Second California Vol. Infty to Robert C. Drum, February 4, 1862

Maj. R. C. DRUM, U.S. Army, . Assistant Adjutant-General, Department of the Pacific:

MAJOR: Since my former letter the routes have become still more impracticable. It has been raining almost without intermission, stopping for three or four days only to cover the mountains and fill up the ravines with snow, in some places to a very great depth. We are here literally on jail limits, some two or three miles in extent, almost as completely cut off from the world—nay, from the rest of my district— as if we were on some desert island. Of course I have had but little news from the interior. I have heard of an instance of Indian depredations upon stock, and of the supposed murder by Indians of two or three white men on Eel River. Since my arrival I have had no news from Fort Bragg, the small garrison at Fort Seward, nor from Fort Ter-Waw, to which I wrote up for a report, by the way of Crescent City, when the steamer was here before. The only news I have had from Fort Gaston is a letter from Captain Johns, of the 5th of January, received by me on the 14th, asking rather urgently for arms and provisions, and speaking of expected Indian difficulties. On the 15th I sent him a supply of both, including subsistence for his command of forty-six men for sixty days, with an escort of eight men. The supplies were packed on mules at Arcata (the terminus on the bay of the trail to Gaston), where they had been stored for some time under a contract with an experienced and energetic train conductor. For the particulars of the contract with him I refer you to Acting Quartermaster Swasey’s report to Colonel Babbitt by this mail. The conductor expected to make the trip to Gaston, which is only about forty miles from Arcata, in about four days. Instead of that when last heard from, two or three days since, they had not been able to get farther than the Redwoods, some ten or twelve miles from Areata. In the direction of Fort Seward the route must be still worse. Five or six weeks ago, when the cavalry came down from there, their only means of crossing some of the streams was by felling some lofty tree near the bank long enough to reach across, on which the men and the entire baggage were passed over, while the animals were made to swim. As it has rained almost incessantly since then, it would seem to be impossible at present to send any supplies to that point from here, even if a mounted messenger could get through. Two or three days since some citizens of Hydesville arrived here on foot, the trail being in such a condition that they would not venture to take the journey on horseback. Hydesville is on the route to Fort Seward, about twenty-two miles from here, and the trail to it has been hitherto much more constantly traveled than any other in the county. From information obtained from different sources I am decidedly of opinion that Fort Seward should be abandoned. It is situated about eighty miles from here, near the boundary of Mendocino County, on the farther side of Eel River. To reach there it is necessary to cross several streams, which in the winter season become roaring mountain torrents; but the most important objection to its location is that it is entirely too far from the settlements to afford much protection to them. All accounts agree that a post on Van Dusen’s Fork or Yager Creek (tributaries of the Eel River), some twenty-five miles nearer here, would accomplish the object much more eftectually, there being in these neighborhoods many more settlers and many more Indians.

Since the 20th of December Fort Seward has been garrisoned only by twenty men, partly of the Third California Volunteer Infantry and partly of the Second California Volunteer Cavalry, under Lieutenant Davis, of the Second Cavalry. From estimates made by my direction by Acting Quartermaster Swasey, based upon reports made to me of public property left there, it appears that on the 20th of this month they will be entirely out of all subsistence stores except about 1,000 pounds of flour, and that forty-four mules could transport hither all the Government property at the post. This number of mules belonging to the Government Mr. Swasey thinks he might have ready for the trip by the 20th instant. It may, however, be some weeks later before the route is fit to be traveled. With their 1,000 pounds of flour there is no danger of the garrison starving in the meantime, especially as seven oxen were left behind, and beef no doubt can easily be obtained in the neighborhood. It is very doubtful whether any one could be hired at present to take supplies there at any price—certainly, Mr. Swasey tells me, not for less than 123 cents per pound. In regard to breaking up the post at Fort Seward, I shall take no steps till after this steamer’s return from San Francisco. But unless otherwise instructed from your headquarters as soon after that as the route becomes practicable and there are public mules nough here in good condition I shall have the garrison and the public property brought down to this post. I understand that no buildings except two log huts, not completed, have been erected there, the troops having refused to build anything but a bake oven. If another post is to be established to replace it in some other locality Í think it better to wait until I shall be enabled by more full information than I can now obtain and by an actual reconnaissance of the country to select the site judiciously. The cavalry horses are recruiting very slowly, having as yet no shelter. By the 1st of March a dozen, perhaps, might be fit for the field.

