Unknown, August 30, 1864

The Court met pursuant to adjournment. Present, Major-General Hancock, Brigadier-Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge-advocate. The proceedings of the seventh day were read and approved.

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL WARREN—CONTINUED. By General MEADE:

Question. What did you mean by saying ” some one should have been present to have directed my command together with the commands of Generals Ord and Burnside”? Were you not aware that the commanding general of the Army of the Potomac was in the field and in telegraphic communication with yourself and the other officers alluded to?

Auswer. I saw from my position, which was, I suppose, about 400 yards from General Burnside’s, as well as could be seen in the morning in the smoke, that the assault was not going on very rapidly and that no effort had been made to do what I thought was the first essential—to take that battery on the left of the mine. I then went to General Burnside’s, which was as close to the scene of operations as a man could be and see well. There I found Generals Burnside and Ord engaged in conversation. I suggested to General Burnside that that battery should be taken at once; he asked me to go down the line and take a look at it from another point, and I did so. Upon returning I said I was confirmed in my first opinion, and he asked me if my troops could not take it. At that time all the approaches leading down to where the mine was were filled with his troops still slowly moving down and there was no chance for me to get at the battery, except to go over the open field. I, however, determined to put in General Ayres’ division at once and try to take it, and went back for that purpose, when 1 got a dispatch from General Meade (the ex- act language of which I do not remember), to the effect that I would await information from some operations which had been directed or that were going on on the left, and then it was that I wrote one of the dispatches, in which I said that I thought some one should be there to direct whether I should attempt to take that battery, or go with my division round to the left, as General Crawford reported that he was unable to do anything with what force he had there on the plank road. I will qualify what I said about the loss of time. I lost considerable time talking to General Burnside; I lost some time in going to see the battery with him; I lost some time in writing dispatches and awaiting answers; and in an operation of that kind every moment was of vital importance, for, before I got the order to go in and take the battery the enemy had driven nearly all of General Burnside’s line out of the intrenchments he had taken. If General Burnside had given me any orders, as I was there for the purpose of supporting him, I would have obeyed them; but he seemed to act as if what we did was to be done after consultation, and therefore I thought that some one should have been right there to have directed at once, without a moment’s loss of time, what should be done and what should not. Those dispatches show the extent of the loss of time. But, as I said in my testimony yesterday, I do not know that it affected the result at all. Butin reply to the direct question, if I thought there should have been some one there to give promptly positive orders what to do, I gave my first answer.

Question. How much time was occupied in these consultations, reconnaissances, and other matters referred to by you, and would not the commanding general, had he been at the point referred to by you, have been compelled to consume the same time?

Answer. I do not remember how much time was lost, and cannot tell exactly unless I can have my official report or a copy of it, or some records of that kind, to refer to. But it was a point of observation at which I should have consulted with nobody. Everything was plainly to be seen. Different persons might look at it differently, but it was a position where any one man could see the whole. In my opinion, the most important time was lost before I went to that point.

Question. Why did you consume the time which you acknowledge to have been lost, and why did you not at once telegraph the commanding general about what you saw and what you thought could or should be done?

Answer. The time that I speak of was consumed by General Burnside. In my instructions I was directed to support him; and I informed him where my headquarters were, as stated, not far from his. I waited there for his directions. I thought that my being with him, under orders to support him, the time lost was lost by him and not by me. I did keep the commanding general as promptly informed of everything as I possibly could. Even if I had chosen to have acted independently, according to my own discretion, subject to the approval of the commanding general, all the approaches to the point were occupied by General Burnside’s troops. I could not have moved mine without getting them mixed up with his.

By the Court:

Question. Did you not mean in your previous answers that it was your belief that if the commanding general had been on that field there would have been a pressure brought to bear to push those troops of the Ninth Corps that occupied those trenches forward faster than they went?

Answer. I think that the controlling power should have been there and nowhere else, so that there should have been no reference to anywhere else.

