Myles W. Keogh to Henry W. Halleck, October 24, 1863

Major-General HALLECK: Taking all our information together, I think it probable that Ewell’s corps has started for East Tennessee by way of Abingdon, marching last Monday, say, from Meade’s front directly to the railroad at Charlottesville. : ; First, the object of Lee’s recent movement against Meade; his destruction of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and subsequent withdrawal, without more motive, not otherwise apparent, would be explained by this hypothesis. econdly, the direct statement of Sharpe’s man that Ewell has gone to Tennessee. Thirdly, the Irishman’s statement that he has not gone through Richmond, and his further statement of an appeal made to the people at Richmond to go and protect their salt, which could only refer to the works near Abingdon. Fourthly, Graham’s statement from Martinsburg that Imboden is in retreat for Harrisonburg. This last matches with the idea that Lee has retained his cavalry, sending Imboden and perhaps other scraps to join Ewell. Upon this probability what is to be done? If you have a plan matured, I have nothing to say. If you have not, then I suggest that with all possible expedition, the Army of the Potomac get ready to attack te and that in the meantime a raid shall, at all hazards, break the railroad at or near Lynchburg. Yours, truly, A. LINCOLN OcTOBER 24, 1863—2 p. m. (Received 3.45 p. m.)} Major-General HALLECK: Your telegram of 11a. m. is received. The information given in Colonel Sharpe’s dispatch is disproved by two deserters just in, who repent Ewell’s corps in my immediate front on the Rappahannock, with one division (Anderson’s) on this side at the railroad crossing. My cavalry this morning drove in the enemy’s cavalry pickets to the railroad crossing, where they fell back on infantry supports that advanced and compelled our cavalry to retire. From all the information I can get, Lee’s army is now between the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, principally at Stevensburg, Brandy, and Jefferson. It. would seem as if he intended to dispute the passage of the Rappahannock, and some indications that would lead to the belief of an intention to advance, two pontoon bridges being reported at the railroad crossing, which would not be required if the defensive was only to be assumed. Before receiving your dispatch, I had intended to repair the railroad as far as Warrenton 5 unction, to establish my base at Warrenton and Warrenton Junction, and then to advance against Lee, Colonel McCallum reporting he could have the road repaired to Warrenton Junction by the 30th instant. I informed you when in Washington that my cavalry was much reduced by the recent active operations, and particularly by the appearance within the last few days of the hoof disease, which is now spreading rapidly. I have ae for reports as to the present numbers and condition of the cavalry. The proposed raid, in my judgment, will be more likely to succeed with small than large numbers. Twenty-five hundred men, I should think, would be sufficient. The withdrawal of Imboden from the lower valley is not, I apprehend, to send him south, but to hold the passes in the upper valley and resist such expeditions as we now propose, or perhaps to operate: on my rear, should I advance. It has been raining very hard since last evening. This will render all roads, excepting the pike to Gainesville, impassable, and will swell all the small streams and branches. I shall make every preparation with the utmost expedition to advance, and in the meantime select. a cavalry command, and arrange the details for the raid ordered. GEO. G. MEADE, Major-General, Commanding. Washington, i October 24, 1863—6.45 p. m. Major-General MEADE: Yours of 2p. m. is just received. I shall not be able to see thé Presidgnt before to-morrow to learn his views on your report of the present aspect of affairs. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. OCTOBER 24, 1863. Report from the cavalry advance toward Bealeton Station : Colonel Devin’s brigade, of the First Division, encamped last night. at Liberty, pushing one regiment as far as Bealeton Station. Thi morning Colonel Devin sent two regiments to drive the enemy’ pickets toward or across the river at Rappahannock Station, in orde to establish his line at that point. Colonel Devin’s men succeeded in driving the enemy from the woods a mile on this side of the river, and close on to the works over the burned bridge, where the enemy had their infantry in line, and from whence they immediately pushed forward about 3,000 men with a force of cavalry, the infantry moving on the north and the cavalry on the south side. Colonel Devin fell back, being closely followed by the enemy’s infantry, as far as Liberty, when the enemy halted, and in ashort time fell back, followed by our forces, toward Bealeton. Colonel Devin did not engage the enemy, merely observing his movements, losing only 1 man killed and a few wounded. Colonel Devin expects to have his brigade advanced by sunset, close to Bealeton, as the last reports from his advance guard say: The enemy seem to be retiring to their previous position in the works at Rappahannock Bridge. Colonel Gregg reports to have learned from a prisoner, or deserter, that Ewell’s corps occupy the works at the bridge, two divisions being on this side. Both of our cavalry brigade commanders agree ne that there is at least one division of rebel infantry on this side. A locomotive was heard to approach the bridge last night from Culpeper. Respectfully forwarded. Ss Ss r

MYLES W. KEOGH,