Thomas W. Sherman to Thomas W. Sherman, February 14, 1862

Brig. Gen. THOMAS W. SHERMAN, Commanding at Port Royal, &c. :

GENERAL: Your dispatches in regard to the occupation of Daufuskie Island, &¢., were received to-day. I saw also to-day for the first time your requisition for a siege train for Savannah.

After giving the subject all the consideration in my power, I am forced to the conclusion that under present circumstances the siege and capture of Savannah do not promise results commensurate with the sacrifices necessary. When I learned that it was possible for the gunboats to reach the Savannah River above Fort Pulaski, two operations suggested themselves to my mind as its immediate results:

instantaneous advance and attack by the Army and Navy.

The time for this has passed, and your letter indicates that you are not accountable for the failure to seize the propitious moment, but that, on the contrary, you perceived its advantages.

Second. To isolate Fort Pulaski, cut off its supplies, and at least facilitate its reduction by a bombardment.

Although we have along delay to deplore, the second course still remains open to us; and I strongly advise the close blockade of Pulaski and its bombardment as soon as the 13-inch mortars and heavy guns reach you. I am confident you can thus reduce it. With Pulaski you gain all that is really essential; you obtain complete control of the harbor; you relieve the blockading fleet, and render the main body of your force disposable for other operations.

I do not consider the possession of Savannah worth a siege after Pulaski is in our hands. But the possession of Pulaski is of the first importance. The expedition to Fernandina is well, and I shall be glad to learn that it is ours.

But, after all, the greatest moral effect would be produced by the reduction of Charleston and its defenses. There the rebellion had its birth; there the unnatural hatred of our Government is most intense; there is the center of the boasted power and courage of the rebels.

To gain Fort Sumter and hold Charleston is a task well worthy of our greatest efforts and considerable sacrifices. That is the problem I would be glad to have you study. Some time must elapse before we can be in all respects ready to accomplish that purpose. Fleets are en route and armies in motion which have certain preliminary objects to accomplish before we are ready to take Charleston in hand, but the time will before long arrive when I shall be prepared to make that movement. In the mean time it is my advice and wish that no attempt be made upon Savannah, unless it can be carried with certainty by a coup de main. ;

Please concentrate your attention and forces upon Pulaski and Fer-. nandina. Saint Augustine might as well be taken by way of an interlude, while awaiting the preparations for Charleston. Success attends us everywhere at present.

Very truly, yours, GEO. B. McCLELLAN Major-General, Commanding U. 8. Army.

15 R R—VOL VI ‘he ADJUTANT-GENERAL U. 3. ARMY, Washington, D. 0.:

Sir: As I informed you on the 8th instant, General Viele had orders to erect his battery on the Savannah River, whether the Navy could assist him or not. Accordingly a battery of six siege guns was erected at Venus Point, on Jones Island, on the night of the 11th instant, and fortunately without molestation from the enemy.

In order to render the blockade of the river complete, a similar battery is to be erected at the head of Long Island. The preparations for this have, like the other, been ready ever since the day of the reconnaissance, the 28th of January.

As the naval gunboats cannot be prevailed upon to enter the river, I have given General Viele orders to likewise erect this battery without them, which I think will be done without much hazard, now that the Venus Point battery is up.

Commodore DuPont will leave two or three light-draught gunboats in Mud River, which will probably tend to cover our batteries from gunboats of the enemy coming down the Savannah and attempting to take us in rear by way of Mud River.

I have sent a 10-inch columbiad down there, which will now be necessary without the aid of the gunboats.

Venen Wright’s troops are yet in Warsaw Sound, waiting for the avy.

Our delays since the middle of January have grieved me to almost a state of mortification. The season is “apid)y passing ; we can work six weeks longer, and probably twelve. Jw, if anything serious is to be done in that time over and beyond the expedition that is about to start, I will state candidly and explicitly what will be required at once: All the means of transportation that have been asked for (which I believe have been ordered but which have never got here); the mortars and siege equipage (which are gradually arriving, though none of the 13-inch are here yet), and 10,000 infantry troops.

The great extent of coast we have had to garrison and guard has absorbed a good portion of our troops.

The mortar battery against Pulaski will go up as soon as the mortars arrive.

Savannah is out of the question with our present force, particularly after the detachments to Fernandina and Edisto Island, which I did not desire to make at present; but, in order to do something in the absence of our ability to get on the main for want of transportation, was compelled to do so.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,