Unknown, August 31, 1864

August 31, 1864. The Court met pursuant to adjournment. Present, Major-General Hancock, Brigadier-Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge-advocate. The proceedings of the eighth day were read and approved.

questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE, says:

Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th of July, and what was your command?

Answer. I was commanding the Fourth Division of the Ninth Army Corps (colored troops).

Question. What was their formation for the attack?

Answer. There was no formation further than moving down in rear of the Third Division, as directed in the orders, by the flank, in the covered way.

Question. Was this the most judicious?

Answer. It was the only formation that could be adopted under the circumstances.

Question. Please to state the circumstances. Answer. There being no position to mass the troops. Question. Why was there no position?

Answer. On account of there being three other divisions in advance of mine,

which would occupy all the available ground where my troops could have been formed.

Question. What orders had you to prepare the parapet for the débouché of troops?

Answer. I had no orders whatever.

Question. State some of the causes of the failure, if you regard it so. Answer. I do regard it as a failure.

Question. State some of the causes, briefly.

Answer. The failure of the First Division to go forward immediately after the explosion.

Question. Do you attribute their halting and not going forward to misbehavior on their part?

Answer. Not being present there that I could not say. In my opinion there is no reason that I know of why they should not have gone forward.

Question. State the reasons why you arrived at that conclusion.

Answer. I would state that there could have been no obstructions whatever at that time, from the fact that the crater was crowded with troops, in and about it, when my division went through and passed over the obstacles, not only the obstacles occasioned by the explosion, but also the mass of troops in the crater. They went through and passed beyond those troops at a time when there was heavy firing, whereas, those troops that had gone forward on the lead could have gone forward witha very slight loss, in my opinion. I would state that in my opinion the order of the battle for the movements of troops on that day was extremely faulty. If I understand it right, the object to be attained was to gain the crest on Cemetery Hill, and to take advantage of the momentary paralyzation of the troops in and about the crater, caused by the explosion of the mine. It was necessary that the troops that made the assault should move with the utmost rapidity to gain that crest. I contend that the point of the assault was not properly selected to carry out that object; that the obstructions which the explosion of the mine would naturally create would disorganize the troops and prevent them moving forward with the rapidity that was desired. Furthermore, I would state that the manner in which the troops went in would not lead them to attain the object that was desired. The two divisions that followed the leading division were to have protected the flanks of the same. Now, how could they protect the flank when the leading division (the head of that column) would hardly have reached the crest before the Second Division would have reached the crater, subjecting the First Division to flank fires and to be taken in reverse? And, even had the Third Division, which had the second position in column, have gotten through, it would have taken a long time before the Second Division, which was the third in column, could have reached its proper point to protect the right flank of the First Division. I mean to convey the idea that either other movements should have been made on the flank of the leading division, or that division should have deployed to the right and left, engaging the enemy on the flank, so as to give the assaulting column an opportunity to advance rapidly to the crest of the hill.

By the Court:

Question. How long was it after the explosion of the mine before the assaulting column moved forward ?

Answer. I was not with the leading division; therefore I cannot give you the ex act time, but it was very shortly after.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. State to the Court how the Fourth Division (colored troops), your own command, conducted themselves on the occasion.

Answer. I would state that the troops went in in the most gallant manner; that they went in without hesitation, moved right straight forward, passed through the crater that was filled with troops, and all but one regiment of my division passed beyond the crater. The leading brigade engaged the enemy at a short distance in rear of the crater, where they captured some 200-odd prisoners and a stand of colors, and recaptured a stand of colors belonging to a white regiment of our corps. Here, after they had taken those prisoners, the troops became somewhat disorganized, and it was some little time before they could get them organized again to make a second attempt to charge the crest of the hill. About half an hour after that they made the attempt and were repulsed by a very severe and galling fire, and, I must say, they retreated in great disorder and confusion back to our first line of troops, where they were rallied, and there they remained during the rest of the day and behaved very well. I would add that my troops are raw, new troops, and never had been drilled two weeks from the day they entered the service till that day.

Question. If your division had been the leading one in the assault would they have succeeded in taking Cemetery Hill?

Answer. I have not the slightest doubt from the manner in which they went in, under very heavy fire, that had they gone in in the first instance, when the fire was comparatively light, but that they would have carried the crest of Cemetery Hill beyond a doubt.

