Tho. E. Bramlette to George B. McClellan, November 27, 1861

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, Commanding U. S. Army:

My DEAR FRIEND: I have not written you very frequently because I could not write definitely, and because such, perhaps exaggerated, importance do I attach to secrecy in these matters, that I have hesitated to put my own thoughts to paper, and I now ask you to keep them to yourself. It is certainly possible that in the end you may have to observe how far the consummation will have fallen short of my plans.

I hope you have not supposed that the introduction of the re-enforcements through this point has had any reference to a defense of Louis- : ville. That has not entered my mind at all. I assume that to be safe in any event. I do not place high estimate on Buckner’s force at Bowling Green, and have no sueh thought as that he will attempt to advance. His position is purely defensive, and he will be quite content if he can maintain that. IL have therefore thought of no such thing as fortifying Louisville. Sherman threw up a little work at the mouth of Salt River. It may have been judieious when he did it. I have not seen the necessity of it since, though it does no harm. _ If you will look carefully at the map you will see that Louisville affords the best base that can be taken for land operations from the north upon any part of Tennessee. The railroad to Lebanon curves around to the northeast behind Salt River, giving, besides the Nash: ville Railroad, three good pike roads, which converge to a point of easy communication for three columns about Glasgow—one by the mouth of Salt River, coming into the railroad at Elizabethtown; one by Bardstown and New Haven, and coming into the direct pike road to Gallatin and Nashville; and one by Lebanon, Shepherdsville, and Greensburg into the same road; while Lebanon Junction, New Haven, and Lebanon form convenient points for the final departure of as many columns. Lebanon also affords a point of departure for a column on east Tennessee as short as any route; for wagon transportation as short as the route from Cincinnati by Lexington, and shorter and less attended with delay by railroad. Nothing could be more convenient. This point has the further advantage of bringing everything under my eye. I could know nothing of what would be done from a base at Cincinnati. These advantages will not fail to impress themselves upon you without going more into detail. s

And now for a plan of campaign: Up to the organization of columns behind Salt River all the plans I have in view at present concur, “Omar. XVIL] CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.—UNION.

Beyond that they diverge, and may be stated briefly and eandidly thus: First, to establish a sufficient force before Bowling Green to hold Buckner there, while a column moves into East Tennessee by Somerset and the route we had in view; second, to hold him in check while a column moves rapidly past him on Nashville by the turnpike via Gallatin; and, third, holding him in check at Bowling Green and throwing in columns on both the Somerset and Nashville routes. The choice of these must depend on circumstances, whieh may vary in the mean time or which may not now be clearly perceived. In conjunction with either of these should be the movement of two flotilla columns up the Tennessee and Cumberland, so as at least to land and unite near the State line, and eut off communication between Bowling Green and Columbus, and perhaps run directly into Nashville. A strong demonstration should at the same time be made on Columbus by the Mississippi. The details of all this, such as the destruction of railroads, so as to cut off communication, and a thousand other details, I do not go into, nor is it necessary. You can imagine them all.

All this I hope you will at least say looks plausible; more than that, I hope it is reasonable and believe it is practicable, though I would not like you to forget that circumstances not fully foreseen may mar it in part. For the water movements means are necessary which 1 have not the control of; that is, gunboats and transports. The troops which you promise from Missouri could be used for the purpose, and ought to move at my signal. I should take the troops from Paducah for one of them, and replace them by those which probably would not be as well disciplined and equipped. .

Thus far I have studiously avoided any movements which to the enemy would have the appearance of activity or method. The points occupied are pretty much the same as when I arrived, except that a regiment has now and then been moved into position and Thomas has gradually been closing in upon Lebanon. Ishall in a couple of days at most eomplete the matter of organizing brigades and divisions as the troops come in, and begin to get them into position. We are now “lying around somewhat loose,” and I shall not care much if some of our fragments have to look sharply after themselves. We are at the mouth of Salt River, Elizabethtown, Nolin, Columbia, Campbellsville, at the points on the Lebanon Railroad, Somerset, London, Crab Orchard, and Dick Robinson, and on the Lower Green River. The latter force is composed mostly of Kentucky regiments, half organized. I shall probably keep them to make a demonstration on Russellville and Hopkinsville at the proper time. We have occasional stampedes at the outposts, but I do not allow myself to be much troubled about them. Such a one we have now on the Lower Green River, where Breckinridge is said to be advancing with 8,000 men. He may have 2,500 or 9,000. Another at Somerset, where Zollicoffer is said to be crossing with 10,000. He may have 4,000 or 5,000, and he may cross a regiment or two.

As the troops come in they go into camp 5 miles from the city, under Mitchel, who is attentive and subordinate, and where they replenish their worn- -out clothes and outfit and go to drilling. Nelson has been in camp a day, and, I am informed, has already got into difficulty with Mitchel; and, iit I am rightly informed, has behaved very absurdly. As he is a veteran, some allowance must be made for him.

There are at Indianapolis seven regiments ready for service, but demoralized by the proximity of friends and the want of discipline and instruction, I propose to form them into a reserve and camp of instrucSon OH Dy e AN t yn ee eer “T “A: wn ess i p

x tion at Bardstown; which is a convenient place in many respects. I

` can make no use of them in an advance. The Kentucky regiments are

only partially organized, and can be but little used at present. If I were to go into my affairs I should have the appearance of comPanne over difficulties. I am greatly in need of general and staff officers. My own staff force is entirely insufficient, but I have no means of augmenting it with advantage. As for myself, I should pay myself a very high compliment if I hoped to come up to the expectations which you first formed. I am afraid I shall have to ask a little patience.

Very truly, yours, D. €. BUELL AGE de

COLUMBIA, K. Y., November 27, 1861—2.30 a. m. (Received November 29, 1861.) General THOMAS:

Since writing to you last evening Mr. E. L. Van Winkle has just come in with dispatches from Colonel Hoskins, who says that two regiments of infantry and one of cavalry are preparing and perhaps crossing on a raft at Mill Springs, 12 miles below him, on the Cumberland.

I cannot give full credit to the crossing, but it may be true. I still think they are only preparing to steal what they can in the way of provisions and retire; but they ought to be and could be hemmed in and eut off from here with proper movement and sufficient force. It will not do for the forees here to leave the stores unprotected, for the reason that the rebel pickets have advanced to Edmonton, 20 miles from here, and threaten us with forces coming on.

Although I do not believe they have the forces behind, yet it will not be prudent to weaken this point while the question is one of doubt.

If you will throw forward two or three regiments, with one or two batteries, and give me authority, ean leave enough to protect this place and take enough to knock these scoundrels on the head and stop this eternal annoyance by the raids of these hog-stealers. They are taking mules, hogs, &e., as they go, and, unless driven out and crushed, will desolate the counties of Wayne. Clinton, and Cumberland.

Were there sufficient forces to protect the stores here and let me have what eould move from here now, I eould get in behind these marauders and eut them entirely off. They report Zollicoffer’s forces just behind, but that I think is all humbug.

Lieutenant: Nell is sick, and I have no one to work his artillery in his absence. Can’t the Ohio batteries be hurried up ?

There are ample forces from Lebanon and on this way for all the present needs if they were up this far.

Respectfully,