attached to my re-enforcing column. Restrictions upon my chief quartermaster at Wheeling having been at this time in a technical form removed, it was reported in encouragement that team and cavalry horses were coming freely in. These, together with wagons, harness, and other equipage, would be promptly forwarded. The Sixth Ohio Cavalry, having now the opportunity, procured their mount, joining by companies according as they were furnished and equipped. A battery of mountain howitzers for one of the companies heretofore alluded to as specially authorized had also arrived at New Creek. Being brought forward as packed, with carriages, implements, harness, &c., they were, on the last night of my stay at Petersburg, mounted and made ready for the field.

With a view to future service a brigade of light troops was made up at Petersburg, consisting of the Sixtieth Ohio, Colonel Trimble, and the EKighth Virginia, under Major Oley. Colonel Cluseret, of my staff, a French officer of experience, and especially so in the tactics of skirmishers, was assigned to the command.

In the mean time General Banks had been withdrawn from his advanced position near Staunton, and my left became dangerously exposed. Seeing his advantage, the enemy was not slow to profit by it. Turning promptly to the west, and uniting with his own the forces of Johnson and Ewell, the rebel leader Jackson, upon the 7th of May, attacked the outposts of General Milroy. The simultaneousness of his onset indeed, with the retirement of Banks, argues strongly that, by whatever means obtained, the rebel general had early information of the projected movement. On the 8th of May, with an aggregate of upward of 14,000 men and thirty pieces of artillery, Jackson advanced upon the main body of General Milroy’s force at McDowell. Pushing forward in a march of 34 miles in twenty-four hours General Schenck arrived from Franklin in time to unite with and support General Milroy. An obstinate engagement took place. Official reports of the action were at the time sent in by me to the War Department. Under the leadership of their gallant commander the men of Milroy’s brigade repeatedly attacked and charged a greatly superior force, exhibiting a courage and tenacity worthy the highest praise. The Ohio troops behaved with equal gallantry and suffered severely. After several hours of fighting, however, our troops, outnumbered at every point, reluctantly yielded portions of the field to the odds flowing in against them. The enemy’s loss was over 40 killed and between 200 and 300 wounded. Our loss was 31 killed and missing and 217 wounded.

Finding his position at McDowell untenable, and looking to the chances of a night attack, General Schenck, now in command, decided to withdraw toward Franklin. The retrograde was executed with skill and address, and bringing safely off his trains, artillery, and wounded, Genera! Schenck re-entered the above-named town on the 10th of May. Here, uisposing his troops to guard against farther advance of the enemy, he awaited the approach of re-enforcements from Petersburg.

Less than twenty-four hours’ rest had been given to portions of the command arriving with General Blenker, but deeming the situation of increased importance I determined to move at once to the relief of General Schenck. I was unable to carry forward with me necessary supplies, owing to the still entirely inadequate transportation, but was obliged to rely upon renewed effgrts at the rear to get forward in time whatever should be most needed to sustain my troops.

At 4 o’clock on the morning of the 12th my advance had forded the Shenandoah at Petersburg, and on the forenoon of the 14th, after a camp of one night upon the route, I reached Franklin. Preferring to avoid any immediate encounter with my force as concentrated, Jackson, leaving temporarily a thin curtain of his people to disguise the movement, began an early retreat. By sundown of the 15th he had disappeared in a southeasterly direction from my front, taking the road toward the Shenandoah Mountain. Although hitherto crippled for want of transportation, and needing more than ever supplies of every description, I had reason to expect that with economy in the camp as well as just effort on the part of agencies elsewhere deficiencies would yet be made good. Accordingly for the ten days next following upon my arrival at Franklin I addressed myself to the task of getting into order and condition my troops, as well as to details of the movements projected against Knoxville and the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. While thus occupied I received from the Secretary of War the following urgent dispatch, which made me still more deeply regret the embarrassments of my situation:

Washington, May 16, 1862. Major-General FREMONT, Franklin :

The President desires to know whether you design to move on to the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, and break it between Newbern and Salem, according to the plan you proposed and he approved; and also whether, having reached and broken that road, you cannot move forward Henk upon Richmond by that route, and by what time you can reach the railroad, and how long it will take you from there to reacb Richmond. Please answer immediately.”

