Unknown, September 1, 1864

September 1, 1864. The Court met pursuant to adjournment. Present, Major-General Hancock, Brigadier-Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge-advocate. The proceedings of the ninth day were read and approved.

GENERAL WILLCOX—RECALLED.

Question. In your testimony yesterday you stated that at the time of the explosion of the mine you were at Roemer’s battery. Where were you the rest of the time?

Answer. Immediately after the explosion I started for the which was on left and in rear of the First Division. I mecca betes Apieineer works nearest the crater before the whole of the First Division had crossed. The head of my column had already commenced moving for the crater, and was then occupying the left portion of the enemy’s works. ‘

By the Court:

Question. You stated that General Burnside’s order directed that your division should bear to the left, and take up a position on the Jerusalem plank road. What was the cause of the failure to execute this maneuver?

Answer. The First Division was to move on Cemetery Hill. I would state that Cemetery Hill bore rather to the right of my front, so that it was necessary that Cemetery Hill should be occupied before any ground beyond it could be occupied. In pursuance of my original expectation, I had given orders that the leading regiment should turn down to the left in the line of works, and the Twenty-seventh Michigan started down that line. As soon as General Burnside perceived that the First Division was not moving forward, he sent me orders to move forward my division direct upon Cemetery Hill. My idea was to carry out the spirit of what was understood the day before, and my plan was to throw the whole division on the left into line, so that the right would rest on the Jerusalem plank road; and that would have completely protected the flank of the First Division. Thismovement was begun, but the commanding officer of the Twenty-seventh Michigan was shot, and the way the First Division moved forward by division created more or less confusion; and by the time I received the order to advance on Cemetery Hill, or before that, in fact, the enemy had concentrated such a fire that we could not advance any farther.

questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Were you atthe assault on the 30th of July, and what was your command?

Answer. I was at the assault. My command was the Second Brigade, Second Division (General Potter’s), Ninth Army Corps.

Question. Did you regard that assault as a failure? Answer. Yes, sir; I think I should, because we did not hold the ground. Question. State some of the causes that you attribute this to.

Answer. In the first place I should say that the troops in the front did not advance exactly as they should, nor as far as they should. Probably the best ground was not selected. Then the cause of our not holding the ground was the piling in of so many troops in certain parts of the ground where there was no room for them, and a panic having seized those troops caused the disaster. The enemy concentrated all their fire upon that point as soon as we attacked, which was another great reason, no doubt. We received their fire at that point from all directions, and very soon after we first arrived there it was a very sharp fire.

Question. Why were all the troops directed to that point? Answer. I do not know.

Question. Do you think that arrangement was faulty? Answer. The execution of the plan seemed to be faulty.

Question. Were any arrangements made for passing the troops through the abatis of our line and over the parapet in front of the enemy’s?

Answer. For my part, in my brigade I had a pioneer corps, and skirmishers to clear the way for them.

Question. Did your command go beyond the crater? Answer. It did. Question. About how far?

Answer. I should judge 200 yards; it might be more or it might be less; it could not have been much less, however; that is as near as I can judge.

Question. Why did you retire?

Answer. My troops were driven back from that point. They afterward retired from the crater under orders. They were driven back from the advanced position at the time the panic seized the negroes, which more or less affected all our troops, and the negroes rushing through them as they did carried them back. The rebels made a very desperate attack at the same time.

Question. If the enemy’s parapets had been leveled on each side of the crater or made practicable for the passage of troops what would have been the probable result?

Answer. I am not sure that I can tell what the result would have been. Probably

the troops might have advanced more readily and with more force, but it was not a thing easy to do.

Question. Do you know anything that prevented the troops, having attained the crater, from going forward immediately to the crest of Cemetery Hill?

Answer. Nothing more than the sharp fire from the enemy.

Question. What kind of fire?

