Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams, March 6, 1862

Mr. Seward to Mr.
Adams.

Sir: Your despatch of February 13, No. 114, has
been received.

I regret that it has been impossible to supply you with statistics, which
our uncharitable friends in England so strenuously insist upon, to show
how effective or how inefficient the blockade is. We, of course, have no
record of the cases in which the blockade has been run. Such information
must be in possession of those who performed the achievement, while we
were ignorant of the transactions in which they were engaged. I have,
however, sent you such a list as could be procured at Havana. It shows
that generally the vessels which have violated the blockade were
British. The British revenue officers, therefore, can furnish the
information wanted by members of the British Parliament, or at least
much of it. It would prove nothing to show how many vessels we have
captured in the attempt, or the value of such vessels and their cargoes,
for it is the failure to seize vessels, not success in seizing them,
that constitutes the gist of the issue.

I cannot but think that the true test of the commercial blockade lies in
the results. The price of cotton in New York is four times greater than
in New Orleans. That fact is certainly demonstrative. So is the fact
that salt is ten times higher in New Orleans than in New York. So is the
fact that gold is even more scarce in Charleston than cotton is in
Liverpool. Moreover, the pleaders for our destruction in Parliament
ought to be held to choose between contradictory pleas, and cease to
complain of the ruin brought into England by the failure of supplies
from the blockaded districts, or else they ought to admit the efficiency
of the blockade.

I trust, however, that these contradictory complaints about the blockade
will have passed away before this despatch shall reach its
destination.

Affairs have just fallen into a new condition, suggestive of very
different questions from those which were troubling you when the paper
which I am answering was written. It can now be seen, by those who will
consent to see it, that disunion originated in a local popular
excitement or passion, and not in any radical and enduring interest
adequate to sustain a revolution. It is now apparent that we are at the
beginning of the end of the attempted revolution. That end may be indeed
delayed by accidents or errors at home, as it may be by aid or sympathy
on the part of foreign nations. But it can hardly be deemed uncertain.
The strength of the Union is seen in a vast army in excellent condition,
and a vigorous and well-appointed navy, while the national finances are
perfectly sound and reliable. On the other side are seen a demoralized
and decaying navy consisting of two worthless pirate steamers, in all
carrying half a dozen guns. The credit of the insurgents is depreciated
sixty per cent below par, and daily sinking lower. Cities, districts,
and States are coming back under the federal authority, while it has not
really lost a square mile of territory which it held when the conflict
began. The permanent interests and political sentiments of Union are
lasting and reliable elements of strength in the federal cause. The
fires of faction, which gave to disunion all its force, are already
burning out. Of all foreign nations Great Britain has the deepest
interest in a speedy termination of. the conflict and in a complete
restoration of our national commerce, as no other nation has so great an
interest in the relations of permanent friendship with the United
States. If Great Britain should revoke her decree conceding belligerent
rights to the insurgents to-day, this civil strife, which is the cause
of all the derangement of those relations, and the only cause of all
apprehended dangers of that kind, would end to-morrow. The United States
have continually insisted that the disturbers of their peace are mere
insurgents, not lawful belligerents. This government neither can nor is
it likely to have occasion to change this position, but her Majesty can,
and it would seem that she must, sooner or later, desire to relinquish
her position. It was a position taken in haste, and in anticipation of
the probable success of the revolution. The failure of that revolution
is sufficiently apparent. Why should not the position be relinquished,
and the peace of our country thus be allowed to be restored ?

Do you think Earl Russell, astute and well-informed as he is, could name
one single benefit that Great Britain derives from maintaining a
position which, although unintentionally, is so unfriendly and so
injurious to us, or that he could designate one evil that would probably
result to the country of whose foreign interests he is the guardian from
the resumption of her long-established relations towards the United
States? Is it not worth your pains to suggest to him the inquiry whether
it would not be wiser and better to remove the necessity for our
blockade than to keep the two nations, and even the whole world, in
debate about the rightfulness or the expediency of attempting to break
it, with all the consequences of so hostile a measure ?

I am, sir, your obedient servant,