By the Court: Question. Did you go forward with your division?

Answer. I went to our first line of works and there remained to see my command go through. I would state that I deemed it more necessary that I should see that they all went in than that I should go in myself, as there was no hesitation in their going forward whatever. Iwas at no time at a farther distance than eighty or ninety yards from my division.

Question. Where were you after they had all passed the crater, and were, as you say, at one time half an hour in reorganizing?

Answer. I was immediately in front of the crater on our front line of works. I would also state that one regiment was checked between the crater and our front line unable to get through, and I was at that time making every effort to get that regiment through with the intention of passing through myself as soon as they got past, but it was impossible for me to do so from the crowded state of the troops that were there,

Question. Were the obstructions in front of the first line of works of a character to admit the passage of a horseman or a piece of artillery after the whole corps had passed?

Answer. They would not admit of the passage of either because the parapet of the rifle-pit had never been dug away. I was compelled to remove abatis on our own front, under fire, to get my command through by the flank.

to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Were you in a position to see the operations of the assault before Petersburg on the 30th of July, and in what capacity?

Answer. I commanded the Third Division of the Ninth Army Corps. At the time of the explosion of the mine I was at Roemer’s battery, just in rear of my Second Brigade, and in good position to observe the assault.

Question. Do you regard the attack as a failure? Answer. I do. Question. State some of the causes of it.

Answer. The first and most obvious cause was the failure of the First Division to go forward when there was no firing, for the fire of the enemy was suspended for fifteen to twenty minutes. In the next place 1 think that the troops that went in support of the leading division should have gone in almost simultaneously with it, and should have gone to the right and left avoiding the crater, but going near it, and then bearing down the enemy’s works to the right and left so as to have prevented the enemy bringing flank and reverse fires to bear on the advancing columns. The order of attack stated that my division should wait until the First Division had cleared the enemy’s works. For that reason of course the threo divisions could not have gone in simultaneously. It was the published order that preventedit in part. Theattention of the enemy was not attracted to any other point than the crater. I consider that the third reason. Almost as soon as the enemy’s first astonishment was over they concentrated an almost circular fire around the crater. Their field batteries came out in position on different points on the Jerusalem plank road and on Cemetery Hill. They kept up aflank and reverse fire; and a battery in the grove of trees on our right was so situated, the line of the rebel works taking a direction a little re-entering, that almost as soon as they opened fire at all they began to fire nearly in rear of the crater. I would say that at the meeting in ecard Burnside’s tent, where Generals Ord and Meade were present, I supposed it was intended that the two divisions, following the leading division, should move to the right and left, and that the duty of the Ninth Corps was to clear the ground to enable the Eighteenth Corps to move forward. Ifthat plan had been carried out I think it would have been successful, but I do not think that the temporary occupation of Cemetery Hill by asmall force would have insured the success of that attack. I think that ultimately they would have been driven out unless we had a large force (two corps at least) to fight a battle at those works. Now, to go back to the interview which General Burnside had with his division commanders where General Meade was present: it wasa well understood thing there that this was intended to be a surprise, and it was thought by all the generals, including General Meade himself, that unless it should be a complete surprise it would be a failure; and the written order which was published to the commanders did not fully, in fact did not substantially, give the order of attack as it was understood at this interview—I mean General Burnside’s order of attack. At the time the matter was talked over I certainly understood that I was to move downand clear the enemy’s works on the left, and then move up toward the Jerusalem plank

road. The order stated that I would bear to the left and take a position on the Jerusalem plank road.

Question. What preparations were made and what orders were given to pass troops over the parapet and through the enemy’s works?

Answer. None but the written orders before the Court. The abatis, what was left of it when my division passed over, was no obstacle whatever,

duly sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Were you with General Meade during the assault on the 30th of July?

Question. What was the substance or language of a dispatch which he received from Lieutenant-Colonel Loring, assistant inspector-general of the Ninth Corps, but addressed to General Burnside, about 5.45 a. m. of that day?

Answer. The substance of the dispatch was, that some of the troops there, I think Ledlie’s division, were in the crater and would not go forward, and asking that some other division or some other troops should be sent to go forward to the crest. The main point with me, however, was that his troops were in the crater and were not going forward as they ought to have done.