Answer. All kinds. I wouldstate here that there is another reason why my troops could not go forward. The ground where they were was broken up with covered ways and numerous rifle-pits of the rebels. We had just driven the rebels out, and my troops occupied their places; therefore in that position, disconnected, as many of them were, it was difficult and almost impossible to form them to make a direct charge; but if a column had moved farther to the left I did not see any reason why they should not have gone in.

Question. Suppose you had had working parties to level the works, those working parties being supplied with fascines and other necessary preparations to render a passage practicable, could you not have gone forward then?

Answer. I do not think there was time for that work—it would have taken hours. J think the time to go forward was at the first, because very soon after we went there the enemy concentrated their troops and poured into us at that point a terrible fire from every quarter.

Question. The great mistake, then, was the halting of the troops in the crater?

Question. Whose troops were they?

Answer. General Ledlie’s division.

Question. Could the troops have gone over the enemy’s parapets on

the left of the crater, in line of battle, immediately after the explosion of the mine?

Answer. I think they could; but I could not say positively bec i was directed more particularly to the right of the ueee i ae eae ic aire

Question. Could they have done it on the right?

Answer. No, sir; on account of those numerous cross lines and pits and cov ways which were full of the enemy even after we arrived there; aad others eet pouring in in addition to those that were already there.

Question. When the troops retired from the crater was it compulsory from the enemy’s operations or by orders from your commander?

Answer. Partly both. We retired because we had orders. At the same time a column of troops came up to attack the crater and we retired instead of stopping to fight. This force of the enemy came out of a ravine, and we did not see them till they appeared on the rising ground immediately in front of us.

Question. Where was your position during the contest?

_Answer. I went up with my brigade, and while we were there I was most of the time in the crater, or near it, with my troops all the time. Question. What was the forces that came out to attack you—the force that was exposed in the open? Answer. Five hundred or 600 men were all that we could see. I did not see either the right or left of the line., I saw the center of the line as it appeared to me, It was a good line of battle. Probably if we had not been under orders to evacuate

we should have fought them and tried to hold our position; but according to the orders we withdrew.

Brig. Gen. J. F. HARTRANFT, U. 8. Volunteers, being duly sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th of July, and what was your command ?

Answer. I was there. My command was the First Brigade of the Third Division (General Willcox’s) of the Ninth Corps,

Question. Did you regard the attack as a failure? Answer. I did.

Question. What, in your opinion, were some of the causes of that failure?

Answer. The massing of the troops in the crater where they could not be used with any effect. I think that the troops, instead of being sent to the crater, should have been sent to the right and left, so as to have moved in line of battle, then they could have advanced in some kind of shape; but after they came into the crater in the confusion they were in, other troops being brought up only increased the confusion, and by that time the enfilading fire of the enemy’s artillery and infantry had become very annoying, which also made it very difficult to rally and form the troops.

Question. Do you know any reasons why the troops did not go to the right and left of the crater? Were there any physical obstacles to prevent them?

Answer. No; I think troops could have been sent there. The Second Brigade of my division was sent to the left of the crater; they took a portion of the pits. If a vigorous attack had been made on the right and left of the crater I think the enemy’s pits could have been taken without any difficulty and the line occupied.

Question. What was the formation of your command in moving forward?

Answer. I formed my command, which was immediately in rear of the First Division (which was the assaulting division), in one or two regiments front—I put two small regiments together—and my instructions were, after I passed through the crater with my advance, to form to the left of the First Division, protecting its left flank while they were advancing, and form my line as the regiments would come up, so as to form a line of battle on the left of the First Division,

Question. If the troops that first went into the crater had not delayed there, could they not, considering the consternation that the explosion of the mine made in the enemy’s camp, have got forward to the crest of Cemetery Hill?

Answer. I think they could have moved up to that crest immediately, if they had

made no halt at all, under the consternation of the enemy. I think they would have had to re-enforce them speedily in order to hold that hill.

Question. The re-enforcements were there, were they not ? Answer. Yes, sir. Question. And there was nothing to prevent that result?

