T. W. Sherman to quar. XV.) CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.—UNION. 205, December 14, 1861

December 14, 1861.

Port Royal, S. 0., December 14, 1861.

General LORENZO THOMAS, Adjutant- General U. S. Army, Washington, D. O.:

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following to the consideration of the General-in-Chief and.to the War Department:

The object of this expedition was to seize upon at least two important points of our Southern coast, and hold the same for the protection of our blockading squadron when compelled to seek a harbor, as well as to ereate something of a diversion in favor of our armies in the field. After the taking of Port Royal it was intended to proceed to Fernandina and get possession of that harbor, but in consequence of cireumstances unnecessary here to particularly relate that part of the expeditiou has not yet been accomplished, and, although I have been for some time prepared for it, a still further delay arises from the fact that the gunboats of the Navy have first to be occupied in the work of disposing of the stone fleet just arrived from the North; but our operations resulting from the capture of Port Royal have become so developed as to lead to the occupation of Saint Helena Sound, the Tybee, and, in short, to the full possession of the eoast from South Edisto to Tybee, and to which may be added Warsaw and Ossabaw Sounds, which, if not yet occupied by us, have been deserted by the enemy.

In the mean time there is a formidable strategic line formed and forming in our front, its right resting on Green Island, in Vernon River, passing by Thunderbolt, or Augustine Creek, at both of which places there are earthworks mounted with heavy guns, through Fort Jackson, Savannah, and thence along the line of the Savannah and Charleston Railroad indefinitely towards Charleston, this line having its principal bodies of troops between Vernon River and Savannah, at Savannah, Hardeeville, Grahamville, Coosawhatchie, Pocotaligo, Saltketcher, &c., and its most advanced posts at Pulaski, New River Bridge, Bluffton, Port Royal Ferry, &c. The object of this line appears to be to resist an invasion of the main-] and, and not to attack the occupied coast, which, from all that can be learned, the enemy have concluded they cannot maintain, and given up all idea of doing so. It may be hence inferred that the main object of the expedition has been already accomplished, and that the point of Fernandina is now of so secondary a character as to render it not only almost insignificant, but the operation of taking it actually prejudicial to the great work which the development of circumstances appears to have set before us.

I am aware of the good effect that the capture of this place would

have on the publie mind, but the military is the only point of view that should be taken of it. It is no point from which to operate, and will probably fall of itself the moment Savannah is occupied by our forces, and therefore the resources of the Navy and Army here should be husbanded for a more important operation, viz, the attack of the enemy’s line the moment preparations ean be made.

The precise point of the hostile line to be struck and mode of attack cannot now be specifically set out without first knowing the means to be placed in our hands, and must therefore be left to time and cireumstances; but in my judgment, with the necessary means, Savannah should be the point, and to be accomplished somewhat in this way: Pulaski to be vigorously shelled, as already recommended in a former communication; at the same time the gunboats of the naval squadron to shell out the garrisons of the forts on Vernon and Augustine Rivers, to be closely followed up by the landing of the land forces in the vicinity of Montgomery and Beaulieu, thus taking Augustine River, Fort Jackson, and Savannah in reverse; this operation to be connected at the same time with one from this point on Bluffton, New River Bridge, and Hardeeville, to get effectual possession of the railroad crossing the Savannah River, and prevent re-enforcements arriving at Savannah from the center and left of their line. A small head of column shown at Port Royal Ferry would have its effect in aiding this demonstration. I am firmly convinced that an operation of this sort would not only give us Savannah, but, if successful and strong enough to follow up the success, would shake the so-called Southern Confederacy to its very foundation.

Not knowing precisely what forces the enemy may have available, it is difficult to estimate for the men and means necessary to the success of this operation. But I must modify the terms of my letter of the 27th November, which did not look to this precise operation, and recommend that the one “ regiment of cavalry, one regiment of regular artillery, ten regiments of infantry, and one pontoon bridge” be extended to “ one regiment of cavalry, one regiment of regular artillery, and twenty regiments of infantry, and as many pontoon bridges as can be sent here.” An addition to our armament will also be required to enable us to carry on a siege, if necessary, for which the ordnance officer will make requisition. I do not say but the thing can be done with less troops, but it would be better to have too many than too few, particularly as any success should be followed up rapidly and with sufiicient force. I must, at the risk of being considered importunate, again repeat the necessity of having some more experienced staff officers, particularly a quartermaster of rank and great experience, artillery officers, and, if they cannot be had, ordnanee officers.

All our work, which is immense, is done by volunteer soldiers, and it all drags for the want of a sufficient number of able directors. The negro labor expected to be obtained here is so far almost a failure. They are disinclined to labor, and will evidently not work to our satisfaction without those aids to which they have ever been accustomed, viz, the driver and the lash. A sudden change of condition from servitude to apparent freedom is more than their intellects can stand, and this cireumstance alone renders it a very serious question what is to be done with the negroes who will hereafter be found on conquered soil.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Bvigadier- General, Commanding.
quar. XV.) CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.—UNION. 205