Question. Relate what passed at the interview between General Burnside and Generals Grant and Meade after the former had been directed to withdraw the troops from the crater and prior to the withdrawal of the troops.

Answer. I recollect the directions to General Burnside, which were that if he could not withdraw his troops with security during the day they should be withdrawn at night; that the best time for the withdrawal of the troops he himself should be the best judge of. My impression is that General Burnside did not wish to withdraw them. He certainly so expressed himself to me after General Meade left, for I did not leave the headquarters of General Burnside the same time as General Meade, but remained there a short time. I do not know whether he so expressed himself to General Meade and General Grant or not. I thought I understood the conditions that existed there, and there was no question in my mind as to the necessity of withdrawing them.

Question. Did you understand it to be his wish to maintain his position in the crater?

Answer. I didnot pay much attention to what he said to General Meade and General Grant, but he so expressed himself to me afterward; but inasmuch as he stated no facts which put a different aspect on the condition of things I did not consider that he gave very good reasons for his wish. He certainly ditfered from General Ord.

Question. Did you hear General Ord give any opinion as to the probable success of carrying the crest if persisted in for a certain time, and, if so, what was it?

Answer. I heard him then or before express the opinion that the time was past; he was averse to it. I did not pay so much attention to what was said at that time, for the reason that the facts were all known and the conclusions come to in regard to them.

Question. Were you at the tourteen-gun battery near which General Burnside had his temporary headquarters on that day?

Answer. Yes; I rode out there. I think it was between 10 and 11 o’clock when I rode out there. I had been there before, and am somewhat familiar with the ground.

Question. Could anything be seen from there with sufficient distinctness to have enabled the commanding general to give orders other than he did from the point occupied by him?

Answer. I think not. I do not think it made any difference whether he was there or whether he was at the point he occupied. In the gratification of a personal wish to see, simply, he might have seen something more, but it would not have made any

difference in the conclusions arrived at. He would have understood matters as thoroughly where he was as if he had seen them,

Question. Ought the assault on that day to have been successful ?

Answer. I think so; I was confident that it would have been successful.

the Potomac, being duly sworn, says in answer to questions by JUDGEADVOCATE:

Question. Please to state in what capacity you were serving during the assault on the enemy’s lines on the 30th of July and days preceding it.

Answer. I am chief of artillery of the Army of the Potomac, and had charge of the siege operations on this side of the Appomattox.

Question. Relate briefly what arrangements were made for opposing the enemy’s artillery fire on that occasion, and if they were successfully carried out.

Answer. Batteries that had been constructed several weeks preceding the assault had armaments placed in them, from the plank road to the Hare house. There were eighteen Bioge guns in the line, eighteen large mortars, and twenty-eight Coehorns along in the lines in front, and some eighty field pieces. The object was to silence the fire of the enemy’s batteries in the redoubt which formed their salient on the plank road, and especially all of their guns which bore upon the ground in front of the mine. The fire was opened immediately upon the explosion of the mine, and was very successfulin keeping down the enemy’s fire.

Question. Was the enemy’s artillery fire formidable, and particularly directed to the point of our assault, after the explosion of the mine?

Answer. The fire did not become very formidable. It was almost entirely silenced soon after it opened, with the exception of one gun in a battery next to the mine, and a battery on the crest beyond the mine, and a few guns that were used by the enemy on our right of the mine toward the railroad. The gun that was in the work next the mine was so placed that it was protected from all direct fire, and a sufficient number of mortars could not be brought to bear upon it to stop it. Nolarge mortars had been placed to control that battery, as, according to the plan of assault, that work might reasonably be supposed to fall into our hands within ten or fifteen minutes after the explosion. All the guns in that battery were silenced, however, excepting that one. The battery on the crest of the hill, directly in front of the mine, was almost shut up after firing two or three rounds, as we had some heavy guns bearing on it, and anumber of field guns. J was not where I could see the fire from our right of the mine. I had Colonel Monroc in charge there, and he reported that the fire was pretty well kept down. On the left they occasionally fired a shot.

Question. Under the circumstances, then, ought not the assault have succeeded ?

Answer. I think so. That is, so far as it depended upon us. I do not know what the enemy had behind the crest. The object was to take the crest.