Question. When you replied to the last question put to you yesterday did you consider that the commander of the Army of the Potomac should have been present in person, or that some one should have been invested with the command of all the troops engaged in the assault as supports, reserves, &c., if said commander was not there?

Answer, I meant that some one person having general command should have been there to have seen and directed all at once.

6 R R—VOL XL, PTI the JUDGE-ADVOCATE, Says:

Question. Will you please to state what in your judgment caused the failure of the attack on the enemy’s lines on the 30th of July?

Answer. It seemed to me that it was perfectly practicable fur the men, if they had been properly led, to have gone straight through the breach which was caused hy the explosion of the mine, and to have gone to the top of Cemetery Hill. It looked to me, from what I could see and hear, that it was perfectly practicable to have taken the men through; but whether it was because the men themselves would not go, or whether it was because they were not led, I was not far enough to the front to be qualified to say.

Question. What orders which you issued were not executed, if any?

Answer. I could send you copies of all the dispatches that I wrote. The orders for the assault were issued by General Meade in obedience to general instructions from me. I saw the detailed order of General Meade before the mine was exploded, and I thought that the execution of that order was practicable. That order I presume you have before you. My order was to General Meade, and then General Meade made his order from whatI directed him todo, andsent mea copy of it, and I thought it was all that could be required. I recollect that, failing on the north bank of the river to surprise the enemy as we expected or hoped to do, but instead of that drew a large part of his force to the north side, I telegraphed to General Meade that we would now take advantage of the absence of that force of the enemy to explode the mine and make an assault on Petersburg.

By the Court:

Question. From your information how many of the enemy were in Petersburg at the time of this assault?

Answer. My information was that three divisions were left in Petersburg, with one brigade absent from those divisions—Johnson’s. From the best evidence none of the enemy’s troops crossed the James River until 2 o’clock of the 30th of July, on their way back. Then they had fully sixteen miles to travel to get back, with, however, the advantage of a railroad near them to carry many of themen. The distance I guess at when I say sixteen miles.

amined by the JUDGE-ADVOCATE, says:

Question. Were you at or near the scene of the assault on the 30th of July? By whose orders, and in what capacity? Answer. I was at General Burnside’s headquarters as aide-de-camp to LieutenantGener Grant, and afterward at General Warren’s headquarters by General Grant’s orders.

Question. Did you see General Burnside in person, and had you conversation with him?

Answer. I had some conversation with him. Question. Relate the conversation in brief.

Answer. I went from General Burnside’s headquarters to the position he had in the front to ascertain how things stood. I suppose the time was about an hour after the explosion of the mine. He told me that his troops were forming then for an

assault to carry the crest of the hill. That was the only important point in the conversation.

a Ma Did he give you any information to communicate to General ran

Answer. I do not recollect that he did.

Question. Had you an opportunity of forming an opinion as to the cause or causes of the failure on that day?

Answer. I had not, from anything that I saw myself. By the Court: Question. Were you so situated that you could see this assault?

Answer. I could not until I went to General Warren’s headquarters, which was about 7 o’clock. I could not see the details.

Question. Had you made such an examination prior to the assault that would enable you to give a professional opinion as to the chances of success in attempting to take Cemetery Hill by assault, considering the explosion of the mine as the basis of the assault?

Question. I wish you would state to the Court what the chances of success were, using this mine as a means of inaugurating the assault.

Answer. I thought it entirely impracticable when the mine was made if the enemy’s line should be held in full force. This opinion was formed a week or ten days prio to the assault. Afterward, with the knowledge I had of the movement of the enemy’s troops from the south to the north side of the river, I thought an assault was entirely practicable.

Question. What do you suppose would have been the best plan for the assaulting troops to have followed after having reached Cemetery Hill— made a lodgment on and fortified that place, or proceeded immediately into the town of Petersburg?

Answer. I suppose the first step should have been to have made a lodgment on Cemetery Hill, and then to have pushed up troops to hold it at all hazards. The dispositions of the troops would depend upon the nature of the ground.