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

In the mean time the campaign was being well carried forward. In execution of the plan upon my right the operations of General Cox were resulting in brilliant success. Moving forward as directed, with a view to reach and sever the railroad, his forces were attacked at Lewisburg, May 23, by a body of the enemy over 3,000 strong, under the rebel leader Heth. After an engagement of several hours the enemy were routed and fled in disorder from the field. Four pieces of artillery were captured by General Cox’s troops, 200 stand of small-arms, and over brilliant affair the conduct of Colonel Crook’s brigade, bearing the brunt of the attack, cannot be too highly praised. The rebel loss in killed and wounded in the action was also severe.

But events were now taking place in another direction which had – the effect to terminate suddenly my proposed campaign and divert my column intended for Knoxville upon a line of march entirely new. The rebel General Jackson, quitting my front and turning abruptly to the north into the Shenandoah Valley, had, with his customary impetuosity, attacked General Banks at Front Royal, pressing him backward toward Strasburg and Winchester, and threatening the whole valley of the Potomac.

With the intelligence of these events dispatched to me under date of May 24 came also an order from thu President directing me to break camp and march against Jackson at Harrisonburg. As stated in the order, the objects of the movements were, first to relieve General Banks, secondly to cut off and capture Jackson and his force in the valley of the Shenandoah. It was the seventh or eighth day of a

ee eee “hee Fréimout to Stanton, same date, in “Correspondence, ote.,” Part III, p. 197, storm. Urging forward by forced marches troops already worn with fatigue, I had reached Franklin in advance of supplies ta relieve Schenck and Milroy. The streams at my rear were swollen vy the incessant rains and the roads had become almost impassable. With a complement of wagons much exceeding that upon the route the supply would have been but meager even in fair weather. With the limited number available, together with the hinderances encountered, the supply was far below the need. Not so much as one-quarter forage was got forward, and except an incomplete ration of bread no rations had been gotupforthemen. For days together fresh beef, with a little salt, was the only provision on hand for issue. Coffee, so essential and desirable in the field, was becoming a luxury almost unknown. Subsistence arriving ander invoice to a particular brigaile was taken by order and so far as it would go distributed among all. Sick lists were largely on the increase, and such was the demoralization induced by privations endured that demonstrations among the men, amounting almost to open mutiny, had in instances to be put down with the strong hand. Of forage in the country about scarcely a single pound could be gleaned. It had already been too well stripped by rebels. Our animals, then, were starving, dying in fact, and by scores, as even prior to my reaching Franklipv they had from the same causes begun to do out of the command of General Schenck.

With the order directing my march authority was now giveu me to

‘ order the purchase of horses, or otherwise, in the language of the dispatch, “to take them wherever or however I could get them.” But it came too late to aid me. Naturally upon the absence of forage and the causes which led to it animals also had disappeared. As to waiting for the arrival of horses or mules from Wheeling, that was impossible under the terms of the order. I was to move at once.

Of the different roads leading from Franklin to Harrisonburg all but one had been obstructed by Jackson in his retreat. Bridges and culverts had been destroyed, rocks rolled down, and in one instance trees felled across the way for the distance of nearly amile. The road still left open ran southwardly, reaching Harrisonburg by a long detour. Granting, however, that loss of time by removal of obstacles, or by taking the longer route, were no consideration, tending to lengthen my line of supplies, was a little better than a physical impossibility. The condition of my troops forbade it. Strategically speaking, also, a movement toward Harrisonburg would not have endangered simply—it would have been fatal to my lines of supply. Jackson retreating from his raid could strike westwardly from Strasburg or Winchester by way of Romney or Moorefield, or both. Indeed, as the sequel will develop, it was afterward regarded probable by higher authorities that he had taken these very directions.