Question. Have you formed any opinion as to the causes of the failure of the assault on that occasion?

Answer. I do not know what other causes might have existed, but I attributed the failure to the want of promptitude in pushing forward assaulting columns immediately on the explosion of the mine. I believed from the first that if that were not done promptly the attack would probably fail.

Question. Was the enemy’s fire directed upon the point of attack

very formidable at any time so as to prevent reasonably resolute troops from pushing forward ?

Answer. I think not. Certainly not within the period within which their advance. should have taken place,

Lieut. W. H. H. BENyAuRD, U. S. Engineers, being duly sworn, says to questions by JuUDGE-ADVOCGATE:

Question. Were you present at the assault on the rebel lines on the 30th of July, and in what capacity?

Answer. I was with General Burnside on that morning. I was sent by Major Duane to report to him for duty as an engineer.

Question. Were you in a situation, then, to see the progress of events on that day?

Answer. Not all the time. A portion of the time I was with General Burnside at his headquarters; and then, afterward, I was at different points along the front. I was not in such a position that I could see everything that was going on.

Question. Were there working parties for the assaulting columns, and engineer officers to lead them?

Answer. Not that I know of.

Question. No arrangements had been made with you by General Burnside for anything of that sort?

Answer. No, sir; not previous to the assault.

Question. Do you know if any arrangements were made for the débouché of our troops from our lines and their passage over the enemy’s?

Answer. No, sir. General Burnside did not give me any instructions in regard to taking away the abatis on the rifle-pit on the front line.

Question. Were the obstructions on the enemy’s line formidable, and of what did they consist?

Answer. They had a pretty strong abatis in front of their rifle-pits. Question. Could they have been removed by working parties that usually accompany assaulting columns?

Answer. I did not go near enough to the crater along that line to judge of that, although 1t appeared to be merely the usual abatis placed in front of works and placed in the usual position.

Question. Did you see the explosion of the mine?

Question. Was its effect to clear for any distance, and, if so, how much, the enemy’s parapets?

Answer. Only a portion of the parapet was blown down. A portion of it remained standing. I suppose the crater that was formed might have been forty or fifty yards long and perhaps twenty wide.

Question. Was the breach sufficient and practicable for the passage of troops in line?

Answer. I did not go in to look at the crater, and consequently I could not say

whether they could go in without further work being done or not. I could not tell how deep it was.

Question. As an engineer, would you criticise that point of attack?

Answer. I had been there working on that front before, and I had frequently expressed the opinion that the enemy could bring a flank fire all along there—that is, their line formed a kind of re-entering there.

Question. Did you ever chance to hear why that point was selected, or do you know?

Answer. I did hear that that mine was made because that hollow in front was a good position to run a mine from.

Question. State briefly some of the causes, in your opinion, of the failure of the assault.

Answer. I think one cause was the way in which the troops were taken in by the flank, passed down these covered ways, one on the right and the other on the left, on which General Ferrero’s troops went down. I understand that only a portion of our parapet was taken away, and the troops had to go through by the flank instead of advancing in line. The portion of the ground south of the covered way was the way along which the troops could have advanced inline. The railroad cut being only six feet, high in one place, the troops could have easily advanced through that. The troops were not in their proper positions at the time of the assault—that is, a portion of the troops were away back beyond the edge of those woods when they should hav been in the hollow. ;

By the Court:

Question. Had you been placed in charge of a proper working party, suitably equipped, could you not, immediately after the explosion of the mine, have leveled the enemy’s parapets so as to have allowed troops in line of battle to have passed through?

Answer. I think I could. When the enemy afterward had a flank fire between the

enemy’s line and ours, I offered to General Burnside to run a covered way from our line to the enemy’s-line, on the right and left of the crater.

(Lines marked on map 66 A and A1.) By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. Would any advantage have ensued from simply holding the crater without advancing farther? Answer. No, sir; I do not think so. By the Court:

Question. Were there any preparations made in the way of collecting gabions, and so forth, so that if the troops had been successful we could have crowned the crest?

Answer. No, sir; not that I-know of.

Question. Were tools collected or used—picks, shovels, axes, &c.? Answer. I did not see any.

The Court adjourned to meet at 10 o’clock on 1st of September.