Lorenzo Thomas to Confederatehk Correspondence, Etc, February 3, 1863

Near Vicksburg, February 3, 1863.

DEAR Stig: As it is now proper I will explain to you certain things which I think you ought to know to enable you to understand the history of recent events in connection with the attack on Vicksburg.

General Steele never reported to me his belief that Haines’ Bluff was the true point of attack first to be made. He wrote to General Grant to that effect from Helena by Colonel Grierson, who crossed over to General Grant at Oxford after I had taken my departure; but I know it was the genera] conviction of all military men who studied the maps that an attack on Vicksburg should be made by way of the Yazoo, landing at the first bluff or hard land above its mouth. This was usually styled Haines’ Bluff, but in fact the first high ground touches the Yazoo 2 or 3 miles lower down, at Snyder’s house, and is now known as Drumgould’s Bluff, the same on which the enemy had made his fortifications. I also was of the same impression, and the moment our fleet reached the mouth of Yazoo I repaired on board the flag-ship and there inet Captain Gwin and many most intelligent navy officers, who had been repeatedly up the Yazoo last summer, fall, and winter, up to the hour of our arrival. They described Drumgould’s Bluff as very strongly fortitied; that not only were heavy guns there in position, but earth forts and ritle-pits and a strong force of infantry camped immediately behind at Milldale. The Yazoo, also, was obstructed by a raft; and for3 miles below by a system of torpedoes, one of which had exploded and sunk the Cairo. Even the gunboats could not approach Suyder’s Bluff, much less our frail transports. All agreed that a landing of the troops must

be made lower down, and there was no difference of opinion but that; Johnson’s plantation was the best if not only place to disembark the troops, even if Haines’ Bluff were to be the point of real attack.

I’rom the levee above Chickasaw Bayou where Steele landed all the way up to Snyder’s is an impracticable swamp, passable at only two points, one near Benson Blake’s and the other which Steele attempted, and which he pronounced officially as more difficult than the Bridge of Lodi. There is one small bayou close up to Snyder’s, another a short: distance below, and about a mile below is the large creek called Skillet (Zoliah, and all along the foot of the hills is a swamp and bayou similar co the one we had so much trouble with. At first the enemy expected us there, but when we landed at Johnson’s they of course changed to the points accessible from Johnson’s. They were familiar with every foot of graund, and we had to study it under extreme difficulties. ©

I think that the chances against Snyder’s were better after we had drawn the enemy to the head of Chickasaw Bayou than before. More. over in the interim; Admiral Porter had constructed a prow to one of the rams with which to take up or explode in advance the torpedoes that filled the Yazoo. ._The moment he was willing to attack the batteries at Snyder’s I was ready to co-operate, and, as you say, we made prompt and secret preparations for the attack. General Steele was confident and so was I, and we did not abandon the attempt till the admiral declared it ‘too hazardous.” But an essential feature in the proposed attack on the morning of January 1, 1863, at Snyder’s was a simultaneous attack at Morgan’s front and that of A. J.Smith. At great labor we had brought up four 30-pounder Parrott guns, and had all our field batteries placed according to our then more perfect know!]- edge of the ground and the enemy’s position. I held all ready to begin the moment I heard you engaged at Snyder’s, and I contend we at Chickasaw Bayou could and would have held the infantry force there, leaving the gunboats and Steele’s forces to fight the batteries above at Suyder’s. It is for this reason that I say the military chances were better on the early morning of January 1 than if we had gone with our fleet direct up to Haines’ Bluff on the morning of December 27. We do know the difficulties we encountered, and it may be, as is al: ways the case, that we cannot do as well on the ground as we can figure on paper, but in my mind I know I studied night and day to acquire the most accurate information; that I acted in perfect harmony with the naval squadron, and that I communicated frankly and fully to all division commanders all facts that reached me. I do know that Morgan’s advance was on the true line of attack; that his attack was the signal for all others; that he was full of confidence ; that he knew early on the morning of December 29 of the road by which you returned from the assault; that his entire division was ordered to carry the road and up the hill to the first summit; that your brigade and Steele’s whole division were ordered to support Morgan ; that the pontoon bridge was designed only as auxiliary, so as to enable Morgan to cross a part of his troops by a route where the enemy had made no seeming preparations for resistance.

