T. MEeLvin to George Crook, August 3, 1864

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of yesterday, inclosing a dispatch from Brigadier-General Kelley. This is the first communication I have received from your headquarters since the 28th July, I sent to you last night a report. of my operations since that date. When I left Chambersburg I requested General Couch to notify General Kelley of the threatened movement of the enemy upon Cumberland and at McConnellsburg. On the morning of the 31st I notified General Kelley that I was driving the enemy in the direction of Hancock, and I had reason to hope when I attacked him at Hancock that between General Kelley’s forces and my own he would be captured. Nothing but an iron-clad car and a company of National Guards Bppeateds which were driven away by the enemy’s artillery. My artillery controlling the ford

revented his crossing, but with my small and worn-out command feels not prevent his escape by the Cumberland pike, upon which he kept up his flight during the night, felling trees and burning bridges in his rear, rendering pursuit with any chance of success impossible. I sent a messenger to Great Cacapon with a telegram to General Kelley, informing him of the course taken by the enemy, and requesting that a train of cars be sent to take up my command dismounted to Green Spring Run or Cumberland to assist in case of need, to which I received the reply that my command was not needed.

I remained at this point for the following reasons:

impracticability of the Old Town road.

Second. The inability of my command to move, owing to the worn-out condition of my horses, and their wantof shoes. The enemy was mounted upon good horses with which he had recently supplied himself. During the entire pursuit to this place, not a horse of the enemy had been abandoned, except when his rider had been killed or wounded, while 300 of mine had been left ten miles behind

from utter exhaustion. “When the head of my column attacked the enemy at this place, the enemy numbered about 3,000; I had but 1,000, and although I drove him, killing and wounding 15, I could not capture him without the assistance I had expected. I am not

ermitted to take horses, and I have’not received a fresh supply.

he enemy, clearing the country in his front, left nothing for me in his rear. Had the road been open, I could have gone no farther without rendering the pursuit ruinous to my command and fruitless.

Third.Until it was known to me what course the enemy had taken after encountering General Kelley’s forces this was the best point for me to occupy. If he defeated General Kelley, and continued, westward by taking the Bedford turnpike and impressing horses, I could again Be ae upon his right flank. If he turned southward, either from defeat or success, he would probably move in the direction of Winchester, when I would have achance of intercepting him after resting here. }

Fourth. In my attack at McConnellsburg, a portion of the enemy —from 200 to 500—were cut off and scattered, and are now endeaving to reach the river. The available force of one of my brigades has been and is engaged in trying to intercept them.

I have detailed the most prominent rebel sympathizers in this country, and sent them under guard to cut out the blockade and rebuild the bridges on the Cumberland pike. Telegraphic communication with General Kelley has beeninterrupted. Since yesterday at 11 a, m. I have sent couriers, patrols; a hand car, and a locomotive to obtain information of the operations near Cumberland, and the direction taken by the enemy, if he has escaped. The latest intelligence I have received is that he is coming down the river.

I have the honor to request that you will lay the above report, with the inclosed dispatches, before the major-general commanding the department, and that they be sent to the War Department, toether with my report of enteneey I cannot believe that they are ully informed of the condition of my command at Washington, if they expect me to overtake and capture a force double my own and better mounted. If such is their expectation, it is impossible that they can know that this command has marched 1,400 miles since the 1st of May, without a remount, and without a halt sufficiently long to set the shoes on my horses.

Respectfully, Brigadier-General.