The general court-martial for the trial of the Fort Seward mutineers convened on the day appointed. Having ascertained that Lieutenant Davis and three men, now at Fort Seward, are material witnesses for the prosecution, without whose testimony the charges could not be proved, the court adjourned over to next Saturday, and will, I presume, continue to adjourn over from week to week until those witnesses can arrive. On the 30th of January it was officially reported to me by Captains Douglas and Heffernan, commanding Companies F and K, Second California Volunteer Infantry, that some eighty of their men were in urgent need of shoes, some of them being unable, from the want of them, to attend drills or do duty of any kind, and nearly one-third of Company F being on the sick report for the same cause, Acting Quartermaster Swasey having no shoes on hand of the numbers required, and having reported that they could be had in Eureka at $1.65 per pair, I directed him to make the purchase, which was done, and the shoes were at once issued to the two companies. By the aid of an old map and the information I have obtained respecting the topography of the country and the Indian tribes, I am enabled to fill out somewhat in detail the general plan of campaign suggested in my first letter. The general configuration and important features of the district will be found roughly indicated in the inelosed sketch.* To complete the general idea intended to be given by it, it is necessary to conceive of the western spurs of the Coast Range as sloping gradually down for some twenty miles till they meet a serried column of mountain ridges running diagonally across the country. The general direction of these ridges (omitted in the plan for the sake of distinctness) is shown by the streams that drain the narrow valleys between them to be northwest and southeast, except in Mendocino County, where they run nearly north and south. These ridges cover the central portion of the district, an average width of, perhaps, twentyfive miles. The belt of land between these ridges and the coast, of an average width of about twenty miles, is mostly covered with a dense forest of redwood or fir. In the fine season the Indians are mostly roaming over the whole country from the Coast Range to the sea, at least to the belt of forest skirting the coast; but in the winter season, from the time the snow begins to be deep on the mountains, they shelter themselves in the narrow valleys between the ridges, along the banks of the streams, where their rancherias will be found stationary until the snows have melted away, when they scatter again till the following winter. In the winter season, therefore, to find them it is only necessary to follow up the streams from their mouths to their sources, as so many lines of operations. From all this it is obvious that if the routes should become practicable for troops and their baggage and remain so for a few weeks, the snows still resting on the mountains, the proper plan of campaign would be to send up a force of a few hundred men from the Lower Russian River as a base, through the valley of that river to its sources, thence down the various tributaries of Eel River to their respective mouths, dividing for that purpose into as many detachments as may be necessary; this force to be met by another one, which, starting from Klamath River as a base (I have heard no complaints of the Indians in Del Monte), should push detachments up the Klamath, Trinity, Redwood, and Mad Rivers and their various tributaries, as also Hel River and its northern branches. This latter force should be more numerous than the former, having to furnish more detachments. A company or two of cavalry with each of these corps would be very serviceable to head off straggling parties, pursue fugitives, for the more prompt securing of passes, and other duties which properly belong to mounted men. In addition to these two corps, two or three companies on the eastern side of the Coast Range would probably furnish detachments enough to guard the few practicable passes that may exist through those moun. tains while they are covered with snow. The general character of the Indians to the south of the Klamath, so the old residents tell me, is treacherous and vindictive, but not warlike. Fighting only in ambush, they are perhaps more dangerous than the bold mounted warriors of Oregon. Comparatively few of them as yet are provided with fire-arms, but they are constantly receiving both arms and ammunition through the squaw men and other low vagabond whites. The Klamath Indians, however, whose chief habitat is on both banks of the Klamath River, are said to be far superior in intelligence and in bravery to the tribes south of them. They are decidedly warlike and fight in the open field man to man. Their headquarters would seem to be in Hoopa Valley, which is a few miles only in extent and close to Fort Gaston. The number of warriors this valley can turn out is variously estimated from 300 to 500, Their principal mau-we-ma, or chief, is an intelligent man, and having been taken down to San Francisco some years since to learn the power and number of the whites, is said to be disposed to keep

