R. S. Ripley to Thomas A. Washington, December 5, 1861
Charleston, December 5, 1861.
Capt. T. A. WASHINGTON, Coosawhatchie :
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a letter from the commanding general of the 4th, and one from yourself of the same date. I telegraphed to General Gist to ask him what battery was intended by him, and received the answer as follows:
De Saussure said the Marion Light Artillery and the Germans would be ready by today. Call upon the commanding officer Fourth Brigade South Carolina Militia.
From information here neither the Marion nor the German sections will be ready for two or three days, nor do I believe they will be ready for a week. The Washington Artillery commenced its preparation some time ago by my direction, and was called out. Meantime, while absent, it was intended to attach it to the Stevens Legion, and the governor had an idea of also attaching Boyce’s company of so-called light artillery. The Washington Artillery, however, have not mustered into Confederate service, and I doubt whether they will, and they stand now as a company of State troops temporarily in Confederate service, with State guns (six pieces, three caissons, battery wagon, and forge), and horsed partly by State and partly by Confederate horses. Their preference is to a regiment of militia artillery of South Carolina; but I should have no hesitation in making them perform any duty they are capable of.
With regard to the intention, if more troops can be got, to hold in advance and reoccupy Edisto, it seems to me as far forward as we can go with safety from Charleston the better we are for its defense. Now, occupying positions to defend the rivers Ashepoo, Paw Paw, and Combahee involves taking position on the main only. The rivers will be obstructed above the batteries. Paw Paw will be defended by two 24pounders recovered by Lieutenant-Colonel Black, and two light 4-pounders. The other rivers I had intended to defend with two 12s each, and to let a section of light artillery be with each battery, and to have such a supporting force of infantry and cavalry to support them as it may be possible to give or the necessity demands, the defense to be made either permanent or temporary, as circumstances might dictate, and to have for its object the protection of that section of country from which most of our subsistence must be drawn. As it stands now, the enemy can run up to the railroad at any moment and cut our communication at once in his barges, ravage the plantations on either side, and return. The obstructions will detain his vessels, it is true, but, unguarded, will be removed speedily, and his barges can come at any time. There is not even the show of a force to render him cautious, and it has been reported to me by Lieutenant-Colonel Black that the enemy’s officers have made several pertinent inquiries from negroes with whom they have had intercourse with regard to our armament on the rivers. Each of the positions being on the main, retreat to the rallroad is easy, over a low, flat country, impracticable in many places except by the roads, and these tolerably secure so long as the defenders have a force of light artillery. The infantry force, unless a large quantity [is] at our disposal, need be no larger than to support the artillery against a sudden attack and give confidence to the population. Moreover, with a small force in position, the enemy, it appears to me, will be obliged to take time if he wishes to cut our communication and land in strength.
With regard to Edisto, with the three rivers held as proposed, our inland navigation south of Jehossee being gone, we can block Dawho on both sides of the Edisto Ferry, or one to be established at Pineberry or vicinity. The obstructions there can be defended by riflemen, assisted by light guns from Willstown Bluff, the place of obstruction on Paw Paw. If it be possible to place another battery on Edisto or Seabrook’s Island, if an enemy passes he cannot cut off the troops on Edisto, who can gain the main before he can remove the obstructions. Not many are wanted there, if they can, under a proper officer, be made moveable and vigilant to protect property and to retire.
The troops on John’s Island, should the enemy attempt to run by and force Church Flats battery, can fall back through Wadmalaw to a church, which is a fine position for a battle on a small scale, and where the main fight should be on John’s Island. If Church Flats are forced, they can cross the Stono by Legareville, between Stono and Battery Island; or, should the enemy land on the main south of Church Flats, the communication is direct to the lines on James Island or the city. As a defense for Charleston it seems to me that the farther out our posts are, so long as our force is not too small here, the longer the enemy will take to make his attack.
I have written at length, as I shall not probably have an opportunity of seeing the commanding general on the subject soon. But we want two or four more regiments to fulfill these objects, and I regret to state that under present arrangements they are coming slowly.
My commission as brigadier-general dates August 15.
very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Brigadier- General, Commanding.