The Earl of Derby to Odo William Leopold Russell, May 19, 1876

The Earl of Derby to Lord Odo Russell.

lord derby’s reply to the berlin memorandum.

My Lord: Her Majesty’s Government have had under their consideration the memrandum of which a copy was inclosed in your dispatch of the 13th instant, containing he proposals of the Governments of Austria, Germany, and Russia for the pacification of the Herzegovina and Bosnia.

These proposals had been agreed upon by Count Andrásy, Prince Bismarck, and Prince Gortchakoff, at a meeting at Berlin, and your excellency was requested to communicate them to Her Majesty’s Government, with the hope that Her Majesty’s Government would accede to them, and express their opinion at once upon the telegraphic summary furnished by your excellency.

I informed your excellency on the 15th instant that it would be necessary for me to consult my colleagues, and that I could not give any reply until after the proposals of the three governments had been considered by the cabinet.

I have now to state to your excellency that Her Majesty’s Government regret to find themselves unable to co-operate in the policy which the three governments have invited them to pursue. Her Majesty’s Government appreciate the advantage of concerted action by the powers in all that relates to the questions arising out of the insurrection, but they cannot consent to join in proposals which they do not conscientiously believe likely to effect the pacification which all the powers desire to see attained.

The proposals contained in the memorandum are directed to pressing upon the Porte the establishment of an armistice for two months, with a view to direct negotiations between the Porte and the delegates of the insurgents on the basis of the wishes which the latter have expressed, and which have been thought fit to serve as points of departure for discussion.

In the first place, it appears to Her Majesty’s Government that they would not be justified in insisting upon the Porte consenting to an armistice, without knowing whether the military situation admitted of its being established without prejudice to the Turkish Government, and without rendering necessary the exercise of greater efforts on the renewal of the campaign, and a consequent prolongation of the struggle. Moreover, the faithful observance of the armistice by both sides would have to be secured, since the Porte could not well be called upon to suspend operations against the insurgents while the insurrection was receiving support from Servia and Montenegro, and the insurgents strengthening their position, and recruiting their forces, and obtaining arms and supplies. The mere fact of the insurrection remaining unsuppressed would be likely to give it additional vitality, and the result of an armistice might, therefore, be to lead to a rejection of any demands which the Porte might fairly be expected to concede, and thus hinder rather than advance the prospects of pacification.

At the same time Her Majesty’s Government would not advise the Porte against acceding to an armistice should the Turkish Government consider that the political and military position admitted of it, and its result would be likely to be beneficial,, although, in view of the objections which I have mentioned, and others of a similar character which will readily occur to your excellency, Her Majesty’s Government do not feel justified in recommending it to the Porte, still less in insisting upon its acceptance.

In my dispatch of the 15th instant I have informed your excellency of some of the objections which I stated to Count Münster had occurred to me in regard to the five points which were proposed as a basis for negotiation between the Porte and the insurgents. A further consideration of the proposals has not led to any modification of the opinion I then expressed.

Her Majesty’s Government doubt whether the Porte has the means of providing for the reconstruction of the houses and churches of the insurgents, or of finding subsistence for the returning refugees. If Her Majesty’s Government are rightly informed, the cost would be very heavy, and the Porte has not the requisite funds at its disposal.

The distribution of relief by such a commission as is contemplated would be little better than a system of indiscriminate alms-giving. It would probably be beyond the power of the Porte to adopt, and, if adopted, would prove utterly demoralizing to any country.

Her Majesty’s Government do not mean to say that the Porte would not be wise in affording any practical facilities and inducements for the return of the population who have quitted or been driven from their homes owing to the insurrection, but they do not consider that they can urge upon the Porte to undertake engagements the observance of which would be beyond its power.

The concentration of the Turkish troops in certain places would be delivering up the whole country to anarchy, particularly when the insurgents are to retain their arms.

The consular supervision would reduce the authority of the Sultan to a nullity; and, without force to support it, supervision would be impossible.

Even if there were any prospect of the Porte being willing and able to come to an arrangement with the insurgents on the basis proposed, which Her Majesty’s Government scarcely believe possible, the intimation with which the memorandum closes would render any such negotiation almost certainly abortive, for it could not be supposed that the insurgents would accept any terms of pacification from the Porte in face of the declaration that if the insurrection continued after the armistice the powers would intervene further.

Regarded in this light, the proposal of an armistice seems to Her Majesty’s Government to be illusory.

There is another point not referred to in your excellency’s telegraphic summary, but to which it is necessary for me to advert, viz, the proposal in the third paragraph of the memorandum that the powers should agree upon the measures to be taken by their respective naval forces for the safety of foreigners and of the Christian inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire at Salonica and other places where it might be threatened.

Her Majesty’s Government have already ordered that Her Majesty’s ship Swiftsure should proceed to Salonica, and that Admiral Drummond, with three other vessels of war, should go to Besika Bay, where he will be in ready communication with Her Majesty’s embassy, and an additional vessel of small size has been placed in attendance at Constantinople at Sir H. Elliot’s request. They have heard that other powers have reinforced their squadrons in Turkish waters, and that there is a considerable naval force assembled at Salonica.

Her Majesty’s Government do not doubt that the measures thus taken will have had a good effect in affording confidence to the subjects of Great Britain and other powers at Salonica and elsewhere; and they will readily give instructions to Admiral Drummond, and the captains of Her Majesty’s ships under his orders, to give any protection and assistance which may be necessary for the preservation of the lives and property of foreign subjects, should they unhappily be in immediate danger, either in concert with the commanding officers of the ships of the other powers or, in the absence of any such ships, on their own responsibility. Her Majesty’s Government do not, however, at present apprehend any necessity for such measures, and they are of opinion that care should be taken that the naval forces of foreign powers are not employed in any manner contrary to the treaty-rights of the Porte or subversive of the Sultan’s authority.

Your excellency is authorized to read this dispatch to Prince Bismarck, and to leave a copy with his excellency, should he desire it.

I am, &c.,