Question. From your knowledge of the nature of the intrenchments— our own and the enemy’s—do you think that immediately after the explosion of the mine, if proper working parties had been arranged, there would have been any difficulty in removing sufficient obstructions to have enabled our troops to have moved against those intrenchments in line of battle?

Answer. I do not think there would have been any difficulty.

amined by the JUDGE-ADVOCATE, Says:

Question. Please state what was your command at the assault on the 30th of July.

Answer. My command was composed of two divisions to aid in the assault, one of which belonged to the Tenth Corps and was under General Turner, and the other to

the Eighteenth Corps, under General Ames. The divisions numbered: General Ames’ about 5,500 and General Turner’s 4,000 available muskets, or probably a little less.

Question. What were your troops ordered to do?

Answer. My troops were ordered to a position in the rear of General Burnside’s corps, with a view to supporting it. The positions were selected by General Burnside.

Question. Did your troops experience any interference from the Ninth Corps moving into position on that occasion?

Answer. After General Burnside’s troops had made the assault and pushed forward, probably about an hour or a little more after the explosion of the mine, he said to me, ‘Now you can move your troops forward,” I sent orders immediately to the leading division to move forward rapidly according to the programme, following the division that was in front of it, which was the rear division of General Burnside’s corps. In the course of twenty minutes after the order was sent out by a staff officer, General Turner reported to me that he found the way blocked; that the aproach to the place of débouché was occupied by the divisions in front, and that he fad found himself in front of General Potter’s troops. This was the report made by him to me. General Potter’s troops, according to the programme, were to precede his.

Question. Were any arrangements made for the passage of troops through the abatis and over the parapets to go to the front on that day?

Answer. When I went to the front I found the troops debouching by a single opening. The parapet had been thrown down and the abatis had been removed, and the troops were moved out by that opening.

Question. Please state the dimensions of that opening. Would it admit of the passage of troops in column, or line, or how?

Answer. I cannot give the exact dimensions, because my attention was occupied principally in watching what was going on in front of this place, but my impression is that the opening was large enough for a column of a company front to go out, over pretty rough ground. I do not know whether there was more than one opening; I only saw that one.

Question. That was the one your troops passed through?

Answer. No; my troops did not all pass through that way. I directed a portion of my troops to go over the parapet.

Question. Did you direct them to go over the parapet because in your judgment the opening was inadequate?

Answer. I gave those directions because the ground in front of this place of exit was occupied by the other troops and there was no room after they got out for them to a ” service without moving for a considerable distance by the flank to the right and left.

Question. How were the troops that débouchéd to the assault formed to advance?

_ Answer. When I went to the front I saw white troops moving out by the flank into the crater and the trenches near. I say by the flank, but I will explain that they passed along by twos and threes and sometimes fours along this space, which was pretty well swept by the fire of the enemy—the space between our trenches and the crater formed by the explosion of the mine. These white troops were followed afterward by some colored troops, who also moved out, as it were, by flank, though the appearance of moving by flank may have been caused by the ‘columns being somewhat disordered and hesitating in the move, so that a few moving forward first and others following them would diminish the width of a column and give the troops the appearance of moving by flank. ‘

Question. In your opinion was this movement by flank judicious or was it unavoidable?

Answer. I would not suppose it was a judicious move under the circumst i it could have been avoided. I rather think if intended to bea oven aon n front of one or more companies then the kind of formation I saw was caused by the hesitation of the troops in the rear and the natural disposition of those men who

are more or less timid, in following those in front, to stri i snore: ; g ‘ ing themselves out in almost

Question. What, in your opinion, were some of the causes of failure on that occasion?

Answer. I think the first cause was that the troops were not well discipli They probably had not had time to become soldiers. The next cause a es that they passed out of the trenches by one place of exit and through the covered way toa considerable extent, which necessarily impeded the progress of troops goin out, especially as troops began coming in by the same covered way. °.

