Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams, December 20, 1863

Mr. Seward to Mr.
Adams.

Sir: I send herewith a copy, which has
accidentally attracted my notice, of what purports to be an extract from
an annual report of S. R. Mallory, who is pretending to act as Secretary
of the Navy for the insurgents at Richmond. So soon as I can lay my hand
upon a full copy of that paper I shall transmit it. In the mean time, it
is proper to say that I have not the least doubt that the extract now
sent is authentic.

It boldly avows the authority and activity of the insurgents at Richmond
in the building of the rams in Great Britain and France on their
account, and for their use in making war from British and French ports
against the United States.

Secondly. It avows with equal boldness and directness the sending of
twenty-seven so-called commissioned officers, and forty reliable petty
officers from Richmond to the British North American provinces, to
organize an expedition from thence to co-operate with the so-called army
officers, in making war against the United States on our northern border
lakes. And it confesses that this expedition has only been defeated
through the watchfulness of the British provincial authorities.

Thirdly. In connexion with these two avowals, the same conspirator says
that he has sent another courier with instructions, which will shortly
be made apparent to the enemies of the insurgents nearer home, which may
possibly mean instructions under which the actors in the piracy and
murder lately committed on board the Chesapeake proceeded in that
criminal enterprise from and returned to the British provinces of New
Brunswick and Nova Scotia.

You will lose no time in laying this information before Earl Russell, and
you will submit to him, as the opinion of this government, that the
proof thus furnished is sufficient to remove all doubt that might yet be
lingering over the objects, character, and designs of the builders of
the steam-rams which her Majesty’s government has recently detained in
the British ports upon your representation.

Secondly. In the opinion of this government, a toleration in Great
Britain, or in those provinces, of the practices avowed by the
insurgents, after the knowledge of them now communicated to his
lordship, would not be neutrality, but would be a permission to the enemies of the United States to make
war against them from the British shores.

Thirdly. It is the opinion of this government that to tolerate in the
British realm or provinces, without some restraint, these avowed enemies
of the United States, while carrying on the hostile practices now
avowed, after the knowledge herein communicated, would not be an
exercise of the unquestioned right of sheltering political exiles, but
would be permitting them to use the British soil and British waters, and
British vessels and armaments, to wage war against a country with whom
Great Britain is at peace.

Fourthly. That in the opinion of this government it is the design of the
confederates in these proceedings to involve Great Britain in a war with
the United States, and, at least, that they have a direct tendency to
produce that evil, which is mutually to be deprecated by both
nations.

Fifthly. This government has borne itself towards that of Great Britain
under these annoyances in the spirit and in the manner that have seemed
best calculated to defeat the wicked design of the insurgents, without
giving cause of offence or irritation to the British people.

Sixthly. That these new difficulties occur most unseasonably, at a time
when the Congress of the United States are considering the question of
legally terminating the so-called reciprocity convention, which
regulates the commercial intercourse between this country and the
British North American provinces—a question of deep interest to the
whole British empire.

The President wishes that he was able to suggest to her Majesty’s
government any adequate remedy for the deplorable state of things to
which I have referred, not inconsistent with the policy that Great
Britain has adopted in regard to this insurrection. But, in the opinion
of this government, that state of things has resulted, although
unintentionally and unexpectedly on the part of her Majesty’s
government, from that very policy itself. The recognition of the
insurgents, without navy, ports, courts, or coasts, as a belligerent
naval power was deemed by them, and by ill-disposed British subjects
conspiring with the insurgents, as an invitation to them to use British
ports, navy, courts, and coasts, to make themselves the naval power they
are acknowledged to be, and yet are not.

Indications of popular favor towards this design of the insurgents are
not wanting in British communities. If we correctly understand
occurrences of the hour, there are not only in the British provinces,
but also in the British realm, and in its very Parliament, many persons
who are engaged in advancing that design, or who at least are pursuing
practices which they must well know necessarily tend to exhaust the
patience of the United States, and to provoke our citizens, in
self-defence, either to seek their avowed enemies within British
jurisdiction, or to adopt some other form of retaliation. It must be
manifest that this government can do nothing more to prevent that design
than it has already done. If it is to be prevented, it would seem that
something further than what has yet been done must now be done by her
Majesty’s government.

After making these frank explanations to Earl Russell in the spirit of
perfect friendliness, and in the most respectful manner, you will for
the present leave the whole subject for his just consideration.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

Extracts from the report of S. R. Mallory,
secretary of the navy of the rebel government.

During the months of July and August I sent twenty-seven commissioned
officers and forty trustworthy petty officers to the British
provinces, with orders to organize an expedition and co-operate with
army officers in an attempt to release the confederate prisoners
confined on Johnson’s island, in Lake Erie. From time to time I
learned that the arrangements made were such as to insure the most
complete success. A large amount of money had been expended, and
just as our gallant naval officers were about to set sail on this
expedition, the English authorities gave information to the enemy,
and thus prevented the execution of one of the best-planned
enterprises of the present war.

In accordance with the order of the president, early in the present
year I despatched several agents to England and France, with orders
to contract for eight iron-clad vessels, suitable for ocean service,
and calculated to resist the ordinary armament of the wooden vessels
of the enemy. These ships were to be provided with arms, and
designed expressly to break the blockade of such of the ports as
were not blockaded by the iron-clad monitors of the enemy. Five of
these vessels were contracted for in England, and three in France.
Due precautions were taken against contravening the laws of England
in the construction and equipment of the vessels. They have been
completed, but owing to the construction of her neutrality law, the
government of England stationed several war vessels at the mouth of
the Mersey, and prevented their departure from England. Subsequently
they were seized by the British government. Another and larger
vessel has since been completed, but it is doubtful if she will be
allowed to leave the shores of England, although it is believed the
precautions taken are sufficient to exempt her from the fate of her
consorts.

The vessels being constructed in France have been subjected to so
many official visitations that I have forwarded instructions to
cease operations upon them until the result of negotiations, now
pending, shall permit our agent to resume work upon them. In this
connexion it is proper for me to state that the great revulsion in
popular sentiment, both in England and France, towards the
confederate government, has rendered our efforts to obtain supplies
from those countries almost abortive. In view of all possible
contingencies, I have instructed the agents of this department to
wait a more favorable opportunity for carrying out the instructions
previously forwarded. By the last courier I sent instructions that
will shortly be made apparent to our enemies nearer home. I do not
deem it advisable to communicate any portion of these plans to your
honorable body at the present time, for reasons perfectly
satisfactory to the president.

Although the operations of our navy have not been extensive, I cannot
overlook the services of Captain Semmes in the Alabama. During the
year he has captured upwards of ninety vessels, seventy of which he
destroyed, the others being either bonded or released. One of the
greatest drawbacks this officer reports having experienced is the
difficulty he now has in procuring full supplies of coal. The
provincial English authorities have hitherto afforded him every
facility, but recently they have interpreted their neutrality laws
so stringently that our war vessels and privateers are much
embarrassed in obtaining suitable supplies.