Reaching New Creek, then, and Petersburg, the rebel leader would have destroyed my depots at these points and captured every train upon the route. Again, while as a practical relief to General Banks the movement by way of Harrisonburg would have been of no greater importance than a movement striking the valley farther north or lower down, it would at the same time have permitted the enemy to avoid all chance of collision with my force. My own and the rebel columns would have been constantly moving in opposite directions upon opposite sides of a species of parallelogram, having for its four corners Franklin, Harrisonburg, Strasburg, and Petersburg—or otherwise, Winchester, Romney, &c. Our relative positions only would have been changed, with the difference that the gain would have been all upon the side of the rebels, the loss upon mine. Defying contact, Jackson would have escaped intact with his prisoners and plunder. This was a contingency not desired by the President nor contemplated in his dispatch. ;

Accepting, then, the spirit rather than the letter of the order, or if the letter, the added expression to ‘operate against the enemy in sucb way as to relieve Banks,” I judged it within my discretion to select another than the route specifically set down—this even though ample means had existed with a fresh and active column to move southward upon my original destination or toward the immediate east. Instead, then, of the attempts through a barren district by any of the abovenamed routes, [I determined to move rearward as far as Petersburg, thence striking easterly by way of Moorefield and Wardensville to Strasburg. Retracing thus for a short distance my supply line I could feed my hungry troops, gather stores, and possibly by vigorous effort reach the Shenandoah Valley in time to intercept Jackson going south. Happily, before leaving camp the next morning (May 25), a later order was received from the Secretary of War confirming previous conclusions, and leaving me free to choose my line of march. I was to “direct my attention to falling upon the enemy wherever I could find him with all speed.” With the Secretary’s dispatch came also the information that General Banks had abandoned Strasburg, been driven from Winchester, and was in full retreat upon Harper’s Ferry. That the enemy would of his own will relinquish pursuit was not consistent with his manifest objects in entering the valley. Iwas therefore fully apprised of the situation. General McDowell, it was further stated to me in reference to the movement about to be made, would operate toward the same object as myself with his troops.

Looking to the chances of a possession of the telegraph wires at any moment by the rebels I did not at this time communicate my plan of march to the President. It was not desirable that the enemy should by any process be informed. Upon the road out from Franklin were met at various points my stalled and scattered trains, laden with provisions and forage for the command. From the stores contained I was enabled to supply present necessities, and by liberal issues to men and animals afford the necessary strength for coming fatigue and travel.

At Petersburg was found an accumulation of imperfect rations for five days. Causing three days’ rations to be cooked and placed in haversacks, I ordered trains made up to carry forward the remainder, together with supplies of ammunition and forage. Tents, with the exception of a very few for indispensable staff and hospital purposes, — were at this point required to be abandoned and placed in store. In like manner all surplus personal baggage was directed to be cast off, it pene my object to put the column in the lightest possible marching order.

My movement northward leaving the department much exposed, and particularly to the west and south, General Cox was enjoined to double vigilance against the enemy, and ordered to do the best he was able in his position. General Kelley, within the Railroad District, was directed to concentrate, as far as practicable, his force, with a view to the safety of New Creek and other important points.

My column had reached Petersburg on the afternoon of May 26. On the 27th, at daybreak, the march was resumed. The troops, fording the Shenandoah and camping at night near Moorefield, arrived on the 28th at Fabius, about 10 miles easterly from Moorefield, upon Branch Mountain. At this latter point, upon the written protest of my medical director against further marching of the command without one day’s rest, a halt was called for the 29th. Hundreds of stragglers and broken-down men from the Blenker division had been left along the road in the ascent of the mountain, and it was plain their condition demanded consideration. They were weak and reduced not only from recent fatigue and want of food, but from previous hardship and privation on the route from the Potomac. I could not venture to proceed with them in disorder and with safety undertake the work in prospect.