Question. Were the obstacles met by our tro ‘ “2 formidable? y roops, 1 your opinion,

Answer. I did not go to the front until difficulties were reported in the way of carrying out the order received from General Meade to move my division out to the right, independent of the troops in my front, and endeavor to reach the crest of the hill. It was reported by the division commanders that the nature of the ground was such that they could not get out that way. I went down to inspect the ground myself, and I derived the impression that there were difficulties in the way of getting out from the position occupied by my men at that time except in one place. They were in the long covered way, the way leading to the angle from which the troops débouchéd. The ground was swampy, covered with more or less undergrowth and trees, and appeared to run obliquely in front of the enemy’s trenches. If the troops should get into that swamp and undergrowth it would have been difficult to have kept them in order, and the enemy would have had them at a greater disadvantage, raking them if they occupied the trenches. The covered way was a pretty deep one, and I supposed from the fact of its being there leading to the place of exit it was swept by a very heavy fire from the enemy’s batteries. It was reported that the stream running through the marsh was bridged in one place by a narrow bridge, where we crossed it, and that it was a difficult place for troops to pass over. When I got there I saw that it was very muddy, that delays would be occasioned, and that it was a difficult place to attempt to take the enemy’s intrenchments, and we would have got on the ground just under the enemy’s works and probably be exposed to a very severe fire.

Question. Did any troops, to your knowledge, misbehave or disobey orders?

Answer. None that I know of, except after when an assault was made by some colored troops, followed by a brigade of the Tenth Corps, which assault was made about 8 o’clock while I was in the front line of our trenches and within less than 100 yards of the crater, and what I would call the movement of assault. The men were repulsed by a very heavy concentrated fire, which enveloped that point of exit, the enemy having massed forces on the right and front and some fire coming from the left.

Question. In your opinion had the first troops that went forward not hesitated or halted in the crater could they not have got to the desirable point—that is, Cemetery Hill?

Answer. I knew nothing about their halting or the facilities that they had for getting forward, except through what I heard from others, I not having been present at that time.

Question. How was our artillery firing, as far as you observed—effective or otherwise?

Answer. The artillery fired very rapidly and for a long time, and judging from the reports in the enemy’s newspapers which I have seen since we must have done considerable damage by our artillery upon their columns moving across to the place of attack.

Question. Were the obstructions north and south of the crater removed sufficiently to admit the passage of troops in line of battle, say brigade front?

Answer. I did not see that any obstructions made by the enemy’s trenches had been removed when I was there, except what had been removed by the explosion of the mine at the crater. Their ditch still remained, and I counted the regimental flags of our troops in my front occupying the trench. I do not know whether there was a strong abatis before the attack; so that I refer only to the ditch and the parapet,

By the Court: Question. Do you think the assault would have been successful there had the best dispositions been made that you are conversant with?

Answer. From what I learned afterward of the behavior of the troops after the explosion, when the enemy was most alarmed, I think that the assault, if it had been made with no more vigor, would have failed no matter what the disposition. If the troops had behaved properly elsewhere I think the probability of success would have been increased by having more openings, a simultaneous assault, and increased material; but if the troops would have behaved as improperly as they are reported to have done in front—not going forward when ordered—I think the assault would have failed no matter what the disposition.

Question. In your opinion was there any necessity for an officer of rank being present who should have had a more general command than the commander of the troops making the assault and the commanders of the supports and reserves; should there have been an officer present to have combined the whole command, nearer than the commander of the army, who was only in telegraphic communication with the different commanders of troops on the field; should there have been one single person there invested with authority to direct the whole operation, and would the result have been different if such had been the case ?

Answer. The only commands referred to as present there, the assaulting corps and the reserves, were under General Burnside and myself; and upon reporting to General Burnside I accompanied him to the trenches and told him I would obey any instructions he gave me; so that the whole of the operations were under his orders, until the orders came from higher authority to make the change referred to, and to discontinue the assault. General Burnside being the senior officer I considered that he had a right to give me orders. He directed me to place my troops in the rear until after his troops should have made the assault, and until] he had learned when they would be necessary and where, which I did. General Burnside was to give me word when to move my troops and where to move them. I told him I considered myself bound to obey any instructions that he might give me, and that any instructions that he would give would be obeyed with alacrity. So that, so far as concerns the movements directed by him, I do not think the presence of any other officer in those two corps would have made any change in moving forward.

