Roger Sherman to John Adams, July 27, 1789
New York July [27] 1789 1
Sir—
I received your letter of the 20th Inst. I had in mine of the Same
date communicated to you my Ideas on that part of the constitution, limiting the
Presidents power of negativing the acts of the legislature.— And just hinted some
thoughts on the propriety, of the provision made for the appointment to offices, which I
esteem to be a power nearly as important as legislation.
If that was vested in the President alone, he might were it not for
his periodical election by the people—render himself despotic.— It was a Saying of one
of the Kings of England. That while the King could appoint the Bishops and judges he
might have what Religion and Law he pleased.
It appears to me the Senate is the most important branch in the
government, for aiding & Supporting the Executive, Securing the rights of the
individual States, the government of the united States, and the liberties of the people,
The Executive Magistrate is to execute the laws, the Senate being a branch of the
legislature will naturally incline to have them duly executed, and
therefore will advise to Such appointments as will best attain that end.— from the
knowledge of the people in the Several States, they can give the best information who
are qualified for offices, and though they will as you justly observe in Some degree
lessen his responsibility, yet their advice may enable him to make Such judicious
appointments as to render responsibility less necessary—
The Senators being elegible by the legislatures of the Several
States, and dependent on them for reelection will be vigilant in supporting their rights
against infringement by the legislature or executive of the united States.— And the
government of the union being federal, and Instituted by the several States for the
advancement of their Interests, they may be considered as So many pillars to Support it.
and by the exercise of the State governments, peace and good order may be preserved in
places most remote from the Seat of the Federal government, as well as at the centre.
And the Municipal and federal rights of the people at large will be regarded by the
Senate, they being elected by the immediate representatives of the people, & their
rights will be best Secured by a due execution of the laws.— what temptation can the
Senate be under to partiality in the trial, of officers whom they had a voice in the
appointment of, can they be disposed to favour a person who has violated his trust &
their confidence? The other evils that you mention that may result from this power
appear to me, but barely possible. The Senators will doubtless be in general Some of the
most respectable citizens in the States for wisdom & probity, superiour to mean and
unworthy conduct—and instead of undue influence to procure appointments for themselves
or their friends, they will consider that a fair and upright conduct will have the best
tendency to preserve the confidence of the people & of the States. They will be
disposed to be diffident in recommending their friends & kindred, lest they Should
be Suspected of partiality, and the other Members will feel the same kind of reluctance
lest they Should be thought unduly to favour a person because related to a member of
their body.— So that their friends and relations would not Stand so good a chance for
appointment to offices according to their merit as others.
The Senate is a convenient body to
advise the President from the Smalness of its numbers. And I think the laws would be
better framed & more duly administred if the Executive and judiciary officers were
in general members of the legislature, in case there Should be no interference as to the
time of attending to their Several duties— this
I have learned by experience in the government in which I live, & by observation of
others differently constituted.
I See no principles in our constitution that have any tendency to
Aristocracy, which if I understand the term, is, a government by Nobles independent of
the people, which cant take place in either respect without a total Subversion of the
Constitution. and as both branches of Congress are elegible from the Citizens at large
& wealth is not a requisite qualification, both will commonly be composed of members
of Similar Circumstances in Life. And I See no reason why the Several brancheses of the
government Should not maintain the most perfect harmony, their powers being all directed
to one end the advancement of the public good.
If the President alone was vested with the power of appointing all
officers, and was left to Select a council for himself he would be liable to be deceived
by flatterers and pretenders to Patriotism, who would have no motive but their own
emolument, they would wish to extend the powers of the Executive to encrease their own
importance, and however upright he might be in his intentions, there would be great
danger of his being misled, even to the Subversion of the constitution, or at least to
introduce such evils as to interrup the harmony of the government & deprive him of
the confidence of the people. but I have Said enough upon these Speculative points,
which nothing but experience can reduce to a certainty.
I have the honor to be / with great Esteem & Respect / Your
obedient / humble Servant