During the day’s delay an inspection was had and roll calls ordered in presence of officers specially designated for the purpose. The result disclosed material inaccuracies in returns thus far accepted from General Blenker’s command, and exhibited a falling off in the aggregate of effective force at this time most unwelcome. In Blenker’s division the number reported present and fit for duty was below 6,000. As an accession, a remaining company of the Sixth Ohio Cavalry, having just obtained horses, joined at this camp.

While halting here at Fabius a party of Maryland cavalry, scouting well to the front, came upon a reconnoitering party of the enemy near Wardensville, and attacked them briskly. The enemy were driven with a loss of 2 killed and several wounded; Colonel Downey, in command of our force, having his horse shot under him.

Later, upon the 29th, a dispatch sent forward from telegraph station brought an order from the President directing me, under date of the ‘ 29th, to halt my command at Moorefield, or otherwise, “if I heard of the enemy in the general direction of Romney,” to march upon him. This order was based upon the conclusion that Jackson had by this time pressed General Banks as far backward as Williamsport along the northern end of the parallelogram I have indicated. It having been subsequently ascertained, however, that the rebels were still occupied with their work in the valley of Winchester and Martinsburg the order was withdrawn, and I was again directed to move upon the enemy ” by the best route I could.”

On the 30th I moved forward with my command from Fabius. A renewed storm had made the roads heavy, and the march was most fatiguing. On the 31st my column passed the summit of the mountain between Lost River and Cedar Oreek, marching most of the night, and closing up in a drenching rain and amid intense darkness at Cedar Creek. I had now reached the point indicated in the following telegrams:

Washington, May 29, 1862—[12 m.] Major-General FREMONT:

General McDowell’s advance, if not checked by the enemy, should, or [and] probably will, be at Front Royal by 12 noon to-morrow. His force when up will be about 20,000.

Please have your force at Strasburg, or, if the route you are moving on does not lead to that point, as near Strasburg as the enemy may be by that time.

Your dispatch No. 30 received and satisfactory.

: Washington, May 30, 1862—4 p.m. [2.30 p. m.] Major-General FREMONT: Yours saying you will reach Strasburg or vicinity at 5 p. m. Saturday has been received and sent to General McDowell, and he directed to act in view of it. You must be up to time of your promise, if possible.

At Cedar Creek the road forks, one branch leading to Strasburg and the other in a northeasterly direction to Winchester. Expecting to learn something of General McDowell’s movements, early in the day I had sent forward Major Haskell, of my staff, with a party of scouts. He fell in with a party of the enemy’s cavalry and two of my scouts were captured at Strasburg, but no information was obtained.

With the arrival of the rear the leading corps of my command again stretched forward, taking the road to Strasburg. At 7 in the morning of this day, June 1, my advance, under Lieutenant-Colonel Cluseret, first touched Jackson’s main body, driving in the advanced pickets of General Ewell’s brigade. Pressing forward and encountering and driving stronger bodies of skirmishers the column within a short distance came upon cavalry and a battery in position, which immediately opened fire. The enemy’s artillery was engaged by detachments from the Eighth Virginia and Sixtieth Ohio, under Major Oley, supported afterward by a section of artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Pilsen. The fire of the enemy’s musketry now brought into action indicated the presence of two or three regiments. I was entirely ignorant of what had taken place in the valley beyond, and it was now evident that Jackson in superior force was at or near Strasburg. In anticipation, therefore, of possible demonstrations on his part before some needed rest could be taken, my command as they came up were ordered to position.

About noon the enemy’s batteries ceased fire, and my troops were ordered to encamp. Our cavalry, being pushed forward, found the enemy withdrawing and a strong column of infantry just defiling past our front. A reconnaissance by Colonel Oluseret with the Eighth Virginia, pushed to within 2 miles of Strasburg showed the enemy withdrawn, and at night-fall this officer, with his brigade, accompanied by a battalion of cavalry and a section of artillery, was ordered to move forward upon Strasburg and determine the position of the enemy.