I know that the Second Division did commence when Morgan opened fire, and I know it occupied large masses of the enemy who otherwise would have encountered Morgan. I know the same of the First Di vision, and that the ground to its front was absolutely impassable to any army except skirmishers; but still Colonel Landram, commanding that brigade, did push his skirmishers through the tangled mass of timber, which I have examined personally, and he did occupy the atten590 WEST TENN. AND NORTHERN MISS. [Cuar. XXIX.

tion of the batteries and troops in Vicksburg. I have observed an im. pression that the road on which A. J. Smith advanced might have been made a line of attack. I tell you no; and I defy any one who saw and examined the obstructions placed there by the enemy to say otherwise.

My calculations were that Morgan’s whole division, supported by Steele’s, could at some considerable loss carry the county road and first hills at Chickasaw, and then a gunboat attack on Snyder’s would be certain of success. We could not have secured a footing at Snyder’s easier than by way of Chickasaw Bayou.

I may be and am too reckless of public opinion, but I am not of my officers and men. I would not have them think or feel that I am reckless of their safety and honor or that I neglect to take every possible precaution against danger or fail to study every means to attain success. I am very careful to obey orders and instructions of my superiors, because I know the importance of it in large combined operations, and I may expect too much of volunteers, who think for themselves and don’t feel the implicit confidence of regulars in their officers. Iam fully aware that General Morgan did not carry to the assault all his division as I expected. I have his official reports, and all are now in the hands of our Government. I know General Morgan’s enthusiasm and devotion to the cause and will not question these, and assume to myself the consequences of failure rather than throw it off on any generous and brave man or set of men.

Failures result from many causes, without a necessity for that bitter vituperation that pulls down rather than builds up. As you remark, we are all engaged in the same cause, which calls for the united action of all, and I think I am in mind as willing to bear and suffer as any one if such forbearance adds one atom to the chances of success in the great national struggle. If at one time I did think you had incautiously dropped expressions which gave a newspaper spy the grounds of accusations against all save those in your brigade and division, I now retract that and assure you of my confidence and respect.

Yours, truly, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

SPECIAL ORDERS, ‘ LAKE PROVIDENCE, LA., No. 6. April 10, 1863.

The officers of the One hundred and ninth Regiment Illinois Volunteers, except those of Company K, having been reported as utterly in competent to perform the duties of their respective commissions, anu evincing no disposition to improve themselves, are hereby discharged from the service of the United States.

This is the regiment which was within a few miles of Holly Springs when attacked by the rebels and failed to march to the support of their comrades, but drew in their pickets and stood ready to surrender. From nine companies 347 men deserted, principally at Memphis, and but 1 from Company K.

To render the men efficient it is necessary to transfer them to a disciplined regiment, and they are accordingly transferred to the Eleventh Regiment Illinois Volunteers, Company K to make the tenth company.

The officers thus discharged are Col. A. J. Nimmo, Maj. T. M. Perrine, First Lieut. C. B. Dishon, regimental quartermaster; Capts. J. O.

Hunsaker, Hugh Andrews, Samuel M. P. McClure, 8. O. Lewis; First Lieuts. James P. McLane, Morgan Stokes, Jacob A. Milikin, Charles Barringer, B. F. Hartline, Josiah Toler, Abram L. Misenheimer, R. B. Bartleson; Second Lieuts. M. A. Goodman, Squire Crabtree, T. T. Robinson, Henry Gassaway, Charles Klutts, Andrew Colvin.

Chaplain P. H. Kroh will, as the regiment has been consolidated, be mustered out of the service.

Surg. John L. Dewey, Asst. Surgs. John W. Henley and George H. Dewey will be assigned by Major-General Grant to other Illinois regiments to fill vacancies.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Adjutant-General.