Answer. No, sir. I have thought sometimes that it would have been difficult to have sent troops through the crater in sufficient force to sustain the First Division in advance on that hill; that the troops would have had, after all, to have been sent to the right and left of the crater, because, very soon after I was in the crater myself, the enemy were seen on the hill about the position we were to take and was moving troops to the right. A dozen rebels were seen in the corn-field. My brigade moved right on after the First Division, and after my fourth regiment had gone forward I went forward myself to the crater. The fifth regiment was then ordered forward and was going up.

Question. Did you remain till the troops retired ? Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did they retire in confusion?

Question. Driven out?

Answer. They were driven out at the same time that I had passed the word to retire. It was a simultaneous thing. When they saw the assaulting column within probably 100 feet of the works, I passed the word as well as it could be passed, for everybody to retire, and I left myselfat that time. General Griffin and myself were together at that time. The order to retire we had indorsed to the effect that we thought we could not withdraw the troops that were there on account of the enfilading fire over the ground between our rifle-pits and the crater without losing a great portion of them, that ground being enfiladed with artillery and infantry fire. They had at that time brought their infantry down along their pits on both sides of the crater, so that their sharpshooters had good range, and were in good position. Accordingly we requested that our lines should open with artillery and infantry, bearing on the right and left of the crater, under which fire we would be able to withdraw a greater portion of the troops, and, in fact, every one that could get away. While we were waiting for the approval of that indorsement and the opening of the fire this assaulting column of the enemy came up, and we conciluded—General Griffin and myself—that there was no use in holding it any longer, and so we retired.

By the Court:

Question. What was the fault owing to—owing to the orders that were given, or to the execution of those orders? Wasit that the plan was bad, or that the troops or their commanders behaved badly?

Answer. Not being familiar with all the orders and arrangements I could not say. So far as my own command was concerned we did all that we could do.

Question. Could you have been ordered to have done it in a better way?

Answer. J think if they had gone forward in line of battle it would have been successful. I consulted with General Bartlett, and General Griffin, and Colonel Humphrey, and we were all of the opinion that no more troops should be sent to

the crater. After that the colored division passed right through the crater while we were in it.

Question. How did those colored troops behave?

Answer. They passed to the front just as well as any troops; but they were certainly not in very good condition to resist an attack, because in passing through

the crater they got confused; their regimental and company organization was completely gone.

Question. What general officers were in or about the crater on the enemy’s line during all this time?

Answer. General Griffin, General Bartlett, and myself, of the Ninth Corps; and the general commanding the division of the Tenth Corps that was there (General Turner). I did not see any others, although there might have been others there.

Surg. O. P. CHuBB, Twentieth Michigan Volunteers, Ninth Corps, being duly sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th of J uly?

Question. State what you did there.