Question. Could your troops when they were called into action have advanced to the front over the enemy’s parapet and have gotten through in line of battle in any front greater than that of two regiments, at the time you were sent in, on each side of the crater?

Answer. I think it probable that my troops might have gotten in on the left of the crater at that time if they had advanced through the opening by fronts of regiments, or even companies—gotten into the enemy’s trenches; but my answer must be understood to convey only a knowledge of what I saw. I do not know what force the enemy had on the left, I only knew that the resistance on the right was very great, and they appeared to have a severe fire upon the troops on the right of where we advaneee to the crater. My troops were directed to support General Burnside on the right.

Question. Were you present when the mine exploded; do you consider that the troops might have advanced to the top of Cemetery Hill

on that ridge had they been properly led forward or the troops behaved properly ?

Answer. I do not consider I was present when the mine exploded. By General MEADE:

Question. Where was your general position on the field during the operations of the morning?

Answer. When the mine exploded, and probably for an hour and a half or two hours afterward, I was with General Burnside in the trenches in rear of one of the batteries about one-third or half a mile from the point of assault; after that for half an hour I was up to the front as far as I could get without going into the crater or outside our line of intrenchments as far as the head of my advanced division was. I then returned, and General Burnside and myself occupied the same place in the rear of this battery for probably an hour, except that I rode to the rear where General Meade was and passed around a little trying to rally some troops who were going from the front. This took me till between 9 and 10 o’clock, when General Burnside and myself both rode to the rear to learn something about an order that was issued in regard to our future movements.

_ Question. Could anything be seen from this point with sufficient distinctness to have enabled the commanding general to give orders other than he did from the point occupied by him?

Answer. Immediately after the explosion the fire from both our batteries and the enemy’s camevery heavily, and the cloud of smoke prevented us from seeing anything that was going on there. We were ignorant of the condition of things except from the information staff officers brought us or from the nature of the firing we heard, up to the time that I informed myself by going to the front.

Question. Did you hear any staff officer report to General Burnside that the troops could not be got to advance from the crater? If so, how many officers so reported, and do you know their names?

Answer. The first two or three reports that were brought to General Burnside were brought by officers whose names I do not know, and not until some considerable time had expired after the explosion; and although I did not hear the reports distinctly enough to repeat them they were not satisfactory, and indicated that the troops could not be moved readily forward.

Question. Did you not report to the commanding general that the troops were overcrowded in the crater and the enemy’s adjacent works, and that in your judgment there was no probability of the crest of Cemetery Hill being carried—this, somewhere between 9 and 10 a. wv., at the headquarters of the commanding general in the field?

Answer. I did. I would say, in addition tomy answer, that General Burnsideand myself were present at the time, and the question was whether we could carry it at that time; and my answer intended to convey whether we (General Burnside and myself) with our forces could have done so had they let us; and after the troops were disorganized and driven back those who made the attack later and those who made the attack earlier were packed in the trenches adjacent, that under the circumstances we could not carry it with all our troops at that point of attack.

Question. Did General Burnside, about 10 a. m., when at his commanding general’s headquarters on the field, say that he could maintain his lodgment in the crater, and that he could take Cemetery Hill before night, if so permitted ?

Answer. General Burnside disagreed with me when I said I did not think we could take it. I supposed he meant that he could take it with the force he had, consisting of his own corps and my reserves, though he said something about it was time then for the Fifth Corps to move up. The remark was made by General Burnside with a view of persisting in the attack which he had commenced, and it had been my opinion, ever since I was near enough to see what was going on in the crater, that the sooner we withdrew our troops, when we got into such a bad position, the better, and any persistence in the attack at that point I looked upon as very improper.