The day closed with one of the most violent rain-storms I have ever seen, with really terrific lightning and thunder, and the night being very dark, and Colonel Cluseret being without guides or knowledge of the country, his troops passed the town of Strasburg, and marching to the light of the enemy’s fires, about 11 o’clock came into contact with Ashby’s cavalry, which occupied the road forming the rear of Jackson’s position, about 2 miles beyond Strasburg, on the road to Woodstock. Disobeying the order to charge, after a scattering fire our cavalry broke in a shameful panic to the rear, passing over and carrying with them the artillery.

To the honor of the Sixtieth Ohio, which at this moment formed the head of the reconnoitering column, not a man of them followed the disgraceful example, but delivered their fire steadily, and checked any movement on the part of the enemy. The officers and men, without exception, of the Sixtieth Ohio and Eighth Virginia, which composed this brigade, deserve special mention for the steadiness and bravery which distinguished them during the affairs of this day, when both regiments were for the first time under fire. Having ascertained the position of the enemy, Colonel Cluseret withdrew his men and returned to camp. The reconnaissance showed the enemy in retreat.

With daylight of June 2 my command moved in pursuit. Passing Strasburg I was joined by General Bayard, who had been sent forward by General McDowell with a cavalry force of about 800 men and four pieces of artillery, with a battalion of the Pennsylvania Bucktails under Colonel Kane. Farther along the locality of Colonel Cluseret’s engagement of the night before was marked by one of our caissons which had been disabled and left for jhe night on the ground and by several of the enemy’s killed and wounded, some 10 of whom had already been cared for by Colonel Kane. The route now followed lay aloug the turnpike, stretching southerly from Strasburg toward Staunton. Its more even and compact surface was a welcome exchange for the mire and sloughs of the mountain regions passed.

Closely pressed by my advance, the enemy at about 10 a. m. turned to make a stand. He was vigorously shelled by Buell’s and Schirmer’s batteries, under direction of Colonel Pilsen, aide-de-camp and chief of artillery, supported by General Bayard’s command of cavalry, augmented by about 600 men from my own column, under Colonel Zagonyi, aide-de-camp and chief of cavalry. After determined resistance for an hour the enemy were driven from position and again pursued. Repeatedly during the day they faced about and were as often compelled to relinquish the fight. The pursuit was rapid, not less than 18 miles being made in the space of five hours. In one instance scarcely a hundred yards separated my advance from the enemy, the latter, however, gaining a small bridge and unlimbering rapidly upon a rocky rise beyond. Colonel Pilsen lost at this time his horse, shot from under him, and was himself slightly wounded by a volley from the rebels. But notwithstanding the excellent marching made by our infantry it was impossible to get forward in time for effective operations. ;

By sunset the enemy had reached for the night the higher points beyond Woodstock. The retreat was reckless. Over 500 prisoners fell into our hands, and a number of our own men captured from General Banks were recovered. Several hundred stand of small-arms cast away or left in stacks by the rebels were also gathered. Of gray-coated stragglers at least a thousand were in the woods along the road and country adjoining. Broken ambulances, clothing, blankets, and articles of equipment lined the route. Our loss was small, but one or two killed, and a proportionate number wounded. At the last stand made by the enemy he lost 7 killed, with a number of horses. His total loss during the day must have been considerable. At about 5 in the afternoon General Stahel’s brigade occupied Woodstock.