Answer. I accompanied the Second Brigade of the Third Division of the Ninth Corps across the ravine and up to within ten rods of our breast-works, at the point where the troops passed through immediately after the explosion of the mine. I took position in a bomb-proof which had been used as some regimental headquarters, and remained there for the purpose of dressing wounds. This bomb-proof is located at a point about ten rods in rear of our line. Shortly after I took up that position General Ledlie, of the First Division, and Ferrero, of the Fourth, came up to the front of the bomb-proof, and shortly afterward came in and took seats. This was in the morning about half an hour after the explosion of themine. That wassome time before the colored troops came up. The Third Division (General Willcox’s) was then lying in a little dip of the ground—lying flat upon the ground to avoid shelling at that point, and General Ledlie’s troops of the First Division had crossed over our breast-works and gone over to the fort immediately after the explosion. I saw them goup. I was where I could see the explosion and the movement of the troops as they passed over the space between our works and the fort. Our division, and our brigade of that division, remained in that position for some time. General Ledlie came there and sat down in front of the place where I was; remained there some little time, and afterward went inside and sat down. I could not tell how long, but not a great length of time after he came, General Ferrero came in. His troops were then lying in the covered way and onthe flat. They had not yet come up to gointoaction. While things were in that position our Third Division made a move, charged over the works, some of them went to the fort and some, I believe, came back. Then General Ferrero had brought his division up to that point, and seemed to be waiting for some orders or movement. General Ledlie received orders in my hearing to move his troops forward from where they were then lying. The order came something like this, as near as I can recollect: ”The general wishes you to move your troops forward to the crest of the hill and hold it.” To the best of my recollection that was the meaning of the order, at least, and I think very near the words. I do not know who the order came from. It was brought by an officer, and I supposed that ”the general” meant General Burnside. General Ledlie dispatched an aide or some other officer to order that done. Then shortly afterward came an order to General Ferrero to move his division through and charge down to the city. He replied that he would do so “as soon as those troops were out of the way.” He did not designate what troops, so that I understood ”those troops” meant the troops that were already there, but this order came two or three times, and the last time it came the order was peremptory “to move his troops forward at once.” His answer to the order always was that he would doso as soon as ”those troops” were out of the way, and whenever General Ferrero made that answer General Ledlie sent an aide to order the troops out of the way and see that it was done, so that it became my impression thatit was histroops that were in the way. These two general officers were in the bomb-proof withme. General Ledlie’s troops were in the crater and General Ferrero’s were in the rear. After General Ferrero received this last, peremptory order, he went out, General Ledlie went out with him, and the colored troops commenced moving past the door of the bomb-proof— as it was in the track that troops took—and moved up; and I stepped out and saw them go over our works just in front of where General Ledlie’s division passed over. Then they passed out of sight of where I was standing, but in a very short time I heard they were coming back, and, sure enough, they poured down all along in that vicinity with a good many white troops mixed with them. About that time General Ferrero returned. I am not positive if General Ledlie returned or not, and in answer to somebody who asked him how the battle’was going, General Ferrero said we had lost everything, or something to that effect; that we were repulsed. He said it was nonsense to send a single body of troops (colored or white) forward at one single place, in front of lines held by us, to throw them in the face of a re-enforced enemy, or an enemy who had opportunities to bring other forces to bear. General Ferrero said he thought his division was needlessly slaughtered.

By the Court:

Question. Did you see General Ledlie when his division advanced?

Answer. No, sir; I did not. Our division was lying in the covered way at the poirrt in our first line of works about opposite the fourteen-gun battery, as it is called, and I had passed up the line of the hill to the crest where I looked over the breastwork and saw those troops move forward, but I could not see everything distinctly because there was considerable distance across the ravine or hollow to his division.

Question. Was there any conversation between those generals and yourself while they were in the bomb-proof bearing on this subject?

Answer. I asked General Ledlie, soon after he came in, if his division had been properly supported. The reason of my asking it was that I thought I heard some remark of his that led me to think it had not been, and besides I myself was entirely in the dark in regard to the delay, and so I asked him if his division had been properly supported as it was intended, and he said it had.

Question. Did you hear him give any reason for the division halting?

Answer. No, sir. From the efforts he made to have them ordered forward somewhere I judged that it was contrary to his expectations that they did halt. He frequently sent up aides to have them moved forward somewhere, and from the order that came to him I supposed it was to the crest of the hill. The aide who brought the order said, ”The general wishes you to move forward to the crest of the hill.”

Question. Do you know any reason why he was not with his troops himself?

Answer. No, sir. But during almost the last moments of his stay there he sent an aide to ascertain how things were going on, and remarked that he could not go himself as he had been hurt in the side by a spent ball. I cannot state positively when this occurred; it seemed to be after I first saw him, but I recollect him having mentioned that fact quite late in the forenoon, nearly noon, for the first time. I have a strong impression that he came back there after General Ferrero’s troops moved forward, but I could not say so positively.

Col. H. G. THomas, Nineteenth U. S: Colored Troops, being duly sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th of July, and what was your command ?