Question. Was it not understood at this time that offensive operations should cease, but that the crater should be held till the troops could be securely withdrawn, and that this would probably be till night?

Answer. I think such was General Burnside’s understanding, and I know he received such orders. My troops were all inside the intrenchments except those who had run into the enemy’s trenches to avoid the tremendous fire which they met when they went out.

Question. Do you remember seeing General Warren at the battery at General Burnside’s station?

Question. Was not the whole field at that time sufficiently clear from

smoke to be visible, and had been so for some time previous at that point? aie

Answer. I do not know whether it was after my return from the vicinity of the crater or before that I saw General Warren. My impression is that each time I looked from the parapet before I left the trenches—which was two or three times— that 1 rose to look to the front, the smoke obscured the view so that I, at least, could form no definite idea of what was going on at the front. After the firing from the batteries on our side had ceased, which was probably an hour from the time of the assault, the atmosphere was clearer, but even then I could make out really little of what was going on in front, from the distance, the peculiar position of the point of attack, and from the fact, too, that I do not see very well because I am nearsighted.

Question. Were you in a position to see the operations of the assault before Petersburg on the 30th of July, and in what capacity?

Answer. I was; commanding the Second Division, Ninth Army Corps. Question. Do you regard it as a failure or otherwise? Answer. I regard it as a failure.

Question. To what cause or causes do you attribute this?

Answer. Firstly, to the failure of the troops who had the advance on that day to carry out the orders to advance through the enemy’s line and seize the hill. Secondly, that when it was evident that this part of the plan had failed no attempt was made at a diversion at any other part of the line to enable the troops which were thrown into confusion at this point to be reformed. 1 would further state that I do not think the preliminary arrangements were very perfect.

Question. What preparations were made, or what orders were given for the same, to pass troops through the abatis and over the parapet in front of the Ninth Corps? Did you receive any orders yourself ?

Answer. I received no orders whatever in relation to that matter except what are contained in the general order from the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac.

Answer. The general order of General Burnside—I suppose it might be called the order of attack—was the only order given in writing. Verbal instructions were given to have the pioneers of the different regiments, and a sort of pioneer regiment that we call the Engineer Regiment, in each division, prepared with their tools, and so forth, to prepare the breast-works for the passage of field batteries in case we ‘were successful in moving forward. My regiment was immediately in the neighborhood of the breast-work ready to carry out these instructions, and my pioneers were also prepared, I had orders not to disturb anything immediately in the vicinity of the mine so as not to attract the attention of the enemy to that point. I was told to withdraw everything from that part of the line for a spacé of 200 or 300 yards, except a thin line of skirmishers, and not to attract the enemy’s attention there if I could help it.

Question. How were the Ninth Corps troops formed for the assault— your-own division, for instance?

Answer. My own division was to have been formed left in front to move forward by the flank, so that when my troops had passed the line of the enemy’s intrenchments by fronting their front would be to the right, my division being intended to cover the right of the advance. One brigade of my division was massed between the railroad and the advance line of works on the right-hand side of my covered way and south of the mine. J had orders not to allow any troops on the left of the covered way. ‘The other brigade was partially in the trenches and about to be relieved by some of the troops of the Eighteenth Corps. Two or three regiments which I was ordered not to put in the assault were not in the trenches.

Question. What time elapsed from the springing of the mine till the forward movement of the assaulting columns?

Answer. I do not know, sir. I did not see the movement of the Fi ivisi The first of my regiments commenced to move, I should think, about ciphtortana as utes after the mine exploded. My division was to move third in order, but I took the liberty of altering the programme a little. After I received the order of Major. General Burnside—I received the order about 9 o’clock at night—after thinking he matter over it occurred to me that it would be a long time before my division would have an opportunity to get forward, as the divisions of Generals Ledlie and Willcox were to precede me. I therefore commanded General Griffin, who had the lead in my division, to deploy a line of skirmishers to the right of this crater, and in case the assault seemed to be successful, and General Ledlie moved forward, he should advance his skirmishers to the right, and if he did not find so much serious opposition as to detain him there he should push his troops forward to the right, and move forward nearly parallel with General Ledlie. I gave him these orders about 12 o’clock at night, and I do not think that I communicated to General Burnside that I had made this change. Therefore my troops commenced moving as soon as General Griffin found that General Ledlie’s column had started. This leading division commenced moving and passed into the right of the crater and turned down to the right.

