T. W. Sherman to James C. B. Beresford, January 20, 1862

Port Royal, S. C., January 20, 1862.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL U. S. ARMY, Washington, D. C.:

GENERAL: Reconnaissances of Savannah River had led me to the belief that Savannah might be taken by a combined operation of the Army and Navy by operating in the river itself, which would save the slow and expensive process of bombarding Pulaski by cutting it from Savannah, and also the slow process of besieging Savannah from the south, as recommended in my letter of the 14th December. Could Savannah have thus been taken at once, any future obstructions and defenses in the vicinity of Savannah by the river would have been prevented.

A combined reconnaissance, however, made by Commodore Rodgers, of the Navy, and Lieutenant Wilson, of the Topographical Engineers, subsequently, has led to a report from the former officer that the navigation of some portions of the Savannah River is too hazardous to attempt the running of gunboats and transports up the river without further examination.

It has therefore been agreed upon by Commodore DuPont and myself to at once commence this examination in force. This movement is particularly calculated to the cutting off of Fort F alaski, and will do it, I believe, effectually.

In the mean while any operations by land on the north of Savannah River will be out of the question, because of the want of boats, wagons, and light artillery, none of which expected have yet arrived.

In case we find it practicable to effect a landing at or near Savannah by this route, I think it would be judicious and even necessary to send the force heretofore asked for as promptly as possible. As the process is à slow one, the enemy will have an opportunity to accumulate immense forces at that point, and we should be strong enough to make the thing sure.

The Atlantic I am keeping waiting, and must therefore close in haste.

Very respectfully,

Brigadier- General, Oommanding