Answer. I was at the assault on the 30th of July, and commanded the Second Brigade, Fourth Division, Ninth Corps (colored troops).

Question. What was the formation of your troops in going to the assault?

Answer. The formation was by file left in front, which brought us faced by the rear rank when we made the charge.

Question. The head of your troops struck the enemy’s line, where?

Answer. I forced my brigade around the right of the crater, contrary to orders, because the crater was so full that no man could get through—that is, I left two staff officers to force them through. I went straight to the front and filed to the right and went into these rifle-pits in the enemy’s line as far as the head of the First ri. gade of our division, which I was ordered to support.

Question. Did you get beyond the line of the crater with your troops? Answer. I did, sir. Question. How far?

Answer. I should say about between 300 and 400 yards to the right of the crater, eae in front of it. I was ordered to support the First Brigade when it made its charge.

Question. Did you get beyond the enemy’s line?

Answer. I did, sir. I led a charge which was not successful. The moment I reached the head of the First Brigade I started out the Thirty-first Colored Regiment, which was in front, but it lost its three ranking officers in getting in position and did not go out well. :

Question. What, in your opinion, were some of the causes of the failure of the general assault on that day?

Answer. So far asI can judge from my own stand-point, my utter inabili a decent charge with my own brigade was the fact that the Sit into Sion Soe sent were entirely occupied by dead and dying rebel troops and our own, from the First Division of our corps—General Ledlie’s. There was no room for us to move up We were delayed, I should think, an hour and a half, in the covered way through which we moved, from the fact, so far as I can learn, that the First Division did not make the charge. We were to occupy the pits after they made the charge.

Question. Do you know why the First Division did not go forward? Answer. I do not, sir.

Question. Did you see any of the appliances for overcoming obstacles that usually accompany troops—working parties with tools?

Answer. I saw no such preparations to remove obstacles in the enemy’s line. I had no such assistance.

Question. Do you think the mode of marching up your command was a judicious one—the form I mean?

Answer. No, sir; it was injudicious, for two reasons. First, we moved up by the flank. That I consider injudicious. And secondly, we were ordered up left in front which made us face by the rear rank, which was not a satisfactory way of maneuvering.

Question. Was it a verbal or a written order, and by whom was it issued ?

Answer. It was a verbal order issued by General Ferrero about 11 o’clock on the night before. The order to me that night was to go up by division, follow the First Brigade, and to move left in front. But early in the morning I learned from a staff officer whom I sent out to tell me when the }*irst Brigade moved, that it was filing along the covered way. My instructions were to follow the First Brigade. I was detained at least an hour and a half in the covered way by the troops in front, and by the order of the assistant inspector-general of the corps. He, finding the pits into which we were to go full of troops, suspended the other order until he could see General Burnside.

Question. How did your particular command retire from the front? Answer. In confusion.

Answer. Driven back by a charge of the enemy.

Question. And not by any orders?

Answer. No, sir; they received no orders. They were ordered to stop by myself and all my staff officers who were in the pits. When I got into this position on the right of the crater the fire was very severe; there was also a very severe enfilading fire from the right. I attempted one charge without success the moment I reached there. I could not get more than fifty men out. I sent word to General Burnside by Major Van Buren, of his staff—as he was the only staff officer I saw in the pits except my own—that unless a movement was made to the right to stop the enfilading fire not a man could live to reach the crest; but that I should try another charge in ten minutes, and hoped I would be supported. In about eight minutes I received a written order from General Ferrero in pretty near these words, ”Colonels Sigfried and Thomas, commanding First and Second Brigades: If you have not already done so, you will immediately proceed to take the crest in your front.” It was signed in the ordinary official manner, ”

By order of General Ferrero: George A. Hicks, captain and assistant adjutant-general." I cannot produce that order because I destroyed it when I was captured in Petersburg. Colonel Sigfried had, I think,