Although much fatigued by the forced march of the day previous, my command at an early hour of the morning of June 3 were upon the road to resume pursuit. Again the rear guard of the enemy turned to cover his main body, or to gain time for placing obstacles, tearing up the road, or destroying culverts and bridges. The fire of the opposing batteries was mutually brisk, with at intervals an accompaniment of the dropping shots of small-arms. Strenuous effort was made by the rebels to destroy the bridge over Stony Creek, at Edenburg, about 5 miles out of Woodstock. A portion of the planks were torn up and the timbers so far cut that the structure sank, partially broken, about midway of the current. So prompt, however, were my advance troops that the party left by the enemy was compelled to retreat in haste without further execution of its design. A ford was found at a short distance up the stream, and with some difficulty cavalry and artillery were gotten across. Ultimately my baggage and supply trains passed safely. After some hasty repairs infantry was enabled to cross the bridge. On account of depth of water at the ford ammunition was removed from caissons and wagons and carried over by hands of men. For further and more permanent repairs of the bridge Colonel Raynolds, of my staff, engineer, was left with a small detail. nl

By noon my command were mainly upon the farther bank and again in rapid motion. The bridge over Cedar [Mill] Creek at Mount Jackson, was saved nearly intact by the celerity with which the enemy was over-.

taken. The rebel General Ashby barely escaped captuie at this point by Captain Conger’s company of Third Virginia Cavalry. This company, pressing forward under their persevering leader, were in season to come upon a body of the enemy about to fire the larger and more important bridge beyond Mount Jackson, crossing the North Fork of the Shenandoah. A gallant charge was made, but volleys of grape and musketry drove back the small command. General Bayard in the mean time arrived with the main body of the cavalry upon an elevation overlooking the bridge, but it is to be regretted that artillery could not possibly be gotten up in time to warrant his demonstration in heavier force. The bridge was successfully fired, burning rapidly, with thick volumes of flame and smoke. By the time my main column entered Mount Jackson village it had fallen to the stream below.

A body of the enemy incautiously attempting to go into camp within range across the river were speedily shelled by batteries run up upon the bluffs, and after some excellent practice on the part of our artillerists driven out. Our total loss during the day was 1 killed and a few wounded. ;

The pontoons procured by me at Pittsburgh, having been kept well up with the column, were now ordered to the front, and preparations immediately made to gain passage by rebridging the Shenandoah. The stream was at this point wide and rapid, and had been swollen by recent rains. Major Haskell, of active California experience, plunged with his horse into the current, and by swimming to the opposite bank was enabled to fix fast the preparatory ropes. A corps of employés, acting as pontoniers, under Lieutenant Robinson, of Ohio troops, together with liberal details from infantry regiments, were also put promptly at work. A heavy rain set in, but operations were continued throughout the night. By 6 inthe morning the bridge was made available for crossing and a force of infantry and cavalry gotten over. Suddenly, however, the river began to rise to a yet greater height. Inthe space of four hours, flooded by the storm and its mountain tributaries, it had gained fully 12 feet, with a current correspondingly turbulent and swift. The drift borne down was working great mischief, and several of the boats were swamped. To save the bridge from utter destruction the ropes were cut and the pontoon swung round to the northern shore. Much of the planking and timber was lost.

The troops already across being well posted and amply covered by our batteries upon the bluffs, little apprehension was felt as regarded their immediate safety. Toward night the stream, as suddenly as it had risen, began to subside, and parties at work renewed their efforts. Their task was arduous, and it was not until 10 a. m. of the next day that the bridge was again in condition for crossing.

It will be remembered that at the date of my march from Franklin information was conveyed to me that General McDowell would operate toward the same objects as myself, in capturing-or driving out Jackson. Very earnest assurances to this effect were subsequently given me while upon the route both by the President and Secretary of War. Whether in General MeDowell’s case, as in my own, departmental lines or technicalties of previous orders were temporarily to be lost sight of, was not explained. Arriving, however, within the Shenandoah Valley, I deemed it not extravagant to expect of that officer that he should so far co-operate as, if not himself in advance, to send me troops to secure and hold fast prisoners, as well as to keep intact points of my line in rear. Accordingly, during the delay at Mount Jackson, I dispatched to General McDowell Captain Howard, of my staff, with orders substantially to the above effect. A copy of his reply, declining to recognize authority on my part, here follows: