The liquidation., September 14, 1866

The liquidation.

A man must entertain very robust illusions not to be convinced that the monarchical experiment attempted by France in Mexico is rapidly approaching its denouement; and it may be truly said that the policy of intervention has never before exhibited so plainly the perils which it has created and the troubles which follow in its track. We went to Mexico to recover an insignificant debt; to-day Mexico owes us 250,000,000 francs, and we end where we should have begun, by taking possession of the customs.

We went to Mexico to protect the lives of our countrymen, as the names of eight Frenchmen who were assassinated were given. Now we are obliged to record—to say nothing of our soldiers killed—the murder of French residents at Saltillo, at Tampico, and on the road from Vera Cruz. We went to Mexico to support the claims of some French subjects; now these claimants complain of the enormous reductions which have been made in their demands, and of the non-payment of recognized indebtedness. Besides that, instead of a few claimants, we have before us a legion of holders of the two Mexican loans, who demand that we should reimburse them. We went to Mexico to found a stable government, and now that government, with assistance in money and men which none of its predecessors had, is unable to live without us. Deprived of its customs revenues, its only real resource, soon to be deprived of our material aid, the empire has no longer either money or men, and it has only to choose between a prompt abdication and the successive conquest of all its provinces by the dissidents, who, we have been so often told, were entirely beaten and exhausted. In such a situation, on the eve of the abdication of Maximilian, the adversaries of the Mexican expedition would be lacking in patriotism if they indulged in sterile and useless recriminations. At the same time the journals which have resting upon their conscience the aid imprudently given to an unfortunate enterprise will fail in their duty if they do not unite with us in seeking the means of finishing as soon as possible with an affair which has cheated their hopes and gone contrary to all their calculations. Liquidation—that is what is desired, and it should be firmly desired without, however, indulging in chimeras. To expect that Mexico, which was unable to pay an insignificant sum due to France before the intervention, can now pay us two hundred and fifty millions, is to follow a chimera. Let us get rid of the idea. To expect that Maximilian can reign in Mexico without his customs revenues—that is to say, without a budget—is still to follow a chimera. Let us abandon it. To expect that any government succeeding to the empire will ratify the convention of the 26th of July, and that it can live without a budget, is to pursue a chimera. Let us not talk of it. We will put but one question: How are we to guarantee the existence of our countrymen against reprisals of the Juarists, placed outside the law by official proclamation, and the partisans of whom have been summarily shot? It would certainly be very much to be regretted that the holders of the Mexican loans should lose in whole or in part their investment in the Mexican lottery; but after all, these are only the chances of play. That those who have furnished it or its equivalent should lose the two hundred and fifty millions which Mexico owes us would be very sad; but after all, these were the expenses of an expedition which was approved by the deputies whom the contributors elected. What would be terrible would be the massacre of our countrymen who did not ask for intervention, and who, our army evacuating Mexico, would be left as hostages in the hands of the exasperated Juarists. Now, the only means of saving them, if they are menaced, as the French journals in Mexico unanimously say they are, is to place them under the guarantee of a treaty concluded between France and a national government. Does the government of Maximilian, who cannot even defend himself, present sufficient guarantees? Evidently not; and, besides, it has just taken away from itself the means of existence. There is no necessity of our occupying ourselves further with it.

There remain three republican chiefs—Santa Anna, Ortega, and Juarez. Can we treat with Santa Anna, the ancient head of the conservative party?

Overthrown by the liberal party, absent from Mexico for many years, Santa Anna no longer has any reputation. If his party, who demanded intervention, had possessed the slightest influence, Maximilian would have governed with men of that stamp, and need not have been obliged to seek for his ministers among the liberal party. The presidency of Santa Anna would be then an anti-national and ephemeral presidency, which would furnish us with no real guarantees.

Can we treat with Ortega? Why? What claim has General Ortega to the confidence of the Mexicans? What guarantee of stability would his government present? It would be that of Juarez without his popularity.

There remains, then, only Juarez. Say and think what we please about Juarez, it is none the less true, that in Mexico he is popular. The proof of this is that, notwithstanding our efforts, in spite of our excellent soldiers, he has held the field for four years. After the departure of Maximilian, his will be the sole constituted power. Why, then, can we not treat with him? Attaining power upon the ruins of the conservative party, Juarez has given proof of a firmness, a perseverance, which we must deplore, as it has been very unfortunate for the designs of France, but which, from his point of view, is very honorable. In a country where probity is an uncommon virtue, (we have never heard his probity attacked,) and after having decided upon the sale of the clerical property, he was the only one who did not profit by the operation to which this sale gave opportunity. Again, at the time when, during the siege of Puebla, the population of Mexico loudly demanded, at one time the massacre, at another the expulsion, of the French residents, it was he, and he alone, who saved our countrymen from death and ruin France combated him with ardor as long as she believed in the duration of the empire. This was a duty, as it was necessary that it should defend the government which it had established. But the day when we recognize that the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico will demand too heavy sacrifices—the day when Maximilian disengages us by his abdication—what serious reason have we for not treating with the government of Juarez? That day our only duty will be to come to an understanding with the government which presents the most guarantees of continuation. Now what government offers more than that which has lasted four years, in spite of the intervention?

Let us then cast aside all secondary considerations, and if the empire is to fall, let us not hesitate to adopt the only reasonably course. This course, once adopted, we may be certain that we will obtain from Juarez all the desirable concessions; and, in any case, we will have assured the lives of our countrymen, whom Juarez alone is probably sufficiently influential to efficaciously protect.

The Patrie ought to be satisfied now with our explanations, and should not accuse them. of being obscure. Will it tell us, in its turn, what it proposes to conciliate the necessity of evacuating Mexico, and the duty of protecting our countrymen? Let it speak plainly; but, after assuming the responsibility of the Mexican loan by rash eulogies, let it beware of assuming the much more serious responsibility now of events unanimously predicted by all the Mexican journals.