Question. Did the troops halt in the crater. Answer. Yes, sir.

Answer. No reason at all that I know of.

Question. What was the nature of the obstructions in the enemy’s line, formidable or otherwise?

Answer. To the right of the crater there was an ordinary line of rifle-pits with a sort of chevaux-de-frise in front of it made by pointed stakes being driven into the ground. Immediately in rear of this and to the right of it there were two covered ways. One seemed to be a covered way, and one perhaps a place dug to carry something out of the fort. There were transverse lines of rifle-pits, and some coverings thrown up by the men to protect themselves—one running in these angles between the advance line and this covered way, which runs up toward Petersburg, and another running on the bank of the ravine which runs up through the enemy’s line to the right of the mine, about the line I was ordered to take.

Question. What was the degree of artillery firing on that point, the point of assault ?

Answer. Immediately after the assault very light; afterward the fire was very severe indeed, as severe as I ever saw.

Question. What time elapsed, as near as you can tell, from the time of the assault till the time this severe fire commenced?

Answer. I should think fully half an hour.

Question. Was the ground around the crater commanded by the ground held by the enemy?

Answer. Yes, sir; that is, immediately in rear of the enemy’s line which we had pierced the ground commanded it, and the ground to the right on the other side of the ravine commanded it. In speaking of the right I mean our right. The ground to the left I did not notice so well because I had no business there.

Question. For what distance on each side of the crater were the enemy’s works abandoned after the explosion of the mine?

Answer. To the right of the crater the front line was abandoned for a space of 250 or 300 yards, I should think—that is, the enemy’s troops rushed out of this line back to these covered ways and so forth. From the hasty glance I gave to the left there did not seem to be anybody within 300 yards. Perhaps it would be better to say that the line was only partially abandoned; they did not all go—some went and some did not.

Question. Could the troops have proceeded to the crest immediately after reaching the crater?

Answer. I do not know any reason why they could not. Question. Did any troops that you know of advance from the crater to the crest?

Answer. Some of my troops advanced from the right of the crater toward the crest. I suppose they went upward of 200 yards, and they were driven back.

Question. Why, do you suppose, were they driven back?

Answer. At that time they were driven back by the fire. They were too weak to advance farther.

Question. By the fire of artillery or of infantry? Answer. Both. Question. At what hour was that?

Answer. That must have been about half or three-quarters of an hour after the mine exploded.

Question. Do you think that if your men had been adequately supported they could have gone forward to the crest, notwithstanding the obstacles that presented themselves—firing and so forth—at that hour?

Answer. I think that if I had had my whole division together at that time, if the ground had been such that I could have had my whole division together and made that charge, I could have gone to the crest.

Question. When these troops fell back, where did they go?

Answer. They fell back partially into this covered way leading trom the fort to the right, and a few were driven into the crater of the mine.

Question. How long was it after they got in before they were ordered to retire; how long were you in that place, or wherever they were?

Answer. Until the general order came to withdraw the troops. Question. How long would you estimate that time to be?

Answer. It must have been five or six hours. It seems to me we did not get that order till about 11 o’clock. General Burnside sent for me, I should think, about 10 o’clock in the morning and stated that he had received an order to withdraw, and asked me if I thought we could hold the position. Itold him I thought we could hold the position, but unless something was going to be done there was no use in it. He said it was an important point, or something of that sort; and I asked him if I could make arrangements to withdraw, and he told me, ”No,” that he was going to see General Meade, and that I should wait until he should have consulted with him. Half or three-quarters of an hour afterward I received a copy of a telegram to General White, who was acting as his chief of staff, with an indorsement on the back of the dispatch to the effect that it should be submitted to the officers in the crater, or something to that effect, for their opinion as to how they should withdraw. Subsequently I started to go into the crater to consult with them, and I received an order from an aide-de-camp of General Burnside to report in person at his headquarters,

Question. Was the time a fit one to withdraw, in your opinion?