his tribe, so far as he can, from committing any depredations or hostilities. The few old residents here I have conversed with agree in the opinion that neither these Indians nor any of the others can be brought in willingly to go upon the reservations. Nothing short of actual force will do this, unless it be an impressive exhibition of it. The Indians have been so often told that the whites were coming in great force “to wipe them all out,” without ever seeing any other fulfillment of this threat than an occasional raid by a party of armed citizens, effecting nothing but the slaughter of a few among them, mostly women and children, that they have become stubbornly incredulous on the subject. It is highly desirable to avoid the bloodshed that would be caused by a resistance on the part of the Indians. There is no more likely way of doing this than by making such a display of force as to show resistance to be useless. On the other hand the chances of success in the entire campaign would be much increased by striking a vigorous and effective blow at the outset. The wisest course, therefore, I conceive would be as follows: Suddenly concentrate at Fort Gaston a force of, say, 600 men, regulars and volunteers, but all having the prestige of regulars in uniform, drill, and discipline, the force to include a company of cavalry mounted and the mountain howitzer now at this post, with a detachment to work it. Immediately have a field day to which invite the mau-we-ma at Hoopa Valley and as many of his tribe as would come. lixercise the troops before them in some showy and striking maneuvers, battalion and skirmishing, including a few fires with blank cartridges, and the discharge of a few shells by the howitzer. After this display of what to them must appear an irresistible force, the whole tribe, at least all the Indians in the valley, would probably yield to the evident necessity and come in, on being told that if they did not the entire force would be used to bring them in. Butif they should show a disposition to resist or to hesitate they would find the outlets of the valley already secured by detachments of cavalry, and whether they resisted or not, the result with such a force as I have named would be equally certain. The moral effect of thus at one blow reducing to submission the most warlike of the tribes would contribute powerfully to our success with the inferior races to the south of them, and when combined with the pressure of the column from the south, making them realize that they were hemmed in on all sides by a superior force, would probably induce them to submit without resistance. But whether they resisted or not, the final result would be the same—they would be all brought in. As to the troops to be sent here in the event of a campaign, I shall not presume, of course, to offer any suggestion, though I should naturally prefer the six companies of the Ninth Infantry at the Presidio, and my own company (G), at Alcatraz, if it could be spared, with one mounted company of the Second Cavalry. If Captain Moore’s company at Fort Bragg should be left to co-operate with the southern ‘corps, these re-enforcements, together with the six companies already in this part of the district, would amount in all to fonrteen companies, and making all deductions for garrisons, &c:, at least 600 men in the field. The next question is as to the disposition to be madeofthe Indians when brought in. On one point all opinions here are unanimous. If taken to any reservation in this part of the State, all the more turbulent and dangerous among them will soon find their way back to their usual haunts. This I am told has always been the case, whether taken to the Klamath, the Nome Cult, or the Mendocino Reservations (I have marked on the plan the place as near as I can ascertain it of each of these reservations with a small dotted circle). A resident near the

Hoopa Valley for the last ten years, recommended to me as reliable and intelligent, states that all the male Indians of some bundreds that were inveigled in some years since by General Kibbe and sent to the Mendocino Reservation were back again on their old ground within two months, to his personal knowledge. From the Tejon Reservation they never could find their way back. I therefore earnestly recommend to the department commander that this should be their destination. Subsistence would, of course, have to be provided for the Indians as fast as brought in. The Hoopa Indians could be sent down the Klamath in canoes to Fort Ter-Waw, where they could be guarded and subsisted until shipped on board a steamer or other vessel at Crescent City. Fort Humboldt would probably be the most convenient depot of subsistence and place of shipment for all the Indians to the south of the Klamath. But in respect to all these matters, once at Fort Gaston I could readily communicate with your headquarters by the way of Weaverville, only about forty-five miles from Fort Gaston, to which place there is a regular mail from San Francisco as well as a telegraph. If, unfortunately, of which there is now every appearance, it will be impossible to take the field until the snows are melted and the Indians scattered again, the plan of campaign could still, I think, be successfully carried out. The only difference would be that it would require more time and more troops, but would not this be better than waiting till next winter?

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,