Letter

M. La Rue Harrison to Samuel R. Curtis, April 1, 1863

HEADQUARTERS POST,

Maj. Gen. SAMUEL R. CURTIS, Commanding Department of the Missouri: GENERAL: Being ordered by Col. W. A. Phillips, commanding this district, to hold myself in readiness to move on Van Buren with my command within the next five days, and having stated fully to him the present ineffective state of the command, and some reasons why I consider such a movement premature, I have thought it not improper to state the same facts to yourself directly, inasmuch as I have been ordered to report to you as well as to the commander of this district. 1st. The state of my command. The First Arkansas Cavalry numbers an aggregate of 1,032 men; probably when all are at the post they may number 850 effective men. They have 154 serviceable horses and 65 unserviceable, all told. The regiment has not received any clothing for three months, and only a very small supply since November, so that a large part of the men are in a destitute condition. The First Arkansas Infantry will number in a few days an aggregate of 830 men; probably 700 of them effective. They are totally without transportation, clothing or tents, or equipments of any kind, except the arms picked up on the Prairie Grove battle-ground, which are of all patterns and calibers. The destitution of clothing is very great, and much suffering and sickness prevails on account of it; besides, it would be a ruinous policy to place this undrilled, barefooted, butternut regiment in the field to be mixed up with and cut in pieces by rebels in the same dress. The First Arkansas Light Artillery numbers 110 men, who are destitute of clothing, and have never received their guns. Of course, nothing can be expected of them; ammunition is scarce; we have only caliber .08 and .69 enough to give an average of 40 rounds to each man; but we have a large number of .54 guns and no ammunition for them, while we could only furnish from 15 to 20 rounds for the .58 guns. The post train is reduced for want of mules from 14 to 4 wagons. Forage must be hauled from King’s River, 45 miles, and trains must be escorted by at least 100 men, and even then the danger of their capture cannot be disguised. A trip seldom is made without a skirmish with guerrillas. There being no brigade train, and no transportation for either infantry or battery, we are obliged to depend entirely for our trains furnished at Springfield, Mo., which thus far we have failed entirely to receive, except a partial supply of subsistence stores, having been at two different times reduced to extrewity on account of the delay in furnishing trains. No quartermaster stores have been sent (except a few brought by the First Arkansas QOavalry train) since I have been at this post, and the reply to all my entreaties is that stores are to be had, but transportation is so scarce that they cannot be forwarded. The state of the country is this: Livingston, with 800 guerrillas, is in Southwestern Missouri, watching for an opportunity to pick up forage and subsistence trains. One or two bands are in Benton County, Arkansas, and on White River, War Eagle, and King’s are several more. A large band frequents Sugar Oreek Bottom, north of Elkhorn, and another Cross Hollows; they fire upon our mail riders and telegraph repairers, and destroy the wire daily; they attack all stragglers from train escorts, and many have been taken to the brush, robbed, and turned loose, while others have been killed. The want of horses has complicated this evil, for I have been obliged to send dismounted es. corts or depend on the Indian Brigade. South of this the rebel bands are scouting the Boston Mountains constantly. Cabell, now in com. mand, has about 1,500 men between Clarksville and Fort Smith, which can be concentrated in a few hours, and they are all mounted on the best of horses. I am obliged to depend mainly on spies for information, though I keep constantly one dismounted scout in the neighborhood of Frog Bayou, Mulberry, or head of White River. Not less than 800 men can saiely be left at this post, and none of them can be mounted, for, in case of a movement, I must take every mounted man with me, and then not have enough to do half the duty that will be required of them. Our line of transportation will be increased, so as to require about eight additional days to each trip. To make a successful movement on Van Buren or Fort Smith, we need no new troops, but supplies of all kinds should be furnished to those already here, and especially should horses enough be had, so that we can furnish quick and effective escorts to our supply trains. I have 800 revolvers in Springfield, which cannot be forwarded for want of transportation, and the repeated requisitions for ammunition have been ignored for the same cause. Could I be allowed to go to Springfield for a few days, I think I might at least manage to get our supplies as fur as Cassville, where in a short time we might get most of them. It is absolutely necessary that some one should see to this matter in person. Will you try and help us? I remain, general, your most obedient servant,

M. LA RUE HARRISON,

Oolonel First Arkansas Volunteer Cavalry, Commanding Post.
Hpars. Dist. WEST. ARKANSAS AND INDIAN TERRITORY,
Editor's Notes
From: Operations in Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, Indian Territory, Pt. 1. Location: Fayetteville, Ark.. Summary: M. La Rue Harrison reports to Maj. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis the poor condition and lack of supplies of his Arkansas cavalry and infantry units, arguing that a planned movement on Van Buren is premature.
Sources
The War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 22, Part 1 View original source ↗