Answer. The troops were not withdrawn at all; they were driven out by the enemy.

Question. When did the chief loss of men occur?

Answer. The chief loss in my division occurred between 6.30 and 10 o’clock in the morning. ‘The heaviest loss was at the time that some of the troops of the Fourth Division (the colored division) met with a check and were repulsed.

Question. Was it in the act of retiring from the crater?

Answer. More than half the prisoners I lost were lost in the crater. – plain that I had very few men in the crater, that seeing how it was otigonase a that one or two regiments that attempted to pass through were lost among the other troops, I endeavored to get my troops out of there, but whensome of the other troops gave way, and the operation of General Ferrero’s troops was unsuccessful, and they gave way, I had some stragglers forced into the crater. I suppose I had not more nae

Answer. It was not conducted at all, sir. The cirewnstances : we had received this order General Burnside directed me to eapore aU gheaat yaeene I went to his headquarters, met there the other division commanders, and we con. sulted upon the best plan which should be adopted to withdraw the troops I had previously sent out orders to connect my right with the crater by an intrenchment if possible. While we were returning from this consultation an assault was made upon the crater, and che enemy recovered possession of it. Then all the troops were forced back to our line, except two regiments that I had sent beyond the ravine to silence a battery, and these I withdrew about 4 o’clock in the afternoon.

Question. Do you know whether any troops misbehaved or disobeyed orders in any way or at any time during the action?

Answer. I do not know that I can answer that exactly. I know by the reports of my staff officers and so forth. But I saw troops lying there when they had been ordered to go forward immediately after the mine exploded, probably within ten minutes. Colonel Pleasants, who had charge of the explosion, and whose regiment, having built the mine, being relieved from duty on that day, except as a sort of provost guard with orders from the Ninth Army Corps, had volunteered as an aide on my staff, and as soon as the mine was exploded he rushed forward into the crater, and the troops were moving up, and he reported to me that the troops could not be made to move forward—that was, the troops of the First Division. He showed me his hand, which was blistered in driving them up. It was Marshall’s brigade, of Ledlie’s division.

By the Court: Question. What tools were the engineer regiments supplied with?

Answer. Axes, spades, and picks. The engineer regiment I think was supplied particularly with axes to cut down the abatis

Question. Did they move forward? Answer. Yes, sir. Question. Did they destroy the abatis?

Answer. The chevaux-de-frise on the enemy’s lines for 200 or 300 yards was broken down.

Question. Was there any difficulty in passing a brigade or regimental front over our intrenchments and on either side of that crater to the front?

Answer. It might have been done on the left, but not on the right. Question. What was the difficulty on the right?

Answer. The difficulty on the right was that where you would have to form your troops you would have to pass through a wooded ravine and swamp. A heavy regiment, which charged through in regimental front, I think got very badly broken up. They would have succeeded better farther to the right.

Question. Where did you stay during. the attack?

Answer. Most of the time I staid on the hill on this side of the railroad—a point where you can see the ground.

Question. Did all of your troops go into action?

Answer. My troops all went into action except my engineer regiment, which had just moved up to the front.

Question. Did they all get as far as the crater? Answer. All except one regiment got beyond the crater. Question. Did you ever go to the crater?

Answer. I never went to the crater myself; I was within about eighty yards of it, just off to the right of it.

Question. At the time your skirmish line was ordered up the hill did any individual members of your division get to the top of the crest?

Answer. I do not think there did. It was reported to me that some did, but haying investigated the matter since I am satisfied that they did not.

The Court adjourned to meet at 10 o’clock on 31st of July [August].